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or not we, as members of Western states, have moral obligations to admit 
refugees into our countries. This book reframes this debate and shows why 
it is important to think ethically about people who will never be resettled 
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they remain formally excluded from states.
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On September 2, 2015 the body of a three-year-old boy, Aylan Kurdi, 
washed up on the shore of Turkey. The child, and those who died with 
him, including his five-year-old brother, mother, and at least 12 others, were 
refugees from the war in Syria trying to reach the Greek island of Kos. They 
are among the 2600 people who died crossing the Mediterranean Sea in 
2015, and they are among the hundreds of thousands who have recently 
fled conflict situations in the Middle East and Africa and have tried to find 
asylum in Europe. It is now well known that while many people make it to 
Europe after horrific journeys—tortured by police along the way, chased by 
wolves in the night, hunted down by locals with iron bars, suffocated on 
tiny boats—many, like Aylan and his family, do not (Kingsley 2015). Yet the 
picture of this child on the beach seemed to make the numbers real, show-
ing that there are indeed people behind the statistics that are thrown around 
so often. Whether it was because he was nicely dressed or appeared to be 
like a child peacefully napping, Aylan’s picture touched something within 
many people. The picture marked a change in attitudes about the plight of 
refugees from Syria. Many people in the West, including many politicians, 
began to ask questions not only about our legal or political obligations to 
help, but about our moral obligations as well.
It is not a stretch to say that Aylan Kurdi, and the people who died with 
him, are only the tip of the iceberg of the much larger problem of forced 
displacement. Around the world, well over 60 million people live without 
formal state protection and are in the process of waiting for or seeking some 
form of political belonging. The moral question raised by this large group 
is arguably no different than the one raised by the death of one, innocent 
child: what do we owe victims of forced displacement? Or, to put it in terms 
philosophers are more familiar with: what are our moral obligations to refu-
gees like Aylan and other people who are forced to flee their homes in search 
of safety and security? The refugee crisis in Europe that began in the late 
summer of 2015 brought this question to life, so to speak, as many of the 
world’s liberal democracies struggled to balance the humanitarian impulse 
to help with contradicting political values like security and sovereignty. This 
book is an attempt to stand back from this situation and shed some light 
Introduction
2 Introduction
on how we might begin to understand what our moral obligations to the 
forcibly displaced are and how we might be able to ground our obligations 
so that when faced with what seem to be competing demands—nationalism, 
security, the economy—they may nonetheless be taken seriously.
Before going into detail about the problem of forced migration and the 
ethical complexities that surround it, let me briefly summarize the approach 
I present in this book. The specific problem that I focus on has to do with 
how the forcibly displaced are treated during their displacement, while they 
are outside of their home states and have not yet found a state to welcome 
them. More specifically, I am concerned with the problem of large-scale, 
protracted refugee situations and the use of refugee camps to deny the dis-
placed basic rights and political participation, for prolonged periods of time 
(a problem sometimes referred to as encampment). These problems are dis-
tinct from questions about how many refugees a country ought to resettle or 
admit for asylum, which are the more standard questions philosophers and 
politicians have grappled with.
I argue throughout the book that we have a moral obligation to reject the 
policy of long-term encampment as the de facto solution to the problem of 
unwanted and superfluous people in the world. This is not to suggest that we 
should ignore long-term durable solutions such as resettlement; this is an obli-
gation that is compatible with other obligations to refugees in the long-term 
but can be realized independently of them. My claim is that we cannot ignore 
this period when refugees are between states. This is also not to say that refugee 
camps are never appropriate; they may be appropriate in the short term as a 
way to provide emergency aid. The problem is the use of camps as a long-term 
measure for containing the forcibly displaced so that they do not threaten the 
sovereignty of other states. I discuss some of the many problems with refugee 
camps and argue that if, for pragmatic or political reasons, they are going to 
continue to be used to house refugees over the long term, they ought to at least 
meet the level of what John Rawls calls a decent hierarchical society. That is, 
they ought to minimally protect the basic human rights and dignity of their 
residents and allow some form of political participation and accountability 
(Rawls 2001). Currently this does not occur in most refugee camps. Though 
insisting on this minimal level of decent treatment while refugees are between 
homes may turn out to be as difficult as finding long-term solutions, I argue 
that we ought to at least see this as one of the obligations we owe refugees and 
orient our practices and policies towards trying to realize this end.
Though a low bar in most other contexts, when it comes to the treat-
ment of refugees and the displaced, many would consider ensuring this basic 
level of rights, protection, and accountability an unaffordable and unneces-
sary luxury. The reason that the ethical treatment of the displaced during 
their displacement is often ignored is because displacement is assumed by 
most people to be exceptional and temporary. I argue that both of these 
assumptions should be abandoned. Displacement is so much a fact of every 
day political life that far from being exceptional, it ought to be seen as a 
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regular part of global politics. Given that the norm for displacement is now 
17 years, far from being temporary, displacement ought to be assumed to be 
long-term and enduring. The treatment of people during their displacement, 
because it is regular and enduring, not exceptional and temporary, ought to 
be subject to rigorous ethical consideration.
The scope of this book is fairly narrow. The focus is on the moral dimen-
sion of how the displaced are treated between the time of their exile and 
when they are finally able to find a permanent durable solution. This period 
of time is ever growing, and more and more people spend their lives here. 
For the vast majority of people, it is a time characterized by confinement 
and human rights violations. This should not be the accepted norm. We 
ought to be promoting policies and practices that treat the forcibly displaced 
as fully human and with dignity.
§ Chapter Overview
My starting point in Chapter One is that we must take seriously a number of 
very disheartening realities and recognize these as morally salient facts: that 
a population close to that of the United Kingdom—65.3 million people or 
one in every 100 of the world’s citizens—lives more or less permanently out-
side the nation-state system, and no state acknowledges political or moral 
responsibility for this group (UNHCR 2016b). Further, most people, once 
they are displaced from their homes, remain in protracted situations, situ-
ations lasting five years or more; the average length of time a person will 
remain a refugee is 17 years. Finally, less than 1% of official refugees will 
ever be resettled permanently in a new country.
The majority of the world’s refugees remain for years, often decades, 
sometimes generations, in refugee camps or informal settlements. I argue 
that we ought to take seriously the fact that encampment—placing refugees 
in camps or other places where they have little access to resources, rights, or 
protection for prolonged periods of time—has become the de facto way of 
handling refugee situations. This has supplemented and increasingly over-
taken the other “durable” solutions—voluntary return to the country of 
origin (repatriation), local integration in the country of residence or asylum, 
and resettlement in a third country (most often one of the wealthy liberal 
democracies such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and the EU). 
Encampment has become the unofficial solution in the sense that Western 
states and the international community have come to rely on camps as the 
primary way of handling large numbers of displaced people. If you are a 
refugee in the 21st century seeking aid from the international community, 
you are likely to spend your life in a refugee camp or a similar space of con-
tainment, rather than being resettled, receiving asylum, being repatriated, or 
being integrated in your host country.
That encampment is the norm can be seen from the data. In 2014, of 
the 59.5 million people who were displaced from their countries, 126,800 
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people were able to return to their home countries and 105,200 people were 
resettled (data on local integration is not available). What happens to the 
other more than 59.2 million people who were not able to avail themselves 
of one of the official durable solutions? The vast majority continued to live 
more or less outside the bounds of the nation-state system. Roughly 60% of 
refugees move to urban areas with limited aid from the international com-
munity, where 85% live in private accommodation and the remaining 15% 
live in planned and managed camps. The other 40% live in rural areas and, 
for the most part, in some kind of camp setting (either planned/managed 
camps, self-settled camps, or reception/transit camps).1 By some accounts, 
as many as 34 million people live in camps in 125 countries (Esri 2013).
The situation I have just described is sometimes referred to as “warehousing”— 
placing people in camps, dependent on aid, for protracted periods of time so 
that they do not pose problems for neighboring states or have the ability to 
claim asylum in the West. Those who are warehoused in refugee camps are 
usually deprived of the rights that are part of the 1951 UN Refugee Conven-
tion, such as the right to work, run a business, own property, move freely 
within the country of residence, or choose a place of residence. They are not 
provided travel documents that would allow them to move freely and would 
increase their autonomy and ability to care for their families. Refugees living 
in camps are often not permitted to earn their own livelihood and so remain 
dependent on aid, either from the international community or from their 
host states, in a state of enforced idleness. In short, the moral harms of being 
in a refugee camp include a sense of captivity as well as the denial of free-
dom, autonomy, and basic human rights, not merely for short exceptional 
periods but regularly and for extended periods of time.
Not only should we take seriously the reality of life for the forcibly dis-
placed, but we must also take into consideration the current political con-
sensus regarding our moral and legal obligations to refugees: states have 
no legal obligation to resettle refugees or other forcibly displaced people, 
they recognize no moral obligation to resettle refugees, and Western states 
are, for various political reasons, unlikely to resettle large numbers of ref-
ugees. On the contrary, most states feel entitled to exclude refugees, and 
this motivates many of their policies. To be clear, I agree that we have a 
duty to resettle and provide asylum to refugees in a much more robust way 
than we currently do; however, given that we are not likely to realize these 
obligations, it is important to ask what moral obligations flow from these 
circumstances. Given what Western states and their populations regard as 
their interests and as the limits of their duties, large-scale legally mandated 
resettlement is not likely to be a realistic solution to the current and grow-
ing phenomenon of forced displacement. This is in part why it becomes so 
crucial to take this in between period seriously. The primary focus of my 
book is on what can be done within these unjust constraints, that is, what 
can be done in a world in which there will not be extensive resettlement of 
refugees who cannot be repatriated within a reasonable period of time and 
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in which the vast majority of refugees will continue to live outside of a state. 
Because of these conditions, we ought to identify and pay close attention 
to the harms caused by the actual refugee regime and ask what ought to be 
done to address those harms. In this sense, this book engages in non-ideal, 
rather than ideal theory; it asks us to take seriously what morality requires 
of us in actual circumstances, when we cannot meet ideal demands of justice 
(Stemplowska and Swift 2012).
Is it possible to morally evaluate the treatment of the displaced, or should 
they simply be grateful that they are getting any assistance at all? This is 
the subject of this book. I will argue throughout that we can and ought 
to morally evaluate this in between period, this period of limbo where the 
vast majority of the displaced will spend their lives. Living outside of a 
nation-state is no longer an anomaly that can be brushed aside as excep-
tional to contemporary political life; it has in many ways become a standard 
way of living for millions of people, and will increasingly be so in the future.
For many in the West, the primary moral question about refugees has 
to do with whether we have a moral obligation to admit them into our 
states, either through resettlement from refugee camps or through claims 
of asylum, and if so, how many. This was, for example, one of the first 
questions discussed during the refugee crisis in Europe in the late summer 
of 2015. This line of thinking is obvious in many ways—the refugees who 
managed to make the harrowing journey to Europe demanded, after all, 
residence, rights, and the ability to move around freely in search of work 
and to be reunited with family. The moral question about whether or not we 
have moral obligations to admit refugees and asylum seekers—sometimes 
referred to as the ethics of admission—is also the primary focus of much 
normative philosophical analysis, which I examine in detail in Chapter Two. 
Yet I argue in this chapter that we ought to expand the moral approach we 
take to this issue and not focus exclusively on the ethics of admission. I sug-
gest that philosophers have been overly focused on the moral obligations 
of liberal democracies to admit or exclude refugees, and have not given 
sufficient moral consideration to the treatment of the displaced who will 
not be resettled. I argue throughout the book that we have obligations to 
ensure that the displaced live dignified lives while they are awaiting a more 
permanent solution. This obligation can be realized independently of any 
responsibilities we may have to resettle refugees.
One of the ways that I argue for an increased focus on the morality of 
how we treat the displaced while they are displaced is by arguing for a 
more nuanced understanding of refugees and forced displacement. In par-
ticular, I argue in Chapter Three that displacement—being forced outside 
your country of citizenship and denied political belonging in your state of 
residence—entails two distinct harms that must be analyzed separately. The 
first harm is legal/political—the loss of a political community and a legal 
identity in the form of citizenship. But in addition to this, statelessness entails 
an ontological deprivation, that is, the loss of something fundamental to a 
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person’s humanity. Using the work of Hannah Arendt, I show that taking 
seriously the ontological deprivation of statelessness has important conse-
quences for how we think about our moral obligations.
If the only harm of statelessness is the political or legal harm that comes 
with a loss of citizenship, and the only way to rectify this is through resettle-
ment in Western states, then we must acknowledge that the vast majority 
of the displaced will remain untouched by our moral discourse, since only a 
small percentage of the 65.3–72 million people who are displaced “count” 
as refugees and are thus eligible for resettlement.2 However, if we take seri-
ously the ontological deprivation as a distinct form of harm, other ways 
to address the situation become more evident (I discuss examples such as 
economic integration, disaggregated citizenship, increased political partici-
pation, and temporary local integration throughout the book). Addressing 
the ontological deprivation of statelessness may require that we think about 
ways that the forcibly displaced may be able to keep a meaningful political 
identity and resist a reduction to bare life, even though they may be for-
mally bereft of citizenship or political membership. Once these two sets of 
harms are pulled apart, we will see that even though we have had limited 
success in addressing the former harm (i.e., by resettling stateless people in 
new political communities), there are nonetheless other ways to address the 
second kind of harm, the ontological deprivation. Refugee policy, supported 
by Western states, ought to be concerned with addressing the ontological 
deprivation of statelessness, and not merely the political harm.
To further this argument, I suggest in Chapter Four that the harms of 
the refugee regime must be understood from two different points of view. 
On the one hand, there are many direct injustices that we contribute to, 
such as our policies that make it difficult for legitimate asylum seekers to 
claim asylum and the violation of the legal norm of non-refoulement. Yet we 
should also see some of the injustices from a different perspective. I argue 
that many of the injustices associated with the refugee regime ought to be 
understood as structural injustices. Structural injustices are not necessarily 
the result of deliberate wrong-doing or explicitly unjust policies, but are 
the unintentional outcome of the actions of different agents each working 
for their own morally acceptable ends. That the displaced are often forced 
to live in squalid camps that systematically violate their human rights for 
decades is clearly a moral injustice; yet this injustice is not usually the result 
of the deliberate policies of a given state intended to harm the displaced nor 
the result of ill intentions on the part of international agencies. It arises as 
a result of different sovereign states acting in their own best interests. Yet it 
is still an injustice. Seeing encampment as a structural injustice allows us to 
not get lost in questions of moral culpability and focus instead on remedy-
ing the injustice.
Yet thinking of encampment as a form of structural injustice brings its 
own challenges. In particular, it’s much harder to place responsibility if a 
harmful outcome is not the result of the deliberate actions and intentions 
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of an individual. It calls for a new understanding of responsibility, one that 
I develop by drawing on the work of Iris Young, David Miller, and Thomas 
Pogge. I argue that we ought to move away from linking responsibility 
with our actions and instead, we ought to think about ways that we may 
be remedially responsible for an unjust outcome. We ought to understand 
our responsibility for global displacement as remedial in the sense that we 
are responsible for fixing the problem in front of us because of the various 
ways we are connected to the situation, even though we did not directly 
cause it. Remedial responsibility demands that we expand the way we think 
about our connection to global displacement and the refugee regime.
To summarize, in Chapter One, I address the harms created by the current 
arrangements of the refugee regime and the background political constraints 
that make their elimination so difficult. The actual experience of being a 
refugee in the 21st century is very different from what most people assume 
that it is, and I devote much of this chapter to describing and analyzing this. 
In Chapters Two and Three, I look at two philosophical approaches to our 
moral obligations to the forcibly displaced. In Chapter Two I give an over-
view of the Anglo-American normative framing and approach through dis-
cussing the work of six contemporary philosophers. I argue that though this 
approach is helpful in many ways, it does not pay sufficient attention to the 
harms I describe in Chapter One, namely the encampment and warehousing 
of refugees. In Chapter Three I take up the perspective of continental phi-
losophy through the work of Hannah Arendt, and argue that we ought to 
take seriously the ontological deprivation that comes with being a refugee. 
In this chapter, I present a different perspective on the harms caused by cur-
rent arrangements and what is needed to remedy those harms, even if it is 
not possible to eliminate them entirely because of the background political 
constraints. I argue that both the normative and continental approaches are 
necessary to understand the ethics of forced displacement. In Chapter Four 
I take up the pressing political question of who is responsible for the harms 
experienced by refugees and who must address them. I argue that some of 
the harms of the refugee regime must be understood as structural injustices, 
injustices for which Western states can be held remedially responsible. Over-
all, these four chapters serve to establish how we ought to approach the 
ethics of forced displacement in the 21st century and will, I hope, shed some 
light on what we owe to refugees and the forcibly displaced.
To connect my claims with the recent refugee crisis in Europe, we can say 
that on my view the moral obligations of, say, the United States, to Syrian 
refugees are not exhausted by resettling 10,000 refugees, even though this 
may seem like a large number to some and an insignificantly small number 
to others. We must continue to ask: and what happens to the other 5 mil-
lion people from Syria who have been displaced by the war? Under what 
conditions will they be forced to live and for how long? Even if we are not 
willing to resettle more refugees through formal resettlement programs, we 
are still obliged to ask this question, and the answer to it may require that 
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we substantially increase our funding to the UNHCR and countries that 
host refugees; lobby and encourage other countries to resettle more refu-
gees; come up with other ways to aid refugees who we are not willing to 
resettle, such as through temporarily legal protection statuses or through 
increasing various kinds of visa programs (student, work, and humanitar-
ian); and expand family reunification. We ought to provide oversight of 
refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan and insist that these states 
not violate the human rights of refugees; our aid to these countries ought to 
be contingent upon their upholding the human rights and dignity of the dis-
placed. We must be concerned with our ethical obligations to the millions of 
people who will never be resettled in the West and will spend decades living 
in refugee camps that are supported, at least in part, by the policies of our 
states. Philosophers, I suggest, must move beyond their focus on resettle-
ment and must morally challenge the practices of containment and control 
currently exercised over millions of displaced people that are neither inevi-
table nor politically necessary. We ought to challenge states to work towards 
building a more just refugee regime, one that takes seriously the full human 
rights of the displaced (not merely their survival needs).
This book is not an attempt to solve any of the many complex political 
and economic problems that surround forced displacement. I have little to 
say about how we change our current practices or how we overcome xeno-
phobia and fear of the other. As Carens has pointed out, it is important to 
figure out what is “right in principle before moving to the question of what 
we should do in practice” (Carens 2013, 201). While this book is not about 
solutions, I hope it will help us to find better ways to deal with the growing 
phenomenon of forced displacement and provide a stronger ground for our 
ethical obligations to the forcibly displaced.
Stephen White wrote that there are two kinds of political theory, “world 
revealing” and “action guiding” (quoted in Brown 2011). My book aims 
for the former, while perhaps only secondarily achieving the latter. In other 
words, it is my hope that my book is not read as a book of refugee policy. 
Rather, I hope this book is “world revealing” in that it makes the moral 
dimension of displacement clearer to theorists and others concerned with 
this topic. I agree with Brown that asking “what is to be done” is not the 
only important task of normative theory. However, I disagree with him that 
“the search for some kind of morally satisfying general theory which will 
delineate our duties to and responsibilities for refugees is almost certainly a 
waste of time” (Brown 2011, 166). The task of articulating our duties to ref-
ugees is a worthy one, one that many philosophers have made great strides 
in. I see my book as one that would complement other research on this topic 
by making clear the problems refugees experience and the ways they have 
been historically ignored or assumed to be inevitable. While I do argue that 
we have a set of obligations to the forcibly displaced, I by no means intend 
to suggest that these are our only obligations or that if we fulfill them the 
problems around displacement will disappear.
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§ Methodology
Methodologically speaking, I move between two ways of doing philosophy 
and use methods traditionally associated with both continental and analytic 
philosophy. I am critical of some analytic normative theory around refugees 
because I argue that it artificially excludes the lived experience of the forc-
ibly displaced. I try to show in this book that analytic philosophers work-
ing on theories of immigration and refugees would benefit from the more 
phenomenological description of displacement that is provided by Arendt, 
Agier, and Agamben. Phenomenology seeks to unearth the lived experience 
of refugees from within the larger context. With this deeper understanding 
of the meaning of statelessness and the kind of harm it engenders, we are 
in a better position to understand our obligations to people in this situa-
tion (regardless of how they are legally defined). By contrast, the phenom-
enologists I analyze do not grapple with the concrete political situation and 
come up with meaningful normative claims about what we—as a country 
or as a global community—ought to do to address this as a political prob-
lem. There are broad injunctions, but these are not made concrete. This is 
why the normative analytic approach is essential. But the two must work 
dialectically so that the phenomenological and the normative perspectives 
mutually enrich each other and ultimately help us to move towards a deeper 
understanding of our moral obligations to these most vulnerable of people.
In addition to both of these methodologies, another methodological prin-
ciple I hold is the importance of interdisciplinary and empirical research. 
Thomas Pogge showed why it is important for philosophers to take seri-
ously empirical work. He argued that John Rawls has an inadequate view 
of our moral obligations to the global poor because he misunderstands the 
causes of global poverty (believing that they are purely domestic and not 
connected to the global international order). In other words, for Rawls, an 
inadequate empirical view of poverty led to a moral error (Pogge 2004). 
Likewise I want to suggest that theorists of displacement sometimes misper-
ceive the problem. When one thinks that the political problem is that mil-
lions of refugees want to get into countries in the West, the most important 
moral question is whether or not to let them in, and how many refugees 
morality requires us to admit. Refugees are perceived to be a problem for 
affluent democratic states. Yet most refugees have little hope of admission 
to a Western state, and it is not entirely clear that this is even the solution 
they would prefer (Aleinikoff 1992).3 I incorporate empirical research on 
both the phenomenon of global displacement as well as the refugee regime 
in the hopes that it will lead to a better moral assessment of our obligations.
§ Two Points of Clarification: Who are “We”  
and Who are “Refugees”?
Since I am arguing about our moral obligations, it is important at the outset 
to clarify who I am referring to here. Who is it precisely that has the moral 
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obligations that I’m discussing? That is, who is the “we” that I am speaking 
about? The states that I believe these obligations are most applicable to are 
Western liberal democracies. The reasons for including these countries—and 
not, say, China, India, or Brazil—are both historical and theoretical. His-
torically, it is Western states that have dominated the global refugee regime, 
in terms of creating global covenants, defining practices, and funding vari-
ous institutions. They are also the countries which, by and large, resettle 
refugees. As I show throughout the book, Western states in many ways set 
the terms and policies around the refugee regime. Further, Western states 
in general and the US in particular are the primary funders of the refugee 
regime and thus have the power to influence how their money is spent.
More theoretically speaking, these are the countries whose self-identity 
is bound up with certain moral categories. Western states like the US and 
Canada see themselves as founded on moral principles such as equality, 
human rights, and justice. Showing that their practices are out of line with 
their purported values is significant. Similarly, Carens directs his arguments 
on moral obligations around immigration to people “committed to demo-
cratic principles,” “the broad moral commitments that underlie and justify 
contemporary political institutions and policies throughout North America 
and Europe,” such as the equal moral worth of all human beings and equal-
ity under the law (Carens 2013, 2). For citizens of these states, there is broad 
moral consensus about certain ethical principles that can, I believe, serve 
as a ground for thinking about our obligations to the displaced. Countries 
which have never claimed to be founded on these moral principles may sim-
ply reject the notion that they have obligations to those outside their states. 
While all signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention have the legal obliga-
tions that they formally agreed to, my analysis suggests that those states that 
have a vested interest in seeing themselves as upholding justice and that are 
committed to broader moral principles, such as universal human equality 
and dignity, ought to reconsider the moral, as opposed to legal or political, 
obligations that they have.
A second and connected question is, who precisely am I talking about 
when I talk about refugees and the forcibly displaced? In current political 
dialogues, the term refugee is used in a variety of ways, and there is little 
consensus about to whom the term ought to refer.
Indeed, one of the most charged political questions is how to distinguish 
a genuine refugee—somebody who is fleeing political persecution—from an 
economic migrant—someone who has left their home in order to improve 
their economic situation.4 The former group is thought, by many, to be 
deserving of help, while the latter, for the most part, is not. Though the 
definition of a refugee has little bearing on whether or not a particular 
individual is allowed to enter a refugee camp, there are other important 
implications. First, only those people a state considers to be genuine refu-
gees are entitled to the legal protections that refugee status confers both in 
international law and in most domestic law systems, such as the right to 
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non-refoulement when claiming asylum, as well other benefits and services.5 
Only people who meet a state’s definition of a refugee will have their asylum 
claims accepted and be considered for resettlement from a refugee camp. 
Second, there is an important sense in which those who are considered to 
be refugees are afforded more sympathy and concern than those who are 
considered to be “just” economic migrants or fraudulent refugees. As Shac-
knove has pointed out, the concept of a refugee “has little intrinsic content” 
and has come to mean any subset of forced migrants who are considered 
worthy of preferential treatment (Shacknove 1993, 518). To be a refugee 
is to be worthy of sympathy and compassion, and thus it’s important for 
generating support for state or privately sponsored humanitarian aid, both 
in the aftermath of a crisis and in the long term.
The final reason the definition of a refugee is important is because of the 
negative effects on those who are denied this categorization. Denying people 
refugee status can be profoundly destructive to individual lives. When an 
individual is displaced from her home and denied asylum or refugee sta-
tus, the individual may be placed in one of the many negative categories 
that people seeking legal protection, national or international, receive: 
rejected,6 expelled, false refugee, detained, illegal. People in these admin-
istrative categories simply have no state or international agency willing to 
recognize them as members or to protect their human rights.7 They are in 
a unique state of vulnerability. It of course makes it easier to justify ignor-
ing long-term encampment and the deprivations of human rights in refugee 
camps once individuals or groups have been placed in one of these negative 
categories. We ought to take seriously the power that comes with categori-
zation and the consequent harms that come with being denied refugee status 
(see Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
Though the moral question of who a refugee is and hence who ought to 
be eligible for special protection is far from settled, I argue that we ought 
to interpret the term as broadly as possible. For the sake of this book, I am 
interested in looking at all displaced people, the group that Benhabib defines 
as those who cannot find a state to recognize it as a member and who remain 
“in a state of limbo, caught between territories, none of which desire one to 
be its resident” (Benhabib 2004, 55). I agree with Hannah Arendt that the 
people we ought to be concerned with are all those who are without any 
form of effective citizenship or political belonging, regardless of how they 
are categorized legally, since they “belong to no internationally recognizable 
community” and are effectively outside “of mankind as a whole” (Arendt 
2003, 150). Morally speaking, we must be able to include all people in 
this situation into our theorizing so that less privileged subsections do not 
get ignored. As Chris Brown notes, though philosophers of all persuasions 
agree that legitimate refugees should be helped, they have very little to say 
“about the much larger group of individuals who are not technically flee-
ing a well-founded fear of persecution . . . but who are equally worthy of 
concern” (Brown 2011, 151). Those who have been displaced for prolonged 
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periods of time, usually in refugee camps or in crowded urban spaces, have 
often failed to be recognized either morally or politically.
In this sense, my use of the terms “refugee” and “forcibly displaced” are 
different from the way the terms are used in international law, but closer to 
how they are used by the UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees. Accord-
ing to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 
Protocol (known as the “Refugee Convention”), a refugee is understood 
as an individual who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is 
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country” (Article 1a). The three key features of this definition 
are that the potential refugee must (i) be individually persecuted, (ii) be per-
secuted on the basis of one of the five reasons given in the definition—race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion, and 
(iii) be outside his home country; that is, he must have crossed an interna-
tional boarder. This definition of a refugee enshrines the idea that political 
persecution of a certain kind has a different moral status than other forms of 
harm and as such, entitles an individual to greater international protection.8 
This is the definition of a refugee that is widely used to determine whether a 
person is eligible for resettlement in a country such as Canada, the US, and 
Australia.
This definition is intentionally narrow and meant to exclude many cat-
egories of forcibly displaced people. Those who are fleeing generalized vio-
lence, war, or extreme poverty are generally, though not always, excluded.9 
To be resettled in the US, not only do you have to meet the terms of the 
Convention definition,10 but you must also be of “special humanitarian con-
cern to the United States.”11 Australia and the EU also have very restrictive 
interpretations of who counts as a genuine refugee or asylum seeker. States 
are at pains to exclude “economic migrants,” people who leave their home 
countries as a matter of choice, not necessity, from all definitions of a refu-
gee. Much bureaucracy and financial resources go into making sure that 
economic migrants are not allowed to enter as fraudulent refugees. While 
this is understandable—after all, the global refugee regime is not intended 
to be a solution to global poverty—the distinction is often hard to maintain. 
At the extreme, those fleeing extreme poverty and insecurity often experi-
ence as much of a threat to their lives as those fleeing political persecution. 
Nonetheless, the distinction between economic migrant and refugee is one 
that all states are committed to enforcing.
The UNHCR takes a much broader view of refugees12 and includes 
under its mandate, in addition to those who would be recognized accord-
ing to the Convention definition, all people who are considered “persons in 
refugee-like situations” (UNHCR 2014b, 44).13 People in a “refugee-like” 
situation are people who face the same risks as refugees but who are unable 
to gain refugee status “for practical or other reasons” (UNHCR 2014b, 
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44). The UNHCR will also consider people who are fleeing en masse as 
a result of war or generalized violence to be “prima facie” refugees (Jack-
son 1999).14 The UNHCR also extends protection to Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs)—people who have been forced to leave their homes as a result 
of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights, or natural or human-made disasters, but who have not crossed 
an international border—only when they emerge from conflict situations 
(UNHCR 2014b, 44).15
A number of philosophers are sympathetic to this more expansive under-
standing of refugeehood (Shacknove 1985, Gibney 2004, Ferracioli 2014). 
Carens, for example, has argued for a wider interpretation of the term. He 
argues that the Refugee Convention embodies a misplaced set of priori-
ties when it insists that a refugee must be deliberately targeted. He writes, 
“what is most important is the severity of the threat to basic human rights 
and the degree of risk rather than the source or character of the threat” 
(Carens 2013, 201). He endorses a more flexible and generous reading of 
the Refugee Convention and argues that we ought to use the term refu-
gee in the more expansive way that the UNHCR has come to define the 
term, as people who are outside their own countries and unable to return 
“owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or 
freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing 
public order” (quoted in Carens 2013, 201). Though more expansive than 
the Convention definition, it would still exclude people who might make a 
claim on states on the grounds of the “ordinary inequalities of the modern 
world” (Carens 2013, 195).16
It is this more robust understanding of refugees that I use throughout 
this book. As stated above, I believe we ought to consider the treatment of 
all displaced people, all those who cannot find a state to recognize them 
as a member and spend long periods of time outside of the nation-state 
system. Though the restrictive Convention definition is understandable 
politically—the fewer refugees eligible for aid and resettlement, the easier 
a state’s job is—it is not morally defensible since it fails to include all those 
who may not be technically fleeing a “well-founded fear of persecution” 
but are equally vulnerable and without state protection. It is only with this 
more expansive understanding of refugees and forced displacement that we 
can begin to see the many harms associated with the current refugee regime, 
such as prolonged displacement and encampment.
To reiterate a point made earlier, the goal of this book is neither to pro-
vide solutions to the problem of refugees nor to put forth policy prescrip-
tions for how an individual state ought to handle the issue. I do not attempt 
to provide answers for how to bridge the wide gap between what we ought 
to do in theory and what can be done in practice. What I hope this book 
will achieve is a broadening of how we think about both the problem of 
displacement and the role that we, as members of Western states and sup-
porters of the international community, play in the harms that the displaced 
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experience. With a better understanding of the problem, both politically and 
philosophically, and with an alternative way of thinking about responsibil-
ity for such complex global injustices, I hope that we will be able to agree 
upon better ways to treat the displaced, ways that protect their fundamental 
human dignity and are consistent with the liberal commitments to justice, 
equality, and fairness.
Notes
 1 There is still a fair amount of uncertainty about where the displaced go. In 2014, 
the exact accommodation type for 17% of the world’s refugees was unknown 
(UNHCR 2014, 41).
 2 While the UNHCR considers 65.3 million people to be forcibly displaced, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies considers 
72 million people to be in this situation. The ICRC’s figure encompasses people 
who are displaced within their home countries and who have crossed borders 
due to conflict, repression, persecution, disasters, environmental degradation, 
development projects, poverty, and poor governance. Importantly, it does not 
include “economic migrants,” people who choose to leave their countries to 
pursue economic opportunities, but only people who “are forced to leave their 
homes due to events beyond their immediate control” (International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2012, 14).
 3 Aleinikoff thinks it is at least possible that the displaced would prefer some kind 
of temporary status that would allow them to eventually return home, rather 
than admission to a third country like the US. But as he points out, the displaced 
are rarely consulted about their needs or desires, or what solutions they think are 
best (Aleinikoff 1992).
 4 For example, even though the ICRC uses the term “forced migrants” very 
broadly, even they exclude economic migrants. They use the term “forced 
migrants” to refer to refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons, others who 
flee conflict, repression, and persecution, as well as those displaced due to disas-
ters, environmental degradation, development projects, poverty, and poor gov-
ernance, who are displaced within their home countries or who have crossed 
international borders, but not those who move voluntarily to seek economic 
opportunities (ICRC 2012).
 5 In the US, for example, benefits and services for refugees include direct assistance 
programs (for up to eight months from arrival), as well as social service pro-
grams that help refugees find employment, become self-sufficient, and achieve 
social integration (for up to five years). Refugees are eligible for citizenship after 
a certain period of time and are then able to resettle family members still living 
abroad.
 6 As Agier notes, the “rejected” is one of the most rapidly growing groups of 
displaced people. It is a term that refers to people who are held to be in a coun-
try illegally because their claims to asylum have been denied, which effectively 
criminalizes their displacement (Agier 2011).
 7 The same individual may occupy a different classification over a period of a few 
years or even a few months. A Liberian displaced person became a refugee if he 
fled to a UNHCR camp in Guinea, then illegal if he left to work in a different 
part of the country. If he fled to France he would become a detainee before being 
registered as an asylum applicant (with a 90% chance of becoming a rejected). 
If he is rejected, he will be taken to the border and detained or expelled. If he is 
not detained or expelled, he will be considered a non-expellable irregular, which 
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is also referred to as a sans papier in France or tolerated in Poland (Agier 2011, 
33). All of these statuses leave the individual in a situation of political limbo and 
vulnerability.
 8 Refugees are distinct from asylum seekers. An asylum seeker is someone who 
claims he or she is fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution but whose claim 
has not yet been definitively assessed. The country in which an asylum seeker 
first lands has legal obligations to determine their status, and if they are deemed 
legitimate, the state must grant them legal residence. By contrast, a refugee is 
usually granted this status by the UN in a “third-party” country that has agreed 
to host the refugees temporarily. Morally speaking, should it matter where a 
person is located when they make their claims for help? Some writers, such as 
Joseph Carens, argue that we have a stronger obligation to asylum seekers since 
they are already within our borders and are better able to receive help from us 
(Carens 1992). Others, such as Peter and Renata Singer, think that there is no 
moral difference between refugees and asylum seekers and that we ought to help 
them equally. Consequently, in their view, policies that favor asylum seekers over 
refugees ought to be deemed illegitimate (Singer and Singer 1988).
 9 The Organization for African Unity has, since 1969, used a more expansive 
definition of refugees to avoid this exclusion. According to their definition, a 
refugee may include anyone who is forced to flee their home countries “owing to 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturb-
ing public order” (1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa).
 10 In the US, the legal definition of a refugee comes from the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 101(a)(42), which defines the term “refugee” as: “(A) any 
person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of 
a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because 
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 
or (B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as 
defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within 
the country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no 
nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and 
who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. The term “refugee” does not include any person who ordered, incited, 
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion. For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has 
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who 
has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for 
other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to 
have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a 
well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or 
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to 
have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.”
 11 http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees. The US uses the 
term “special humanitarian concern” to help distinguish those who “from 
among the millions of people termed ‘refugees’ will have access to the USRAP” 
(U.S. Refugee Admissions Program). The USRAP has a priority system to deter-
mine who fits into this category. Priority 1: Individual cases referred to the 
program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement; 
16 Introduction
Priority 2: Groups of cases designated as having access to the program by virtue 
of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement; Priority 3: Individual 
cases granted access because they have immediate family members in the United 
States who were resettled as refugees or granted asylum in the United States and 
whose nationality is currently eligible for processing as refugees to allow family 
reunification (Department of State 2006).
 12 While the UNHCR’s mandate includes all people “of concern,” including per-
sons who are forcibly displaced (refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, etc.), those who 
have found a durable solution (returnees), as well as stateless persons (those who 
lack formal legal status within their countries of residence, most of whom have 
never been forcibly displaced), this is not synonymous with the 65.3 million 
forcibly displaced persons. This number includes refugees and IDPs, including 
those beyond UNHCR’s mandate (such as the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees) 
but excludes returnees and stateless persons.
 13 It also includes individuals who are granted complementary forms of protection 
and those enjoying temporary protection in a country. The concept of “comple-
mentary protection” refers to those people who do not qualify for protection 
under refugee law but are given some kind of other protection under national, 
regional, or international law.
 14 They do so because in many situations, such as the current Syrian civil war, it 
is virtually impossible to assess individual situations, and the general circum-
stances are well known. “UNHCR’s long-held position is that people fleeing the 
indiscriminate effects of conflict should be generally considered as refugees if 
their own state is unwilling or unable to protect them” (UNHCR 2014a, 23).
 15 This is important since it excludes many of the people who experience housing 
insecurity due to poverty. For example, people who are forcibly evicted from 
slums would not count under this rubric. See Weinstein (2014).
 16 Similarly, Ferracioli has argued that the Refugee Convention suffers from its 
“under inclusiveness” because it limits international assistance to those who suf-
fer political persecution, and this excludes large numbers of vulnerable people 
(Ferracioli 2014, 125). Her examples are a Somali farmer and her children who 
migrate because of severe drought, or an Iranian homosexual who experiences 
persecution because of his sexual orientation; in both cases, they would not 
quality for asylum. She argues that we need a more robust refugee protection 
regime so that it includes those who have a moral right but not yet a legal right 
to asylum.
The state of forced displacement today is historically unprecedented. Not 
only is a sizable proportion of the human population residing outside of a 
formal political community, but many people who find themselves in this 
situation are here for close to a generation, confined to camps or other 
spaces of containment that, by their very definition, impose restriction on 
rights, freedom, and autonomy. This situation and how we ought to respond 
to it—that is, large-scale, protracted refugee situations and encampment—is 
the subject of this book. It has not, I believe, been treated with the moral 
seriousness that such a fundamental and systematic degradation of human 
dignity ought to be. The goal of this chapter is to understand how we have 
arrived at this situation, why it is not given the moral and intellectual scru-
tiny that other global injustices have received, and ultimately, how we may 
develop a more meaningful normative framework in the future.
There are somewhere between 65.3 and 72 million people who live effec-
tively outside of the protection of their home states and do not belong in any 
meaningful sense to a political community or have effective access to rights 
or state protection.1 To put it another way, a population almost the size of 
the United Kingdom—one in every 100 of the world’s citizens—lives more 
or less permanently outside the nation-state system, and no state acknowl-
edges individual political or moral responsibility for this group. Of those 
the UNHCR considers to be people they are responsible for,2 40% live in 
refugee camps, where “host governments and humanitarian actors provide 
assistance and services in a centralized manner. The defining characteristic 
of a camp, however, is typically some degree of limitation on the rights and 
freedoms of refugees and their ability to make meaningful choices about 
their lives” (UNHCR 2014b, 4).3 Further, once displaced, the average length 
of time that people remain in this situation is 17 years (UNHCR 2006), 
and two thirds of refugees live in protracted situations (US Department of 
State 2015).4 Less than 1% of official refugees are likely to ever be resettled 
permanently in a third country, and thus the number of de facto refugees 
(people who are in a refugee-like situation but who fail to meet the criteria 
for a refugee as found in the Refugee Convention) who will be resettled is 
even more insignificant (UNHCR 2015).5
1 The Moral Significance of the 
Refugee Regime
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This chapter will proceed as follows. I start with a detailed examination 
of the refugee protection regime and the different normative obligations that 
states have to refugees. I then discuss the way that thinking about solutions 
to the problem of refugees has evolved, from resettlement to repatriation to 
containment. I suggest that there is a moral ideal that underlies our reliance 
on containment: the belief that repatriation (that refugees should be sent 
back to their home countries) is the best solution goes hand in hand with a 
belief that refugees and asylum seekers ought to be contained and controlled 
until this becomes possible; containment is tacitly justified as an unfortunate 
but necessary step to achieve this higher good. I then give a detailed expla-
nation of how encampment—the containment and confinement of the dis-
placed, often for prolonged periods and in ways that undermine their dignity 
and human rights—functions as the de facto “fourth” durable solution and 
explain in detail why this solution is so problematic, paying particular atten-
tion to the ways that basic human rights are violated in camps. Though it 
seems removed from Western foreign policy, I shed light on some ways that 
Western states support encampment both directly and indirectly.
My analysis shows two important facts which, I argue, ought to play 
a larger role in our thinking about the ethics of refugees than they cur-
rently do. First, encampment or containment has become the de facto fourth 
solution for involuntary migrants, one that many are reluctant to acknowl-
edge. Second, this solution, far from in fact being a real solution for the 
displaced, constitutes a unique harm, one that can and ought to be avoided. 
As a result, encampment ought to be understood as one of the most serious 
global problems today. Though part of our moral failure is that we do not 
resettle enough refugees, another significant problem is that we support a 
refugee regime that systematically undermines the rights of the displaced for 
the sake of protecting our sovereignty, and specifically the right to control 
immigration and citizenship.
Understanding the harms around forced displacement in this way, as well 
as seeing the connection to Western states, forces us to reconsider what we 
owe to the forcibly displaced. I argue that my analysis gives rise to two fun-
damental obligations. First, given the analysis I develop, we have an obliga-
tion to reject long-term encampment as a “solution” for displacement, or 
to reform it so that it is in line with moral principles and protects the rights 
and dignity of the displaced. We must morally challenge the practices of 
containment and control currently exercised over millions of displaced 
people that are neither inevitable nor politically or economically necessary. 
Second, I argue that we have an obligation to work towards a just refugee 
regime, one that takes seriously the full human rights of the displaced (not 
merely their survival needs) as well as the interests of states. Philosophers, 
I suggest, are in a position to provide some moral clarity about how the 
international system in general and the refugee regime in particular ought to 
function, and can help to analyze the ethical norms that ought to govern the 
treatment of involuntary migrants who are displaced for prolonged periods. 
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While I outline these obligations here, Chapters Two, Three, and Four of this 
book develop and strengthen the ground for these obligations. This chapter 
concludes on a hopeful note through observing that international norms are 
at least beginning to change in a direction away from encampment.
Let me address a potential objection at the outset. As of 2015, the major-
ity of forcibly displaced people no longer live in refugee camps, but either in 
urban areas or in rural areas without the assistance of the UNHCR (UNHCR 
2014c). Given this, why focus on the morality of supporting refugee camps 
and policies of encampment? There are several reasons why it is still impor-
tant to focus our moral analysis on refugee camps. First, until very recently, 
refugee camps have been the “assumed foundation of refugee policy,” in the 
sense that this was the first mechanism the UNHCR and other aid organiza-
tions used in their attempts to help refugees (Kagan 2013). As late as 1997, 
the UNHCR considered refugee camps “normal and good, and refugees 
should be discouraged from trying to leave them” (Kagan 2013). A change 
in rhetoric came only in 2009 with their Policy on Refugee Protection and 
Solutions in Urban Areas, in which the focus has started to turn to refugee 
autonomy, rights, and the ability of refugees to support and sustain them-
selves with dignity.6 Though there has been a change in rhetoric around 
the permissibility of refugee camps, they still remain the standard way that 
the international community approaches displacement, and are still widely 
believed to be necessary for security. We need only think of the many camps 
that have sprung up in Europe since the summer of 2015 to handle the 
influx of Syrian refugees to see that camps are still the primary way of deal-
ing with refugees.
Further, when the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies are able to 
help the displaced, it is primarily through camps. Often agencies cannot 
locate or count those in need of help when they are absorbed in urban areas. 
The displaced have to make a decision between receiving aid or maintaining 
their freedom by not registering with the UNHCR. Finally, while 40% is 
no longer the majority, 40% of 65.3 million is still a sizable proportion of 
the human population who is subject to conditions that are morally ques-
tionable and thus still a worthwhile focus of philosophical attention. Since 
the use of camps has only increased in Europe recently, it is fair to say that 
refugee camps will continue to play a role in the treatment of the displaced 
in the foreseeable future.
§ What Is the Refugee Regime?
Protecting refugees and other involuntary migrants is a complex task, 
involving a number of actors and institutions that follow various norms 
and rules, both formal and implicit. Specifically, the “refugee regime” refers 
to “the set of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures that 
regulate states’ responses to refugees” (Betts 2011, 56). It is comprised of 
“a network of states, international organizations, and non-governmental 
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organizations” that “govern those who are forced to flee their homes because 
of fear for their lives” (Barnett 2011, 106). The primary document that 
lays out the structure of the refugee regime is the United Nations Conven-
tion and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (alternatively called the 
Refugee Convention).7 The body that oversees the Refugee Convention, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was created at 
roughly the same time. It is the principle humanitarian agency responsible 
for implementing the Refugee Convention8 and perhaps the most important 
actor in the refugee regime.
Though the UNHCR was created to oversee the 1951 Convention, its 
original mandate was much more limited than the one that has evolved 
over time as the UNHCR’s moral authority grew. In 1951 the UNHCR was 
given a very limited mandate, “a reflection of the states’ desire to limit their 
responsibility” (Barnett 2011, 119).9 At first it was only permitted to aid 
those who became refugees before 1951, and the kind of aid it could give 
was very limited: it could issue travel documents, help refugees to obtain a 
legal status, and advocate for more precise guidelines, but it did not have the 
authority to provide material assistance. It had only a small budget from the 
UN’s general operating budget, and was prohibited from raising or spending 
money without the approval of the UN’s General Assembly (Barnett 2011, 
119). This reflects the almost paradoxical nature of the UNHCR and the 
refugee regime in which it plays a large role. When the UNHCR was cre-
ated in 1951, its mission was to protect refugees and ensure their human 
rights in the absence of a state; it was created from a largely humanitarian 
impulse. Yet it was created in such a way as to not be threatening at all 
to the sovereignty of states or their ability to control membership.10 Over 
time, the UNHCR was able to overcome some of these limitations in part 
because it developed a kind of moral authority regarding refugee issues, and 
in part, because in the wake of post-Cold War refugee crises, the agency was 
expected, and needed, to play an increasingly bigger role in world affairs.
The purpose of the UNHCR, of course, is not just to protect refugees but 
also to find a “solution” to their situation and loss of membership in a state. 
The three “durable” solutions that the UNHCR aimed at were repatriation 
to the home country, integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement 
in a third country. One often neglected detail about the history of the 1951 
Convention is that the drafters imagined that refugees would be integrated 
into the countries of asylum while they waited for a permanent solution, 
rather than being warehoused in camps; they thought that only exceptional 
“hard core” cases would require that the international community main-
tain them in the long term. The UN secretary general in 1950 wrote, “The 
refugee will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them 
shelter. . . . They will be integrated in the economic system of the countries 
of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and those of their 
families” (Smith 2004, 42).
The UNHCR has grown to become a giant institution and works with 
over 740 other international and national NGOs along with other UN 
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agencies like the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the World Health 
Organization, among others (UNHCR 2014a, 27). Despite its scale, it still 
remains dependent on the member states of the UN. The UNHCR is depen-
dent on states both for their funding and for their cooperation in secur-
ing resources, providing security, and hosting and resettling refugees. In 
the view of some scholars, this structural feature limits the potential of the 
UNHCR to help the displaced and advocate for political solutions. That the 
UNHCR should require the permission of host states to carry out its opera-
tions is perhaps not surprising given the importance placed on sovereignty 
at the global level. But the lack of mandatory assessed contributions from 
states that makes the UNHCR wholly dependent on donor states for its 
survival is unusual, especially given that this is unique to the UNHCR of all 
UN organizations. The UNHCR’s entire budget comes from a handful of 
countries, with the US, Japan, and the EU accounting for 94% of all state 
contributions (Loescher 2012, 6). The worry is that because it is dependent 
on so few states, its ability to operate independently is compromised, espe-
cially when it might go against the perceived interests of these states. The 
UNHCR, writes Loescher, “is in no position to challenge the policies of its 
funders and host governments” (Loescher 2012, 6). This is a clear limita-
tion for an institution whose job it is to find political solutions to the global 
crisis of refugees.11
The refugee regime more broadly can be understood as containing two 
sets of normative obligations for states: one set of obligations has to do with 
what states are required to do when asylum seekers arrive on their territory, 
while the other set of obligations has to do with state obligations towards 
those seeking refuge in countries other than their own. One of the distinctive 
features of the refugee regime is the asymmetry of these two sets of obliga-
tions: the former set is much stronger and more widely recognized than the 
latter. Indeed, many claim that there is a relative absence of legal obligations 
by states to protect refugees who are not on their territory.
Most scholars agree that the strongest norm in the whole refugee regime 
is non-refoulement, which is part of the 1951 Convention. This norm holds 
that a state cannot send back a person who has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution. What this has meant in practice is that people who arrive in a coun-
try and claim asylum must be given a hearing before they can be deported. 
Over time, a strong normative and legal framework has developed to sup-
port this norm, and most states, at least in principle, acknowledge its legiti-
macy. As a result, non-refoulement has become a well-accepted principle of 
international law and is the cornerstone of the refugee regime because of its 
wide acceptance. This remains true even though many states have looked 
for loopholes to avoid their obligations to asylum seekers—for example, 
by intercepting asylum seekers before they reach the shore or insisting that 
airlines check visas so that potential asylum seekers cannot land in their 
country. If anything, practices like these show how seriously states take their 
obligations around non-refoulement, since they would rather go to great 
lengths to avoid having asylum seekers arrive on their territory than be seen 
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violating the principle of non-refoulement by deporting them upon their 
arrival.
On the other hand, obligations towards refugees and other involuntary 
migrants not already on their territory are more or less discretionary and 
not based on any clear moral or legal obligation.12 In other words, there 
is no legal obligation in the 1951 Convention or elsewhere which requires 
states to resettle refugees or contribute to their protection. This has had two 
outcomes. First, because there is no obligation on the part of signatories to 
the 1951 Convention to fund the protection of refugees, contributions to the 
UNHCR or other refugee aid agencies are strictly voluntary. As a result, the 
refugee regime is chronically underfunded. The UNHCR is funded almost 
exclusively by a handful of countries, and even though their budget is large, 
it is still inadequate to the job that the UNHCR is supposed to do. In 2013, 
the UNHCR presented a needs-based budget of $5.3 billion dollars (US) and 
received $2.9 billion (US). In other words, it was only able to raise about 
60% of what it estimated was needed (UNHCR 2014a, 26–27). As noted 
above, almost all of the UNHCR’S budget is from 10 donor countries in the 
North, with only 3% coming from the UN’s central budget; the US funds 
30% of their budget (Hammerstad 2011, 252n1). This funding structure 
has meant that the UNHCR has to be particularly sensitive to the needs and 
views of the large donor states in the West, and this has had an effect on 
their policies and practices.13
The second outcome of the absence of moral and legal obligations regard-
ing involuntary migrants is the discrepancy in “burden sharing.” This refers 
to the fact that countries in the Global South play a much larger role in 
hosting refugees than the Western democracies in the North that fund the 
regime; 87% of refugees are hosted in the Global South and less than 1% of 
the displaced are resettled in Western states.14 This is in part because West-
ern states have actively sought to contain refugee flows outside their own 
regions to avoid taking on this burden. “For the most part,” writes Helton, 
“the relatively capable states in Europe and North America seek to contain 
human displacement elsewhere, particularly in Africa” (Helton 2012, 31). 
I return to this outcome in more detail below.
The lack of strong norms or legal obligations around the protection and 
support of involuntary migrants not claiming asylum results in an unequal 
system of burden sharing, where the poorest states host the vast majority 
of refugees while Western states fund the majority of aid to refugees. Some 
in the West believe that because Western states primarily fund the refugee 
regime, they bear the biggest burden for refugee protection. Yet for many in 
the Global South, this is not the case. As the Indian Permanent Representa-
tive to the UN argued, “it has to be recognized that refugees and mass move-
ments are first and foremost a ‘developing country’ problem and the biggest 
‘donors’ are in reality developing countries who put at risk their fragile 
environment, economy and society to provide refuge to millions. An inter-
national system which does not address these concerns adequately cannot 
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be sustained in the long run” (quoted in Gorlick 2012, 81). The day to day 
burden of large scale mass migration is born by developing states, and this is 
due in part to geographical contingency but also to explicit policies by West-
ern states in partnership with the UNHCR that discourage or make difficult 
the movement of migrants to Western countries (policies such as administra-
tive detention, imposition of carrier sanctions, visa restrictions, inspection 
of travelers in foreign airports, use of “safe zones,” as well as other policies 
aimed at “externalizing” borders). While Western states consider large-scale 
refugee flows as a security threat and an unacceptable economic burden, it 
is generally considered not only acceptable but required that developing 
countries take in large numbers of involuntary migrants, despite their lim-
ited resources.
This asymmetry of power is one of the key structural features of the 
refugee regime: the vast majority of the world’s refugees and involuntary 
migrants are in developing countries in the Global South, but because there 
are few legal obligations for Northern states to help refugees not on their 
territory, aid to refugees is discretionary and largely based on how they per-
ceive refugees to be connected to their own interests (Betts 2011). As Betts 
notes, there are two main reasons why states comply with international 
law—reciprocity and legitimacy—but neither of these two reasons are suf-
ficient to motivate Western states to support the protection and resettlement 
of refugees (Betts 2011).15
In Betts’s view, it is these features of the refugee regime that have led to 
the current situation of protracted displacement and long-term confinement 
without access to rights: Northern states have few obligations or incentives 
to help refugees not on their territory, but because of the strength of the 
principle of non-refoulement, they have strong incentives to prevent refu-
gees from arriving on their territory; countries in the Global South lack 
power in the international sphere and consequently have little clout in bar-
gaining and so must take whatever Western states or international organiza-
tions offer them.16
§ History of Solutions: Resettlement, Repatriation, and 
Containment
If the displaced turn out to be unwanted in all sovereign states—countries in 
the Global North do not want them to resettle in their countries and coun-
tries in the Global South which host refugees do not want them to integrate 
permanently—it is perhaps not surprising that we have arrived at a de facto 
policy of containment. This refers to the practice of keeping refugees and 
other displaced people in camps or other forms of temporary housing for 
prolonged periods of time. Refugee camps, while often the best and only 
way to provide aid to large numbers of displaced people in critical, emer-
gency situations, have ended up becoming a de facto long-term solution, 
since millions of people who become displaced will end up spending their 
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lives, sometimes generations, in these spaces. In the section below, I will out-
line how the international community has moved from an attempt to pro-
tect the displaced and from institutions that would substitute for their states 
in terms of protection of human rights, to a more or less de facto policy of 
containment, where the goal is to prevent the displaced from disrupting life 
in the developed world.
The paradoxical nature of state sovereignty is important in understand-
ing how legitimate states can exclude refugees and consequently, how refu-
gees can end up excluded from all political communities. On the one hand, 
sovereignty over admissions and membership is seen by some as the very 
core of sovereignty and essential for the right of self-determination of the 
state.17 From this perspective, states have the right to exclude refugees; the 
right of states to determine membership trumps the rights of refugees, even 
when this means that there is no state that is willing to protect their human 
rights.18 Yet on the other hand, state sovereignty has been justified, since 
Locke, because it is seen as the best way for states to discharge the duty to 
protect individual human rights. This is the normative basis of the state sys-
tem: states can legitimately exercise sovereignty over their citizens because 
the protection of human rights that results from this ultimately makes citi-
zens better off (Betts and Loescher 2011, 6). Refugees and other involuntary 
migrants problematize this because they are individuals who are not under 
the protection of a state, and this “calls into question the legitimacy of a 
system that, in practice, relegates people to the largely unfettered exercise of 
sovereignty of a state over its citizens” (Aleinikoff 1992, 121).19
This helps to explain how we have arrived at the de facto policy of con-
tainment. Because states exercise a sovereign right to control their borders, a 
right that for many is grounded in the state’s obligation to protect the human 
rights of its citizens, they can prevent people from entering in order to claim 
asylum or can fail to acknowledge them as legitimate asylum seekers once 
on their territory. The strong international norm of non-refoulement means 
that states cannot just send individuals back to their home countries when 
they have a genuine fear of persecution. Yet refugees have no state that is 
willing to exercise its sovereignty to protect their human rights and provide 
political belonging. As a result, we “find literally millions of refugees around 
the world languishing in ‘temporary’ arrangement, not forced to return to 
their countries of origin but denied permanent resettlement in countries of 
asylum” (Aleinikoff 1992, 124). How have we arrived at this situation and 
how should the international community respond? Below, I outline the his-
tory of “solutions” to the refugee crisis in the 20th and 21st centuries before 
moving onto the question of how we ought to respond.
There is general agreement that following the Second World War until 
the end of the Cold War, the preferred solution for refugees was resettle-
ment.20 Aleinikoff notes at least three reasons for this: refugees from the war 
could not be asked to return to their war-ravaged countries; because of the 
nature of the Cold War, each side could claim a victory when they welcomed 
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refugees from opposing countries; and Western states believed that refu-
gees would be better off if they resettled in the West (Aleinikoff refers to 
this as “Eurocentric humanitarianism”). Once the Cold War ended, these 
reasons for favoring resettlement lost their force. The end of the Cold War 
also brought about a change in migration patterns. Refugee flows were now 
predominantly from Africa and Asia, rather than Europe, and were con-
nected more to poverty and war than political persecution. The result was 
that people in Asia and Africa fleeing war or severe poverty were not readily 
seen as genuine refugees and, because of their large number, seemed to pose 
a particular threat to Western states. Consequently, the preference for reset-
tling refugees in the Global North shifted towards voluntary repatriation.
In addition to these political circumstances, moral and practical objec-
tions to resettlement were raised, and this contributed to the move away 
from resettlement as the preferred way to secure a permanent solution for 
refugees. The pragmatic argument held that resettlement relieved sending 
states of responsibility for the refugees they created and this might create a 
disincentive for states to address their human rights and security challenges. 
The moral challenge to resettlement held that because membership in one’s 
own state is a fundamental good, people ought to have the ability to return 
to the place where they are from. This idea is rooted in a kind of commu-
nitarianism that takes seriously community and belonging as fundamental 
to the individual. On this view, resettlement cannot be the ultimate solution 
for refugees since it requires that we ignore the fundamental relationship 
between an individual and her original community.21
The rejection of resettlement as the preferred option after the end of the 
Cold War led to a preference for voluntary repatriation as the preferred 
durable solution.22 The preference for repatriation was due, in Aleinikoff’s 
view, to the following reasons: the sheer increase in number of asylum seek-
ers; the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences between asylum seekers 
and inhabitants of Western states; the fact that accepting refugees was no 
longer a way of demonstrating ideological victory as it was during the Cold 
War (Aleinikoff 1992, 130). Morally speaking, repatriation can be under-
stood as a way of returning an individual to her state, and thus restoring the 
relationship between the individual and the state.23 In this way, repatriation 
is a way of removing the challenge to the sovereignty of the host state that 
refugees pose, as well as to the international system as such.
Yet the preference for voluntary repatriation should not be understood 
as strictly altruistic. The preference for repatriation is grounded not only in 
the belief that refugees are better off returning to their home countries, but 
also in the view that large scale migration posed a threat to Western states. 
Western states could justify tighter controls of their borders and policies 
that prevented asylum seekers from reaching their shores with the belief 
that this was ultimately for the good of the migrants themselves, since keep-
ing them closer to their home countries would allow them to be returned 
home sooner. In other words, the belief that the best solution to the refugee 
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problem is that they be repatriated to their home countries went hand in 
hand with a belief that refugees and asylum seekers ought to be contained 
and controlled until this became possible. This can be understood as the 
implicit moral basis for our current policies of containment.
This is why the shift to a preference for repatriation went along with 
various practices of containment, control, and deterrence that made it more 
difficult for refugees and other involuntary migrants to reach the West. Ale-
inikoff refers to these as “source-control measures,” techniques states have 
used to keep refugees in or close to countries of origin (Aleinikoff 1992, 
130). Other source-control measures are implemented with policies such 
as “reception in the region of origin,” “the right to remain,” or “preven-
tive protection”; Roxström and Gibney argue that even “temporary protec-
tion” can be understood as one of many concepts that provide “a battery 
of excuses for keeping refugees away from their territories” (Roxström and 
Gibney 2012, 38). All these practices, however, are justified by states as 
ways to provide better and more efficient humanitarian assistance and on 
the ground that they permit the greatest likelihood of repatriation. In prac-
tice, however, they ultimately serve to justify the containment of refugees in 
spaces far from Western borders and thus protect the sovereignty of West-
ern states. Franke agrees with this assessment arguing, “states funding the 
UNHCR have managed to cultivate a shift in the organization’s ethic from 
one of facilitating resettlement to one largely concerned with containing ref-
ugee flows close to the regions of displacement . . . providing mere humani-
tarian assistance, as opposed to rights protection” (Franke 2009, 317).24
Hammerstad (2011) has argued that the UNHCR has contributed to this 
problem by tacitly agreeing to the fears that states have about refugees as 
security threats. The UNHCR, in an attempt to remain relevant to Western 
states, has treated refugees as a matter of “securitization,” which “denotes 
the process wherein an issue is presented as an existential threat, requir-
ing emergency measure and justifying actions outside the normal bounds 
of political procedure” (Buzan 1998, 23–24, quoted in Hammerstad 2011, 
238).25 The UNHCR tacitly agreed to the view that refugees are secu-
rity threats by helping Western states to ensure that refugees never reach 
Europe through in-country protection and other preventative activities.26 By 
employing the language of security, the UNHCR risked legitimizing Western 
states’ discourse on security to limit refugee rights and asylum protection. 
This also helped to confirm the repatriation thesis—that as a matter of secu-
rity, repatriation was the best option.
What is clear is the way that the humanitarian discourse around repatria-
tion masks what is in fact an assertion of state sovereignty. In the view of 
Aleinikoff, this policy change ought to be understood not as a mere change 
in views about the best way to help refugees; it is a change from a way 
of helping refugees, resettlement, to a way of protecting state sovereignty 
through a discourse which justifies policies of containment and deter-
rence, such as the detention of asylum seekers, visa requirements, closing 
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opportunities for resettlement, etc. “These policies are grounded less in a 
desire to breach the walls of state sovereignty than an attempt to keep Third 
World refugee problems from inconveniencing the developed states” (Ale-
inikoff 1992, 133).
This assertion of state sovereignty might have been morally neutral if not 
for the fact that the repatriation-encampment nexus is very often not in the 
best interests of the displaced and often leads to further human rights viola-
tions (Aleinikoff 1992). Barnett raises the worry that voluntary repatriation 
undermines refugee rights in two ways. First, if refugees are asked to return 
to “less than ideal” conditions, they may be put in danger. Though there 
have been decade-long debates about how to balance refugee rights with the 
goal of repatriation, by the 1990s the UNHCR began to consider repatria-
tion for post-conflict situations that were far from ideal. The idea of “safe 
return” indicated that conditions in home countries did not have to improve 
substantially, but only enough to allow refugees to return home safely, and 
“the UNHCR would make the assessment as to whether conditions were 
safe enough for refugees to return” (Loescher 2012, 10). In other words, the 
safety of refugees did not necessarily outweigh the interests of states or the 
larger goal of conflict resolution. Success was measured by the UNHCR and 
states in terms of repatriation, even when repatriation did not serve the 
interests of refugees. Loescher cites refugees returning from Bangladesh to 
Burma, and from Tanzania and Zaire to Rwanda, as examples of refugees 
being returned to countries that were not sufficiently safe because of pres-
sure from host states (Loescher 2012, 10).
In this process, refugees were rarely, if ever consulted or explicitly asked 
to give consent. In this way, they were denied agency. For Barnett, this lack 
of consent is the second way that repatriation violates the rights of refu-
gees, since it is now a decision the UNHCR makes for refugees without 
their input (Barnett 2011). Refugees’ voices no longer count, as the UNHCR 
claims to know what is in their best interests. This, in Barnett’s view, is a 
violation of the autonomy, and thus dignity, of refugees.
As repatriation came to be seen as the only serious option, other possible 
solutions were ignored. The UNHCR no longer considered other options 
such as local integration, educational programs, income-generating proj-
ects, and other ways to promote refugee participation in the community. 
The “UNHCR essentially ran long-term programs in an emergency mode” 
(Loescher 2012, 10). Further, the dogma around repatriation made it much 
less likely that the UNHCR or states could promote local integration. Coun-
tries of asylum worried that allowing refugees to integrate would make it 
harder for them to be repatriated in the future. Roxström and Gibney refer 
to this as the “integration dilemma”: even though the 1951 Convention 
makes clear that refugee status is always provisional (it ceases to apply once 
the political situation that gave rise to this status changes), states resist the 
provisions that facilitate integration because of the fear that it will deter 
repatriation (Roxström and Gibney 2012).
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Even with this strong preference for repatriation, this durable solution 
has not been able to be used on a scale that would improve the lives of 
the millions of involuntary migrants. To put it in perspective, in 2013, 
Afghanistan was the third most successful country to voluntarily repatriate 
its citizens, with 39,700 people repatriated that year. Yet even with this suc-
cess, there are still over 2 million Afghan citizens living in Pakistan (at the 
end of 2013, Afghanistan was the top country of origin for refugees, with 
2,556,600 refugees and people in a refugee-like situation) (UNHCR 2014a, 
13). So even in a “successful” country like Afghanistan, voluntary repa-
triation does not even come close to providing a genuine solution.27 Since 
the other two durable solutions—local integration and resettlement—have 
benefited even fewer people,28 we must ask what happens to those who 
remain? The answer of course is that the vast majority of forced migrants 
are either contained in refugee camps or dispersed into urban areas in the 
Global South. Containment has thus become the de facto fourth durable 
solution for the majority of the globally displaced, and this fact is either 
overlooked or justified because of the importance placed on repatriation.
§ What Is Containment and Why Is It Problematic?
The containment of refugees, the de facto “fourth” durable solution, is prob-
lematic in a number of ways: refugee camps are ineffective ways to provide 
aid to refugees, they are economically inefficient,29 they are largely terrible 
places to live, and they often make it impossible to uphold the human rights 
of refugees. Though they are justified for several reasons, as I argue below, 
these reasons are not sufficient to override the harm they do to refugees in 
the long term.
First, host states often insist that camps that control the movement of 
refugees are the best way to preserve public order and ensure the safety of 
refugees. Host states are concerned with the potential tension between refu-
gees and local populations, and one way of ensuring peace, in their view, 
is to limit competition for scarce economic resources, such as opportunities 
for employment, by restricting refugees to camps. Further, preventing refu-
gees from settling in communities and participating in the local economy 
makes it less likely that refugees will want to stay once the opportunity to 
leave becomes available (UNHCR 2014c, 4).
Second, camps serve an important bureaucratic function. International 
agencies like the UNHCR are often willing to go along with this because 
camps are seen as the most efficient way to count refugees and distribute 
aid. “The process of attracting donor money relies upon the visibility of the 
refugees, and the possibility of counting them; both are easier when they are 
held in confined space” (Stevens 2006, 66). The UNHCR sees camps as an 
essential part of its operational response to emergency situations because 
they can provide protection and assistance in camps better than when peo-
ple are dispersed. Yet they acknowledge that because camps require limiting 
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the rights and freedoms of refugees, they remain a compromise (UNHCR 
2014c, 4).30 Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, both critical of the UNHCR, note 
that long-term encampment often results from institutional inertia and lack 
of knowledge or experience with other ways of assisting refugees.31
Though these reasons may be justifiable in some circumstances in the 
short term, they do not hold over the long term. Refugee camps often 
become long-term temporary living spaces run in an emergency mode, and 
this is not justifiable based on the reasons given above. Refugee camps 
become a way to keep “people alive in secure containment facilities as if 
refugees are, at least temporarily, surplus humanity” (Franke 2009, 318). 
Below, I outline some of the harms of encampment that further undermine 
the use of camps as a justifiable long-term solution to the problem of forced 
displacement and then explain the role Western states play in supporting 
long-term encampment.
§ Paradox of Precariousness and a Permanent Present32
What precisely is a refugee camp and why is the confinement of displaced 
populations to them for prolonged periods of time problematic? Refugee 
camps are heterogeneous. There are self-organized refugee camps (informal 
camps, ghettos), where refugees live before they can be recognized by the 
UNHCR or where those who do not want to register with the UNHCR live 
indefinitely; sorting and holding centers that often house people for months 
and occasionally years (Woomera in Australia, and Sangatte in France being 
two of the best known);33 and the most iconic spaces, the traditional refu-
gee camps in host countries as well as camps within states the displaced 
are fleeing (camps for IDPs, internal asylum camps34) (Agier 2011). What 
all these spaces have in common is that they are distinct from traditional 
political communities, such as territorially bound nation-states, in the 
following ways.
If there is one feature that can sum up this kind of community, it’s that 
they are precarious regardless of how they are organized or how efficient 
they are. Camps are intended to be temporary and spring up as a response 
to a particular crisis or emergency, with the goal of housing people only 
temporarily. This is why, for example, camps are often built from precarious 
materials that can be put up and taken down with a moment’s notice. The 
precariousness of the refugee camp is thus grounded on its exceptionality, 
that it is meant to be there just as long as the emergency requires. Yet, as I’ve 
previously discussed, camps often endure for years, decades, and sometimes 
generations. This is why Agier claims that refugee camps have a “permanent 
precariousness” (Agier 2011, 13).
Refugee camps have no present, in Agier’s view. Dwellers are torn between 
a past symbolized by the land that was lost and a future return on the hori-
zon. The present is only the emergency, a time that is not infused with mean-
ing or significance. For Agier, collective memory cannot be formed in camps 
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because people are just waiting to leave; there is no history to be written 
or ruin that is kept and treasured. The present is without meaning since 
the camps themselves are not places where people put down roots. Life in 
refugee camps, as Agier describes it, is a permanent meaningless present, 
a “brutal entry into a state of liminal floating” (Agier 2008, 30). Yet refu-
gees do resist this: while camps themselves are precarious, individuals are 
nonetheless able to build lives through available resources and transform 
the space into one that can be lived in. The temporality and exceptionality 
of refugee camps does not stop individuals from attempting to build some-
thing permanent or deal with the ordinary daily struggles of life. However, 
if Agier is right, then life in refugee camps can never have the meaning and 
texture of life in a political state.
Another feature of refugee camps is their invisibility from the point of 
view of both the state that houses it as well as the international community. 
Camps are often located far from populated settlements and hard to reach. 
While UN officials and journalists can visit them, they are usually out of the 
way, and access to them is supervised so that their day-to-day functioning is 
not visible (Agier 2011). Camps that have been in existence for long periods 
of time may not even appear on maps (Bauman 2007, 38).
Refugee camps must be understood as distinct forms of space: they are 
simultaneously within a state and outside of it. Physically of course camps 
are within a given state whose territory they inhabit. Yet the spaces often 
have an exceptional legal status making them outside of national space. 
For example, in France, the state declared that the first floor of the Ibis 
hotel at Roissy airport would be a “waiting zone,” where refugees could 
be processed before entering French soil. This space was considered a 
“non-national border zone” where French national law does not apply, even 
though the ground floor and second floor were still considered to be part 
of French territory and thus under French national law (Agier 2011, 50). 
A refugee was considered “a foreigner who is not yet on the national ter-
ritory” (Agier 2011, 50). Consequently, how refugees were treated in this 
waiting zone did not need to comply with French national law. They were 
able to process refugees in this space of exception that is nonetheless on 
French territory. Refugees are thus physically inside a country but legally 
and politically outside of it at the same moment.
The same is true of refugee camps. A camp does not belong to the state 
in which it is located. The UN works with, and is often at the mercy of, 
the host state, but camps are not subject to the same laws and norms as 
non-camp locations in the territorial state in which the refugee camp is 
located. This leads Agier to conclude that camps in all their forms (holding 
centers, IDP camps, etc.) ought to be understood as heterotopias—places 
outside of all places, even though they can be located. These heterotopias 
function to exclude masses of people from domestic and international law. 
This means that the displaced are doubly excluded—first from their original 
homes, and second, from the domain of regular life where local populations 
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live. This remains true even though over time camps can start to resemble 
towns or ghettos, and the “distinction between town dwellers and refugees 
hangs only by a thread” (Agier 2011, 189). These spaces transform over time 
and complex social life develops, but exclusion—legal and political—still 
remains a feature of this life.
§ Problems with Refugee Camps—Human Rights
Refugee camps do not actually serve the purposes they are intended to serve. 
It is often assumed that refugee camps are the most economical way to spend 
humanitarian aid; this is often not the case. As Smith argues, assisting refu-
gees apart from local populations in separate camps “are the most expensive 
ways of responding to their needs with the cost per refugee typically well 
over the per capita GNP of the host nation” (Smith 2004, 40). Nor are they 
less expensive to maintain than other forms of aid, such as development 
investment or integration (Verdirame and Harrell Bond 2005).35 By con-
trast, Alexander Betts’s and his co-authors’ study confirmed that when refu-
gees are allowed to integrate economically, they contribute positively to the 
host state (Betts et al. 2014).
Even if refugee camps were the most economically efficient way of han-
dling large-scale refugee populations, their inability to protect human rights 
alone would give us reason to question them. They violate human rights in 
two ways. First, refugee camps rarely uphold the rights that refugees living 
in them are legally entitled to based on the 1951 Refugee Convention. Sec-
ond, because refugees in camps are so vulnerable, basic human rights are 
routinely violated, both by other refugees and by state and NGO organiza-
tions, and refugees lack the ability to claim their rights or have violations 
redressed. Sexual assault provides a paradigmatic case of this point.
What kind of protection is owed refugees living in camps? The most basic 
standard proposed by the 1951 Convention is that host states have a duty to 
protect refugees residing on their territory and provide them with the same 
treatment given to other categories of aliens. That states are obliged to pro-
tect refugees living on their territory is such a well-established principle that 
even states that have not signed the 1951 Convention remain obliged by this 
principle. To emphasize, this principle holds for all non-nationals, regardless 
of how they are categorized as refugees, illegal aliens, migrants, etc. (Helton 
2012, 23). In terms of treatment, though there is not a specific body of inter-
national law regarding camps, states are expected to live up to the principles 
found in other UN agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which, though not specifically discussing non-nationals, is assumed 
to include them as well.36 On top of that, states are expected to live up to the 
principles found in customary international law, such as the prohibition on 
arbitrary prolonged detention and deprivations on freedom of movement.
The 1951 Convention contains a list of human rights that refugees are 
supposed to have while they are outside of their states, including access 
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to education, access to national courts, and the right to seek employment. 
While the states that drafted the Convention rejected the idea that they have 
a right to membership or asylum, they instead “opted to enumerate rights 
that refugees can expect in order to maintain some level of dignity and sus-
tenance consistent with human rights conventions” (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004, 85). Among the specific rights listed in the 1951 Convention there are 
two that are particularly important and widely violated. The first is article 
26, which grants refugees “lawfully in the territory” the same freedom of 
movement as other aliens. Refugees have “the right to choose their place 
of residence and move freely within [the state’s] territory.” Encampment 
as such is a violation of this basic right, but a violation that is so common-
place that it is unremarkable. Second, the 1951 Convention requires states 
to grant refugees the same access to employment as other nationals (article 
17). It stipulates that if restrictions are placed on refugees they need to be 
removed after three years, so that long-term residents of camps, at the very 
least, are assured the right to seek employment for wages. Again, this right 
is routinely violated. As Roxström and Gibney note, there is such a strong 
assumption that whatever rights refugees may have, the right of states to 
restrict refugees either admission or their right to integrate once on the ter-
ritory, must supersede this. “Norms that would be rejected out of hand 
in other contexts on the basis of human rights suddenly seem ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘realistic’ in the immigration asylum realm” (Roxström and Gibney 
2012, 45).
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond argue that human rights cannot as a mat-
ter of fact be implemented in refugee camps, and warehousing refugees in 
camps cannot be reconciled with respecting human rights.37 They claim that 
this fact is well known, but continually ignored. This is not because of a 
few bad actors or simply lack of funding. Rather, the very structure of the 
camps increases the potential for abuse rather than enhances the ability of 
humanitarian organizations to protect refugee rights. They write, “refu-
gee rights cannot be protected in camps and settlements” (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005, 15). This is in part because in camps the law of the host 
country virtually ceases to apply: camps are spaces beyond the rule of law in 
which “the life of refugees was governed by an oppressive blend of custom-
ary practices and rules established by humanitarian organizations and refu-
gees” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 15). Though dramatic, Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond intend to suggest that refugee camps are spaces where law 
simply does not apply, even though in principle camps fall under the legal 
jurisdiction of those responsible for administering the law.
In their extensive study of refugee camps in Uganda and Kenya, Verdi-
rame and Harrell-Bond found evidence of the full catalogue of human rights 
violations, and they demonstrate in detail the way that the UNHCR failed to 
protect the human rights of refugees in camps. They found that refugees had 
no voice or political agency in the decisions that were made on their behalf, 
were negatively stereotyped and kept at a distance, and any complaints that 
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they had about their treatment could be easily ignored. Local police and 
judiciaries did not have any legal training that would allow them to take 
the rights of refugees seriously. The UNHCR was unable to protect refugees 
from human rights violations by host states, such as arbitrary arrest and 
detention, unfair criminal and civil proceedings, and denying the right to 
work. But they themselves were also complicit in violating human rights. 
For Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, the most basic right that was violated by 
a policy of encampment was the right to freedom of movement, on which, 
they argue, other rights are based. They stress that this is not the case for 
only the worst camps, but also for camps that were considered to be “mod-
els” of refugee assistance and protection (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 
2005, 333).38 Against all sources of abuse, by the UNHCR as well as by 
local police or other refugees, there was very little remedy.
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond argue that one of the main problems with 
camps is that they constitute a unique setting for the arbitrary exercise of 
power. The UNHCR is supposed to oversee the treatment of the displaced 
by host states in developing countries, in particular, to make sure their rights 
are protected as much as possible. In recent years, however, because of the 
sheer growth of the displaced, host countries have effectively handed over 
control of displaced populations to the UNHCR. The UNHCR now has 
almost total control over status determination procedures to decide who is 
eligible for resettlement abroad, who qualifies for assistance, who receives 
crucial supplies, etc.39 The UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations 
working in these camps40 have almost complete control over the displaced. 
The UNHCR exercises sovereign power over the displaced who are under 
its care.41
This demonstrates what Verdirame and Harrell-Bond call the “Janus 
face” of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is in part cosmopolitan and 
caring, and in part, “often callous, sometimes cruel, and—nearly always— 
ineffectual” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 333). What this brings to 
light is that “power exercised under a humanitarian guise was not so differ-
ent from power in other guises” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 333). 
What is unique in this relationship is that the power of humanitarian gov-
ernments is not curtailed by law nor limited by external oversight. “The 
very organization set up to monitor the extent to which refugees enjoyed 
their human rights had assumed de facto sovereignty over them. Who could 
monitor the monitor?” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 17). This is 
because the laws of host countries often cease to apply in refugee camps. 
Laws are supposed to be upheld by the UNHCR, but, because they are 
unable to do this, “camps are spaces that are virtually beyond the rule of 
law and in which the life of refugees ends up being governed by a highly 
oppressive blend of rules laid down by the humanitarian agencies and the 
customary practices of the various refugee communities” (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005, 334). This situation leads Agier to conclude, “the 
humanitarian world is a totalitarianism that has power over life (to let live 
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or survive) and death (to let die) over the individual that it views as absolute 
victim” (Agier 2011, 196).
It is important that there was no body that was put in place to oversee the 
UNHCR or the implantation of the 1951 Convention. This has led to one 
of most widely noted limitations of the way the UNHCR currently func-
tions. The UNHCR is largely unaccountable to anyone for violations of its 
mandate. Though they exercise a tremendous amount of power over the 
displaced, they are subject to very little accountability. As Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond note, they rarely have to submit to the due process of law in 
national or international courts (2005). There are no external agencies that 
they are legally or politically accountable to, nor are they accountable to an 
electorate. Unlike other global institutions grounded on international law, 
there is no independent monitoring mechanism for the 1951 Convention, 
nor any procedures for overseeing the work of the UNHCR or to make inde-
pendent reports to the UN about its successes and failures. Refugees them-
selves are in no position to pursue legal action against the UNHCR; besides 
being difficult, they worry about “biting the hand that feeds them” (Verdi-
rame and Harrell-Bond 2005). There is not even minimally an ombudsman 
who could hear complaints from refugees and report them to the UN or 
attempt to resolve them. Though Article 38 of the 1951 Convention con-
tains provisions on the settlement of disputes and allows states’ parties to 
bring disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the Convention 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), no state has ever invoked article 
38 in order to bring a case of non-compliance to the ICJ (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005, 305). While the international community is now used to 
the idea that global financial institutions like the World Bank can sometimes 
get things wrong even though they are working for positive goals, there is 
still resistance to thinking about the UNHCR in this way.
Among the worst forms of human rights violations in camps is sexual vio-
lence. As Pittaway and Pittaway (2004) point out, it is well known that rape 
and other forms of gender based violence are endemic in refugee camps, and 
domestic violence, sexual exploitation, and various kinds of sexual torture 
occur at extremely high rates; as Ben Rawlence noted in Dadaab in Kenya, 
“rape is routine” (Rawlence 2016, 36). The violence on the Kenya-Somali 
border, for example, is also well known: Somali bandits either raid refugee 
camps or find women who had left the camps to find firewood and gang 
rape whoever they find (Cohen 2000). Near the Kakuma Camp in Kenya, 
there are regular reports of rape and sexual mutilation by local Takrarna 
men (Pittaway and Pittaway 2004). Sexual assault has also been known to 
occur by other refugees in camps as well as by UN peacekeepers and mem-
bers of the security forces (Pittaway and Bartolomei 2003). This is known 
to occur globally in all camp settings, and may include other forms of docu-
mented sexual violence such as child brides, forced marriages, and domestic 
violence. Because of their total dependence on international institutions for 
their survival and often inadequate access to resources, in order to survive, 
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many refugee women are forced to prostitute themselves to other refugees, 
local residents, the police, and men who work for international humanitar-
ian agencies and NGOs (Pittaway and Pittaway 2004). Victims of sexual 
assault often have life-long health issues that cannot be addressed in camps 
and are stigmatized, discriminated against, and harassed by members of 
their own communities. Ironically, when women become infected with HIV/
AIDS as a result of rape in refugee camps, they become ineligible for resettle-
ment in certain countries, including Australia (Pittaway and Pittaway 2004).
The UNHCR recognizes that its job is to prevent the sexual abuse and 
violence done to women living in refugee camps who are supposed to be 
under their protection. To that end, they released Guidelines on the Protec-
tion of Refugee Women in 1991, Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guide-
lines on Prevention and Response in 1995, and a series of other documents 
in the early 2000s (see UNHCR 2001a, 2001b, 2002). Despite this well 
intentioned effort, there is wide spread agreement that the UNHCR and the 
refugee regime in general has failed to protect women in refugee camps as 
well as in urban refugee sites (Ward 2002, Pittaway and Pittaway 2004). 
Why is there so little protection available for refugee women and children 
(Pittaway and Pittaway 2004)? There are several elements to consider.
First, though the UNHCR has recently attempted to put in more robust 
legal mechanisms such as mobile courts and has been successful in prosecut-
ing some perpetrators, the vast majority of violence continues with complete 
impunity (UNHCR 2001a). In Pittaway’s and Pittaway’s view, this occurs 
for two reasons. First, the UNHCR’s recommendations carry no real legal 
consequences or authority. It is the host state that must prosecute criminal 
activity that occurs in its jurisdiction, even in refugee camps. It is not sur-
prising, then, that this occurs so infrequently given that many host countries 
themselves have weak legal systems and may see sexual violence as too com-
mon to require prosecution.
The second reason, Pittaway and Pittaway argue, that victims of sex-
ual violence in refugee camps cannot access either protection or redress is 
because of the very identity of “woman refugee.” In their view, the “sublim-
inal association between ‘refugee’ and ‘non-citizen’ creates almost absolute 
legal impunity for those who exploit or assault refugees” (Pittaway and Pitt-
away 2004). In other words, because all those who work with refugee popu-
lations know how vulnerable refugee women are, that they have virtually no 
legal paths for recourse if they are harmed, and that there is very little will to 
protect refugees, there is an implicit understanding that human rights viola-
tions like sexual assault carry very little risk of legal consequence (Chalk 
1998). In other words, just being labeled a “refugee woman” becomes a 
marker of exploitability and thus compounds the difficulty that institutions 
like the UNHCR experience regarding prevention and treatment of sexual 
violence in refugee camps.
Another factor that is widely agreed to play a role is the general attitude 
around sexual violence. This is perhaps most dramatically expressed by the 
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question posed by a UN worker, “what’s so terrible about rape? You don’t 
die from it” (Cohen 2000, 74).42 For the person who asked this question, 
rape in refugee camps was unfortunate but inevitable, and tolerable as a fate 
better than death. In Cohen’s view, this comment reflected a much deeper 
attitude of indifference and ignorance to the harms women refugees and 
IDPs experience, and this in turn, helps explain why so little was done to 
prevent rape in refugee camps. Similarly, Pittaway and Bartolomei note that 
the attitude of humanitarian workers is often that refugee women “are used 
to rape” and because it is so common it need not be addressed (Pittaway 
and Bartolomei 2003). “Although there is growing recognition, particularly 
since Bosnia, that rape is a crime to be punished,” writes Cohen, “interna-
tional staff are still not forceful enough in protesting against sexual violence 
or taking steps to deter it” (Cohen 2000, 77). Ward notes that though the 
UNHCR has adopted the ideal that sexual violence ought to be prevented, 
they have not been able to realize this goal. For Ward this is connected 
to the funding structure of refugee projects. Because funding is often only 
for short-term emergency responses, it is hard to sustain long-term pro-
gramming that addresses gender based violence. In addition, Ward faults 
the UNHCR for not advocating more strongly to national governments to 
improve protection against gender based violence of refugee women (Ward 
2002, 13).
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond argue that the primary reason attempts to 
protect women from sexual violence continually fail is the structural con-
nection between camps and sexual violence.43 Even the UNHCR acknowl-
edges this reason. The reason rates of sexual violence are at epidemic levels 
in camps is because they are artificial communities, “characterized by unem-
ployment, lack of future prospects, total dependence on insufficient food 
rations, and at times, by a preponderance of single and often young men” 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 149). This is compounded by the fact 
that some of the most effective measures for protecting women from sexual 
violence in camps—respecting a woman’s right to move away from places 
she finds dangerous or threatening; challenging rather than buttressing male 
authority in camps—were not permitted. In other words, the reason that the 
UNHCR is unable to protect women from sexual violence in refugee camps 
is because it is not possible to do so in camps where women are rendered so 
totally vulnerable. This, I argue, is reason to reconsider whether camps can 
be morally supported. If there were other institutions where sexual violence 
occurred on such a scale and with such unregulated impunity, and Western 
states were known to support the conditions which help to create and sus-
tain it, there would likely be heavy scrutiny of the institutions. Yet regarding 
refugee camps, sexual violence is often tolerated and tacitly accepted.
§ How the West Supports Encampment
How do Western states specifically support encampment? Though it is host 
states, largely in the developing world, that ultimately make the decisions 
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for how to treat the displaced, these decisions are often made in conjunction 
with funding mandates from the UNHCR as well as states in the Global 
North. In many cases, Western states directly fund refugee camps through 
funding the UNHCR. As Ben Rawlence writes about Somali refugees in 
Dadaab in Kenya, “those who make it to Europe are few. Millions more, the 
vast majority, remain in camps. And through our tax contributions to the 
UN, we all pay billions of dollars to keep them there” (Rawlence 2016, 5). 
Yet there are two other less obvious ways the West supports encampment: 
it is supported tacitly though policies that encourage the containment of 
refugee flows close to countries of origin for the sake of future repatriation, 
and more explicitly through funding mechanisms.
As Aleinikoff has argued, because of the nature of forced displacement 
since the end of the Cold War, Western states have come to view the problem 
of global displacement not as requiring humanitarian support as much as 
requiring policies of control and deterrence (Aleinikoff 1992, 130). Most 
Western states, he argues, have interpreted the Refugee Convention in the 
narrowest way possible and have established policies that make it diffi-
cult for the forcibly displaced to claim asylum—and thus have the right of 
non-refoulement—on their territory. “Refugee law has become immigration 
law, emphasizing protection of borders rather than protection of persons” 
(Aleinikoff 1992, 130). Tighter visa control, detention of asylum seekers, 
and sanctions on carriers who transport asylum seekers have made it much 
more difficult for asylum seekers to reach Western shores, and thus they are 
forced to remain closer to their countries of origin. As Gibney puts it, West-
ern states publicly acknowledge the principle of asylum, but “use fair means 
and foul to prevent as many asylum seekers as possible from arriving on 
their territory where they could claim its protections” (Gibney 2004, 229).
Another mechanism imposed by the West that encourages the displaced 
to remain where they are is the “externalization of borders.” This term 
refers to the process of transferring the management of migration beyond 
national borders. It’s effectively a way of outsourcing immigration and asy-
lum policy by supporting third countries, especially those countries from 
which migrants originate or transit, in their ability to manage migration. 
According to the UNHCR, “officials from these countries in effect play the 
role of EU border guards to prevent potential migrants from traveling to 
Europe” (ICRC 2012, 30). Coupled with the tightening of border controls 
and a highly selective immigration policy, “these partnerships are develop-
ing into an instrument of deterrence at source with respect to those who, in 
one capacity or the other, need to migrate” (ICRC 2012, 30).44
FRONTEX, the EU agency created to secure the external borders from 
illegal migration and human trafficking established in 2004, plays a crucial 
role in distancing asylum seekers from the possibility of international pro-
tection. Its interceptions in the Mediterranean Sea “are designed to prevent 
would-be migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the Spanish, Italian 
and, since 2010, Greek coasts” (ICRC 2012, 31). One ironic use of FRON-
TEX occurred in 2011. After the Arab Spring that was so widely praised in 
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Europe and around the world, the European governments deployed FRON-
TEX off the coast of Libya and Tunisia to prevent newly freed people, encour-
aged by support for them from Europe, from reaching European coasts to 
apply for asylum. Australia has had a policy since 1992 of detaining poten-
tial asylum seekers in detention centers that are in Papua New Guinea and 
the island of Nauru, which are not Australian territory. According to some 
reports, there are 10,000 people detained in Australian-run camps, which 
“are breeding grounds for rape, rioting, malaria and mental illness, and that 
bear the look and feel of concentration camps” (Neubauer 2014). Douglas 
and his coauthors note that Australia has long moved away from a policy of 
protection to one of militarization and deterrence, represented most notably 
in “Operation Sovereign Borders,” which works to prevent asylum seekers 
from reaching Australian waters (Douglas 2014, 19–20).
What the externalization of borders in Europe and Australia shows is 
the interest of Western states in keeping the displaced as far as possible 
from their territory. To say that this distancing is the overarching concern of 
Western states is fairly well established. As Stevens writes, “Europe and the 
United States have unequivocally supported the strategy of containment” 
(Stevens 2006, 67). This criticism is of course not to say that Western states 
do nothing for asylum seekers or the displaced; far from it. The point is 
that as a matter of policy, aid to the displaced is always within a backdrop 
of ensuring what they see as security for Western states from the threat of 
mass migration.
When we look at how Western states fund international organizations 
that aid the displaced, we see that their funding priorities can lead to sup-
port of containment. In particular, developed countries prioritize human-
itarian aid (immediate relief after emergency situations) and funding for 
processing asylum seekers already on their territory, rather than the needs 
of the long-term displaced. Between 2006 and 2010 only about 5% of the 
total official development assistance of OECD countries was dedicated to 
long-term refugees (USD$ 33 billion).45 Refugees spending extended periods 
in camps or informal settlement are simply not a fiscal priority.
In writing about the broken refugee system, and its impact on Australia in 
particular, Millbank notes that “the discrepancy between what Western coun-
tries spend on their asylum systems, and what is spent on refugees in camps, has 
reached the point where it is raising fundamental questions about the West’s 
responsibilities. What is spent on the world’s 1.2 million asylum seekers is many 
times the UNHCR budget, which is supposed to meet the needs of its identi-
fied (as at end-1999) 22.3 million people of concern” (Millbank 2000, 15). 
In other words, for Western states, funding is primarily allocated to the 
treatment of the displaced most likely to impact Western states.
The problems with funding emergency humanitarian programs, rather 
than long-term assistance, are widely known. Perhaps the most important 
is that this funding structure makes it seem that the most pressing problems 
are the ones that are currently happening, the immediate displacements, 
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and renders invisible long-term encampment and the problems around that. 
According to the ICRC, “funding priorities reflect an unwillingness to take 
seriously the harm that is done to the displaced who are forced to remain 
in limbo, in temporary settlements, either urban or rural. Funding primar-
ily short-term emergency needs makes it harder for the displaced to restore 
their livelihoods, for their economic well-being, self-reliance, dignity and 
integrity” (ICRC 2012, 200).
Smith notes that host countries also rely on funding the displaced as 
emergency measures, not long-term programs (Smith 2004, 48). Many host 
states have offices for refugee affairs that are isolated from other depart-
ments and depend on international agencies who donate funds earmarked 
for refugees. “The result has been the perpetuation of a population labeled 
refugees, left living in limbo and dependent for their survival on relief” 
(Smith 2004, 48).46 According to Smith, funding for host countries—either 
integration of refugees or other programs—ought to be made contingent on 
the protection of rights listed in the Refugee Convention. As he concludes, 
there is an incentive structure put in place by the international community 
that encourages encampment of the displaced, and at a minimum, we ought 
to shift “incentives from policies that treat refugees like cattle to ones that 
honor them as human beings” (Smith 2004, 54).
§ Moral Obligations
If we take seriously the key features of the refugee regime, described above, 
as well as the ways in which Western states are connected to and support it, 
we can begin to see what moral obligations we may have to the displaced, 
in addition to considering long-term solutions such as resettlement in the 
West. The reason I say that we “may have” these obligations is that my goal 
in this section is to introduce some possible ethical obligations that mem-
bers of Western states have towards refugees and other forcibly displaced 
people that have not been discussed previously. However, since there is at 
least some disagreement about whether or not we have moral obligations 
to refugees—which has been a focus of philosophical discussion in recent 
years—I do not doubt that these obligations will be similarly debated.47 My 
contention is merely that if we have moral obligations to those who do not 
have a state of their own, as many though not all philosophers agree, then 
our obligations extend beyond admitting them and must also include our 
obligations to treat them decently while they are between states.
One of the reasons Western states and their citizens are willing to accept 
refugee camps is because of the importance placed on repatriation. Refu-
gee camps become tacitly justified as necessary places to wait, like wait-
ing rooms at a doctor’s office. They are seen as a necessary means to the 
ultimate positive good, repatriation. However, this view of camps allows 
many to see the endemic human rights violations as more tolerable than 
they ought to be (since on this view they are both temporary and necessary, 
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and ultimately serve a higher good, allowing refugees to be returned home). 
It allows for a pragmatic acceptance of the misery of camps: why waste time 
and effort in making camps humane, dignified, or filled with opportuni-
ties, if refugees are just going to leave as soon as they are allowed? With an 
exclusive focus on repatriation, life in refugee camps becomes acceptable 
and inevitable rather than “the worst aspect of refugee policy” (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005, 271). In other words, the hope of repatriation has 
clouded our view on long-term refugee camps, which, I will argue, ought 
to be rejected as a way of dealing with the forcibly displaced who are 
unwanted by any country in the world. While treating involuntary migrants 
with dignity and respect while they are in camps is by no means a solution 
to the global problem of forced displacement, it will go a long way towards 
protecting the human rights of those who have lost the protection of their 
own states. Even if one still holds that repatriation is the ultimate good, we 
ought to remain critical of encampment as a temporary solution.
The first moral obligation we have is to reject the policy of long-term 
encampment as the de facto solution to the problem of unwanted and super-
fluous people in the world or, at the very least, insist that refugee camps 
and other spaces of containment be subject to the same moral and political 
norms of decent hierarchical societies (in the sense that Rawls uses this term 
in Law of Peoples). While it is possible that refugee camps of short duration 
may be justifiable in emergency circumstances as the best way of delivering 
aid, long-term encampment cannot be justified as a way of containing peo-
ple who are unwanted elsewhere in the world. Encampment, when it ceases 
to be a response to an emergency situation and becomes prolonged indefi-
nitely, systematically violates the rights and dignity of displaced people. It 
ought not to be considered a morally acceptable “solution” to the problem 
of displacement in the 21st century as it currently is.
If I am right about this, then Western states ought not support this prac-
tice as we currently do, both directly through insisting that our aid be used 
to fund camps (rather than other more dignified temporary solutions) and 
indirectly through our refugee policies which make encampment the inevi-
table outcome (insisting on repatriation makes encampment justifiable and 
necessary). If no other alternative arrangement is possible, then refugee 
camps and other spaces of containment ought to be subject to the same 
rigorous moral and political norms as states. Given my analysis above, it is 
clear that long-term refugee camps function as new forms of political space 
outside of traditional space, and as a result, systematic human rights viola-
tions should not be ignored because they are “exceptional” or “temporary” 
(which they in fact are not).
What would it look like if refugee camps were guided by more stringent 
ethical and political norms? Minimally speaking, they ought to meet the 
standard of what Rawls calls a decent hierarchical society. Though we need 
not ask the governance of refugee camps to function as liberal democracies, 
they ought to contain some amount of consultation between members and 
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the governing bodies, a commitment to at least basic human rights, and 
include some level of accountability (Rawls 2001). This would allow for a 
minimal way that politics, “the ability to decide the direction and purpose 
of action,” could be part of the life of refugees (Bauman 2007, 2).
As Holzer has argued, it is possible to build political norms into refugee 
camps, and the UNHCR and the international community that supports 
it have a choice to make, whether we react “to the unrelenting scarcities, 
violence and instability of humanitarian crises with a makeshift authoritari-
anism or a renewed commitment to innovative participatory democracy” 
(Holzer 2012, 275). Though refugee camps present political challenges like 
no other form of political space, the international community ought to be 
more creative in their political solutions. Holzer’s analysis suggests some 
ways that we can incorporate political, even democratic norms into the life 
of refugee camps. She suggests that in certain circumstances, “refugee camps 
might serve as particularly strong platforms for ‘associational democracy,’ 
a participatory reform intended to bring civil society organizations into the 
decision-making structure of government” (Holzer 2012, 275). If it’s not 
possible to identify refugee community representatives, camp administra-
tors could explore direct democracy, especially the tradition that stems from 
Europe and North America. Alternatively, camps may also serve as plat-
forms for novel forms of participatory budgeting to allocate humanity aid 
(Holzer 2012, 275). What Holzer stresses, however, is that the decision to 
restrict the ability of refugees in camps to be political and exercise their 
political capacities is a choice, not an inevitability; if increasing the political 
capacities of refugees is seen as an important good, organizations can find 
ways to incorporate politics into camps.
Let me address what is an obvious objection to my claims above: what 
choice do states have besides refugee camps, given the sheer numbers of the 
forcibly displaced and the reality that most states do not want them? My 
account may seem to hinge on my ability to show that there are feasible 
non-camp alternatives or alternative ways of designing camps that would 
fulfill the basic human rights of refugees that states could employ. Though 
I think there are such alternatives, before I discuss them, I would like to sug-
gest that even if this were not the case, my critique of the immorality of the 
current status quo nonetheless remains important.
First, as I have suggested throughout this book, my purpose is not to set 
out a policy agenda for changing how states house and protect refugees. 
Rather, the main goal of this book is to demonstrate that we must frame 
long-term encampment as an injustice, one which ought to concern us even 
if solutions aren’t immediately apparent. In other words, it is a work of 
political and moral theory, rather than policy. Long-term encampment as a 
solution for unwanted human beings is rarely seen as a profound injustice or 
one that requires serious attention. Most people in the West are only scarcely 
aware of the existence of prolonged encampment, and if they are aware of 
it, they see it as inevitable. One of the goals of this book is to change how we 
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see this situation. It was not so long ago that many people believed that the 
inequalities of the modern world—what we now call global poverty—were 
not a matter of justice but simply an unfortunate but unavoidable facet of 
how the world works. Seeing global poverty as an injustice that we ought to 
work towards changing, even if there is no consensus on how to do this or 
what a just global order would look like, is important. It shows that Western 
states and the international community have begun to take global poverty 
seriously. The result is that effort has been directed towards analyzing and 
overcoming it, and policies that contribute to and further global poverty are 
critiqued. Though this framework has not ended radical poverty or global 
inequality, we at least know what we should be aiming for. Similarly, the 
goal of this book is to show that we ought to begin to recognize warehous-
ing and long-term encampment as profound moral injustices, injustices that 
we can and ought to begin to work towards changing.
As the ICRC argues, “there is no shortage of innovative approaches that 
could help to alleviate the trauma of extended exile. However, the difficulty 
lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones. Solving protracted 
displacement is not impossible, but it requires political will. The misery of 
prolonged displacement has become ‘normal’, because many states have 
effectively decided that the misery of excluded forced migrants is an unfor-
tunate price worth paying to avoid having to confront the difficult politi-
cal questions raised by the injustices and inequalities of a bordered world” 
(ICRC 2012, 228). One of the goals of this book is simply to insist that 
we must see the current “normal” as unjust, and an injustice we ought to 
find intolerable. This is a crucial first step before alternatives can even be 
considered.
Once states and their citizens see the current status quo as an injustice, we 
can begin to consider alternative arrangements. What are the alternatives to 
camps for housing refugees while they await repatriation or resettlement? 
One alternative is “temporary local integration” or “self-reliance.” On this 
alternative, rather than being placed in camps where refugees are segregated 
from the local population, refugees would be allowed to settle temporarily 
within local populations and international aid would go to improving all 
public facilities (schools, hospitals, job training programs) and developing 
the skills and talents of refugees that could be put to use in a host country, 
rather than to just funding camps. The goal is that refugees would become 
increasingly self-reliant and not dependent on international aid.
What would allowing refugees to integrate temporarily in a host coun-
try look like? Alexander Betts and his coauthors studied refugee integration 
in Uganda, where the government allows refugees the right to work and a 
significant degree of freedom of movement. The Ugandan government has 
found ways “to offer refugees freedom of movement, the right to work, 
and support in the pursuit of their own economic opportunities, pending 
going home” (Betts et al. 2014, 6). Based on extensive quantitative and 
qualitative research, they found that when refugees are allowed to integrate 
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economically in a host state, they without a doubt contribute in positive 
ways to the national economy and do not remain dependent on the inter-
national community. Refugees contribute to Uganda’s local and national 
economies through buying, selling, or even training and employing Ugan-
dan nationals; “the daily economic life of many refugees directly benefits 
Uganda businesses” (Betts et al. 2014, 17).
Though most refugees in Uganda continue to receive assistance, they are 
not dependent on this assistance for survival because of their integration 
into the national and local economies. Betts and his coauthors stress that the 
most effective kind of assistance is assistance that nurtures talents, capaci-
ties, and aspirations so that refugees are able to contribute to their host 
country and engage in productive and sustainable livelihoods. They con-
clude that the best kinds of aid to refugees is aid that provides opportuni-
ties for education, skills development, access to micro credit and financial 
markets, and improved access to the internet. Further, in order to make this 
positive contribution, displaced populations need a combination of rights 
and freedoms that enable them to flourish as human beings.
“When refugees are given the right to work and freedom of movement, 
they are capable of making a contribution to the national economy” (Betts 
et al. 2014, 41). What this shows is that local integration is indeed pos-
sible and clearly beneficial to both displaced populations themselves and the 
states which host them. This economic benefit to host states demonstrated 
in this study may help to address the reluctance of states to consider local 
integration.48 As the study by Betts and colleagues shows, there are certainly 
alternatives to camps that can and ought to be used, not only because they 
are economically more beneficial, but also because they avoid some of the 
worst moral injustices associated with refugee protection.
Recently, even the UNHCR has advocated for a new policy on alterna-
tives to camps.49 Interestingly, the UNHCR insists that alternatives to camps 
need not take one specific form but can be imagined in many different ways 
as long as they exhibit certain characteristics. Refugees must be able to exer-
cise their rights such as freedom of movement; they must have meaningful 
choices about their lives, including the ability to choose where they reside; 
they must be allowed to work and to access services and resources. Most 
importantly, refugees must have the “possibility to live with greater dig-
nity, independence and normality as members of communities” (UNHCR 
2014b, 9, italics added). In other words, we need not specify precisely 
what the alternatives to camps are or what form they must take as long as 
they exhibit the characteristics set out above. Most importantly, refugees must 
become part of the political communities in which they reside. What this 
means is that the UNHCR would enable refugees to reside in communities 
“lawfully, peacefully and without harassment, whether in urban or in rural 
areas” and have the ability “to take responsibility for their lives and for 
their families” (UNHCR 2014b, 3).50 The goal is to remove obstacles to 
exercising rights and achieving self-reliance.
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One way of achieving the goals set out above is to alter the way that aid is 
provided. Rather than deliver aid only to camps, the UNHCR would take a 
mainstreaming approach within national, local, and community based sys-
tems and structures to provide things like education, public health, nutri-
tion, water, and sanitation. In other words, services are integrated into the 
community and camps themselves become sustainable settlements. Camps 
would be “anchored within the framework of national development plan-
ning and housing, land and property laws and are linked to host commu-
nities and the local economy, markets, infrastructure and service delivery 
systems” (UNHCR 2014b, 8). Refugees would be encouraged to build 
sustainable livelihoods and achieve self-reliance through education, train-
ing, and other forms of support. In order to take advantage of education 
and employment opportunities, refugees must be allowed mobility. The 
UNHCR acknowledges that in the long run alternatives to camps should 
be both more sustainable and more cost-effective. This is because from the 
point of view of aid organizations, they “harness the potential of refugees” 
(UNHCR 2014b, 6). This is true even though transitioning to these alterna-
tive forms may require greater initial investments.
§ Conclusion
What my chapter has showed is why it is so essential to support this nascent 
policy change. As the UNHCR states, moving from a camp-based system 
of delivering aid to an alternative will “require engagement with and by 
host government authorities at all levels and the full spectrum of UNHCR’s 
partners and stakeholders” (UNHCR 2014b, 2). What my chapter has also 
showed is that it will require more than a mere policy change to alter the 
primary way that the forcibly displaced are cared for; it needs a new moral 
justification. What has justified encampment has been a belief that it is 
better for people to return to their home countries than be resettled, and 
this requires the use of refugee camps as a temporary measure. What the 
new UNHCR policy will require is a similar moral grounding to justify the 
resources and change in mentality that are necessary. The analysis above has, 
I believe, shown why such a change in policy is so crucial and why Western 
states and other international actors ought to support it to the best of our 
capacities.
Overall, this chapter has critically examined the refugee protection regime 
and the role the UNHCR and Western states have played in it. The goal 
was to suggest that any moral obligations we have to the displaced must 
include the obligation to reject long-term encampment and work towards 
temporary solutions that protect the dignity and rights of refugees. Hav-
ing explained the necessity of these obligations in this chapter, I further my 
argument for them in subsequent chapters. In Chapter Three, I deepen my 
argument for these obligations by showing that there is a further harm to 
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refugee camps—the ontological deprivation—that many scholars had failed 
to appreciate. In Chapter Four I return to the question of who is responsible 
for upholding these obligations and why. Before I turn to either of those top-
ics, I examine the way that our obligations to refugees have been understood 
by philosophers until now and show why their analyses have been limited. It 
is this task that I turn to in the following chapter, Chapter Two.
Notes
 1 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies claims that 
there are over 72 million forced migrants around the world, while the UNHCR 
says there are 65.3 million (ICRC 2012, UNHCR 2016). The ICRC’s number is 
higher because it includes those displaced due to disasters, environmental degra-
dation, development projects, poverty, and poor governance. For more on who 
is included in which categories, see the Introduction of this book.
 2 Though the UNHCR’s core mandate was to protect “refugees” in the narrow 
sense of the term, it has expanded to include those considered to be asylum 
seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and stateless persons. These are all 
considered to be “persons of concern to the UNHCR” (UNHCR 2014a). Even 
though economic migrants are treated differently under international law than 
refugees or those fleeing persecution and violence, because they often use the 
same routes and means of transportation as refugees, the UNHCR must also 
consider migrants and “mixed migration” patterns (see UNHCR 2007).
 3 It’s interesting to note that the UNHCR includes the limitations of rights and 
freedoms in the very definition of a refugee camp.
 4 A protracted situation is defined by the UNHCR as “a situation in which 25,000 
or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or lon-
ger in a given asylum country” (UNHCR 2014). Though they acknowledge that 
this is a useful definition for monitoring purposes, it also has some limitations. 
For example, as long as a population remains under 25,000, it will never count 
as a protracted situation regardless of how long the group may have been dis-
placed. The average duration of major refugee situations has doubled from nine 
years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003 (UNHCR 2006).
 5 “Of the 14.4 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world, less than 
one per cent is submitted for resettlement.” (UNHCR 2015).
 6 Kagan notes, however, that though this 2009 policy marks a dramatic shift in 
the rhetoric of the UNHCR, their practices have been slow to change. “Camps 
are still abundant, and they are still central to UNHCR’s work” (Kagan 2013). 
Rather than blaming the UNHCR for this, he stresses the difficult position the 
UNHCR is in when it mediates with local host governments. It may oppose 
forced encampment but may feel that it needs to be involved in refugee camps 
that host governments insist on for the sake of the refugees.
 7 The original 1951 Convention limited the scope of the Convention to people 
fleeing from Europe before 1951. In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was added, which eliminated the geographic and temporal limitations.
 8 The UNHCR has 8,000 staff members working in 449 locations in 123 coun-
tries. According to its reports, over the past 60 years it has provided assistance 
to well over 50 million people and earned Nobel Peace Prizes in 1954 and 1981. 
Its programs are approved by an Executive Committee comprised of members of 
the 94 member states along with a Standing Committee that meets several times 
a year (Protecting Refugees and the Role of the UNHCR 2014, 15).
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 9 Elsewhere he puts it more bluntly: in 1951, “they designed an organization to do 
very little and only what states told it to do” (Barnett 2004, 73).
 10 The Convention leaves a lot to state discretion, including what procedures states 
use to determine refugee status. No international body that would assist with 
this and make status determinations at a supra national level was created. The 
UNHCR certainly assists states with this, especially in refugee camps under their 
supervision, but it has no authority, and states are not obliged to accept their 
determinations. This is key because, as Aleinikoff notes, “the adjudication of 
who is a refugee—upon which all the protections of the Convention turn—is left 
entirely to state authorities” (Aleinikoff 1992, 124).
 11 Roxström and Gibney, however, deny that this funding structure is necessarily 
an impediment to refugee protection. While they do not deny that the need of 
the UNHCR to be constantly raising money from donor states limits its freedom 
of action, it nonetheless can still insist on the highest standards of protection 
for refugees. They ask us to imagine what would happen if the UNHCR stood 
up to donor states. Is it really plausible, they ask, that states would punish the 
UNHCR because it tried to fulfill its mandate and challenged states to better 
protect the displaced? They don’t think it is. States are already incredibly reluc-
tant to aid refugees, and “it’s far-fetched to argue that this limited compassion 
towards refugees would be further decreased because politicians are upset with 
UNHCR” (Roxström and Gibney 2012, 59).
 12 For Betts, this lack of legal obligation means that Western states must be per-
suaded and encouraged to support refugees, and the best way to do this is to link 
refugee protection to other issues that the West already takes seriously, such as 
trade and security (Betts 2011, 2009). Of course if Betts is right that the West has 
no intrinsic interest in refugee protection and is only motivated by self-interest, 
we should perhaps be less surprised to find the current situation of containment 
rather than protection, which, in a way, serves Western interests (their interests 
especially in exercising sovereign control of membership and admission) at the 
expense of refugees themselves.
 13 Even the UNHCR itself admits that refugee protection requires being sensitive to 
the needs of states to manage migration and maintain border security (UNHCR 
2014, 13). Balancing both the legitimate concerns of states as well as refugee 
protection and rights has put the UNHCR is a very difficult position, being 
pulled between fulfilling its mandate for refugee protection and solutions, and 
appeasing donor states.
 14 In 2014, out of the 59.5 million people who were forcibly displaced, 105,200 
were resettled (UNHCR 2014). Concerning the population hosted in the Global 
South, see UNDESA 2012 United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, “Population Facts.”
 15 Reciprocity encourages states to comply with international law in order to 
encourage other states to do the same, thus creating conditions of global stabil-
ity in the long term. States also comply with international law in order to be seen 
as legitimate in the international system and as such, able to exercise authority. 
Both of these reasons act as motivations for states to comply with the norm of 
non-refoulement, but are absent in regards to supporting refugees who are not 
on their territory (Betts 2011).
 16 Between 2003 and 2005 the UN introduced the Convention Plus initiatives, 
whose aim was to get beyond the impasse described above. The idea behind 
this was that the interests of Southern states in greater burden sharing could be 
made compatible with the interests of Northern states in reducing the number of 
asylum seekers coming from the South to the North. Ultimately, for a variety of 
reasons, it did not succeed (Betts 2011).
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 17 See, for example, Walzer (1983), Miller (2007), and Wellman (2008).
 18 As Aleinikoff writes, the “affirmation of the authority of states to exclude refu-
gees may well leave the refugee virtually stateless, unable to enter a country of 
asylum and unable or unwilling to return to the country of origin” (Aleinikoff 
1992, 121).
 19 Though this is the dominant view, not all scholars agree. Haddad argues on the 
contrary that refugees are necessary for modern state sovereignty and that they 
are the inevitable if unintended consequence of the international states system. 
She claims that both sovereignty and refugees are mutually constituted insofar 
as refugees help to create and sustain a sense of insider and outsider; refugees are 
necessary for the functioning of sovereignty and consequently should be thought 
of as a permanent and necessary feature of the international landscape. As she 
puts it starkly, refugees are “victims of an international system that brings them 
into being then fails to take responsibility for them” (Haddad 2008, 69).
 20 Though 27 states resettled refugees in 2014, over 90% were resettled in the 
United States, Australia, and Canada (UNHCR 2014).
 21 Aleinikoff refers to this as a sociological conception of membership grounded 
in communitarian considerations. This view holds that human beings cannot 
simply cast off their belonging, roots, and ties as easily as lawyers and theorists 
think (Aleinikoff 1992, 127).
 22 In Aleinikoff’s view, once states exercise their sovereignty and deny membership 
to refugees, repatriation effectively becomes the only possible solution, whether 
or not it is in the best interests of refugees.
 23 See Bradley (2013) and Long (2013) on the complexities of repatriation.
 24 One response to this critique is that the UNHCR is doing its best given the 
political circumstances. Crisp and Slaughter argue that “humanitarian agencies 
in general, and UNHCR in particular, have been placed in the position of estab-
lishing and assuming responsibility for such ‘sprawling camps’ in order to fill 
gaps in the international refugee regime that were not envisaged at the time of its 
establishment after the Second World War.” Further, “the UN’s refugee agency 
has been limited in its ability to address the problem of protracted refugee situa-
tions, mainly because of the intractable nature of contemporary armed conflicts 
and the policies pursued by other actors, but also because of the other issues 
which the organization has chosen to prioritize and the limited amount of atten-
tion which it devoted to this issue during the 1990s” (Crisp and Slaughter 2009).
 25 Hammerstad argues that we ought to see refugees through the paradigm of 
“desecuritization,” that is, we ought to shift the issue of refugees “out of emer-
gency mode into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” (Buzan 
1998, 24, quoted in Hammerstad 2011, 239).
 26 To be sure, Hammerstad is not attributing nefarious motives to the UNHCR. 
Arguably they adopted the language of securitization in order to protect refu-
gees and harness resources. “It would be a deeply unfair exaggeration to argue 
that UNHCR is so beholden to donor agendas as to unquestioningly mimic a 
xenophobia-tainted, knee-jerk reaction of panic and fear against asylum seekers 
just to please European states” (Hammerstad 2011, 247–248). Nonetheless, if 
the analysis above is correct, it did have the effect of solidifying the view that ref-
ugees are a legitimate security threat from which Western states need protection.
 27 The situation in Afghanistan shows the complexity of repatriation in another 
way as well. Since repatriation began in 2002, about 5 million Afghans were 
returned. Yet the country they returned to was still largely unstable and politi-
cally volatile. “In the post 9/11 world, Afghan repatriation was needed to 
legitimize the US-led intervention, subsequent peace process and the fledgling 
government. These three factors seemed to outweigh more careful considerations 
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of the feasibility of return and the impact that such large numbers of returnees 
would have on a poor and war-stricken country that was already struggling to 
accommodate those who had remained. The interests of host countries (want-
ing to rid themselves of a long-term burden, or regain land for urban expansion 
as in the case of Pakistan) also overruled the best interests of the refugees and 
Afghanistan, and possibly even of long-term regional stability. In the search for 
quick success, the durability of the repatriation solution was not adequately 
considered” (Schmeidl 2009, 20).
 28 The second durable solution, local integration, has also not been able to address 
the problem. Local integration refers to the process where refugees who may be 
admitted only temporarily gradually gain full rights and citizenship. According 
to the UNHCR, in the past 10 years 716,000 refugees have been granted citizen-
ship in the country they sought asylum in, with two thirds of these occurring in 
the United States (UNHCR 2014, 22). This means that the number of people liv-
ing in refugee camps in the Global South who have successfully integrated is very 
small indeed. As for resettlement, in 2013, 98,400 refugees were resettled, with 
over 90% of them resettling in the US, Australia, and Canada (66,200, 13,200, 
and 12,200, respectively) (UNHCR 2014). Though a tremendous good for those 
who receive this benefit, resettlement is not a good most refugees can expect.
 29 Verdirame and Harrell-Bond argue that they are a bad investment for donor 
states, since they cost more and have a smaller return on investment than devel-
opment aid or funds for integration (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). Also 
see Betts et al. (2014).
 30 As Arafat Jamal, the former Deputy Representative of UNHCR in Jordan put it, 
“with refugees sequestered, concentrated, visible and presumably out of harm’s 
way, camps represent a convergence of interests among host governments, inter-
national agencies and the refugees themselves. They are not ideal for anyone 
but they help focus attention and provide a safety net. Host governments in 
Africa . . . see camps as a means of isolating potential troublemakers and forcing 
the international community to assume responsibility. . . . Refugees understand 
that camps make them visible, and keep their plight, and the politics that under-
pin it, in the world’s consciousness” (Smith 2004, 50).
 31 As an example of the institutional inertia that perpetuates camps, Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond argue that the UNHCR has two budgets—one for emergency relief 
and one for development—and because donors insist on funding emergency situ-
ations rather than long-term projects, the UNHCR must keep refugees in camps 
to satisfy this requirement (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 288).
 32 I show below that this is one of the reasons why camps have been missing from 
political philosophy. Their precariousness and exceptionality mean that they are 
not important to the past and not relevant to the future, and thus not worth con-
sidering. Their ephemeral quality is at least in part why they have been norma-
tively invisible. Philosophers are interested in the time before displacement occurs, 
and the war, violence, and instability that often causes it; they are also interested 
in the time after refugees return home and in issues around peace, resettlement, 
and reconciliation. However, this time in between, whose duration is unknown, is 
hard to represent to those who theorize about it (Agier 2008 and 2011).
 33 Agier has observed that for many, the waiting in the waiting zones is the most 
intolerable. This is in part because there are none of the distractions that life in 
a refugee camp has. In addition, what makes this situation intolerable is that the 
outcomes of decisions in the waiting zones and the logic used to explain them are 
often incomprehensible to the detainees (Agier 2011, 51). It is for these reasons 
that hunger strikes, suicides, and other “acts of despair” are not uncommon.
 34 The concept of “internal asylum” in countries like Morocco, Libya, and Senegal 
occurred as a response by European states and UN agencies to mass displacement 
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in the first part of this century, and in particular to the new category of “prima 
facie refugee” used in emergency situations on a collective, not individual basis 
(Agier 2011). The principle behind this is that aid agencies can provide aid 
before individuals leave their home countries and thus make a return in time 
easier too. However, Agier argues, internal asylum can be understood as another 
kind of camp that functions to contain and collect individuals and, importantly, 
distance them from Europe. Humanitarian organizations manage the flow of 
refugees, keeping them at a safe distance from Western states where they could 
apply for asylum.
 35 This is in addition to the well-known problems of camps: disease epidemics, 
environmental degradation, and radicalization of ethnic identity, among others 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 270).
 36 Gorlick argues that human rights law must be used to bolster refugee law. “At a 
time when refugee law is under attack and its very foundations are being ques-
tioned, one must rely on other binding rights norms and enforcement mech-
anisms to bolster the system of refugee protection” (Gorlick 2012, 98). The 
non-derogable legal standards of human rights law must be used when refugee 
law fails to protect those in need.
 37 For a detailed discussion of the rights systematically violated in refugee camps, 
see Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005), chapter 4 on civil and political rights 
and chapter 5 on social and economic rights.
 38 To this list of human rights violations, Michel Agier adds the unequal distribu-
tion of covers; food rations in disastrous quantity or quality; insult and physical 
violence against people who request aid; forced repatriation; and prohibition on 
building huts from rigid materials (Agier 2011, 215).
 39 See Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) for a detailed analysis of this in camps 
in Kenya and Uganda. Kenya and Uganda are particularly interesting examples 
of camps since, for the vast majority of refugees there, none of the three “dura-
ble” solutions were available (repatriation, integration, and resettlement).
 40 The UNHCR works by subcontracting out its various operations to different 
NGOs. In 2007, it worked with approximately 575 different NGOs (Agier 
2011, 203).
 41 “UNHCR is the main authority that exercises power and effective control in 
camps; combined with its role in the status-determination process, this power 
means that UNHCR is not simply unable to promote respect for the rights of 
refugees, but is often responsible for the violation of these rights” (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005, 17).
 42 Though it is perhaps obvious, it is nonetheless worth mentioning that many 
women experience rape as among the most intolerable forms of harm a person 
can endure. To point out one horrendous example, take the Africa Rights Watch 
report from 1993. As they describe it, most of the Somali women who were 
raped that year in refugee camps in Kenya were gang-raped at gun point, by 
as many as seven men; they often had to endure this gang rape several times. 
The vast majority were also robbed, severely beaten, knifed or shot; if they had 
been circumcised, they had their vaginal openings torn or cut by their attackers. 
Most Somali women had undergone a kind of female genital mutilation called 
infibulation, where the clitoris and inner lips are removed and the woman is 
sewn together so that only a small opening is left to allow for the flow of urine 
and menstrual blood. Because of this operation, rape is excruciatingly painful. In 
the aftermath, they experience ongoing medical problems, sexually transmitted 
diseases, unwanted pregnancies, miscarriages for women raped when pregnant, 
inability to control urination, life-altering stigma, ostracism, death, and murder. 
There are also documented cases of the rape of children between 5 and 13 years 
old (Africa Rights Watch 1993).
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 43 See Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005, 143) for a list of failed initiatives to 
protect women in camps.
 44 “Readmission agreements are a key tool in these collaborations. Negotiated by 
the EU with ever more source or transit countries, they require the countries to 
‘take back’ not only their own nationals who have entered and/or stayed illegally 
in an EU member state, but also any other person in this situation, irrespective 
of their nationality. This means that the EU gives these countries a free hand to 
deal with the people sent back to them, regardless of the conditions for return in 
these countries” (ICRC 2012, 30–31).
 45 OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, is a group 
of 34 high-income countries that include many of the countries in Europe, North 
America, Australia, Israel, and Turkey. The largest proportion of funding by the 
OECD, 43%, was dedicated to humanitarian aid, and the second largest share, 
41.8%, went to supporting displaced populations within donor countries (Czech 
Republic, France, Greece, and Turkey each spent more than 95% of their des-
ignated funding for displaced people on support for refugees at home). A much 
smaller amount, 13%, went to development activities in host states to fund basic 
service provision, strengthening governance and security, and support to produc-
tive sectors (ICRC 2012, 176).
 46 Smith quotes Mark Malloch-Brown, who writes, “when a tight-fisted interna-
tional community says to a very poor country it will provide help for refugees 
in camps . . . this evidently encourages that poor country to root out refugees 
who are integrated and plonk them into camps. It is probably no exaggeration 
to claim that without any new refugee outflows, the old donor approach might 
actually lead to growing refugee camp populations in many countries” (Smith 
2004, 48).
 47 My own position is that moral obligations can be grounded on the principle of 
the Good Samaritan, which I discuss in detail in Chapter Two. Further, I think 
that our moral obligations to refugees are rooted in the commitment of West-
ern states to the principles of human rights, found in international Declarations 
(such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and Conventions (such as 
the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
the Convention against Racial Discrimination, among others), which contain 
both moral and legal principles.
 48 Kagan, for example, writes, “why should we think that local governments will 
be willing to open their schools, their medical clinics, their employment markets, 
and their housing supply to refugees, especially in a climate of xenophobia or 
economic distress?” (Kagan 2013).
 49 See UNHCR (2014c). This shift has been said to mark a “paradigm shift in refu-
gee protection” (Hovil 2014). This new policy calls on the UNHCR to pursue 
integration “whenever possible, while ensuring that refugees are protected and 
assisted effectively and are able to achieve solutions” (UNHCR 2014c, 3). What 
this means in practice is that the UNHCR is going to work towards removing 
restrictions so that “refugees have the possibility to live with greater dignity, 
independence and normality as members of the community, either from the 
beginning of displacement or as soon as possible thereafter” (UNHCR 2014c, 4).
 50 This is an extension of the UNHCR’s policy surrounding “urban refugees.” They 
try to ensure that “cities are recognized as legitimate places for refugees to reside 
and exercise their rights” (UNHCR 2014b, 4).
In the last chapter I outlined one of the most pressing problems of global 
justice—our system of responding to mass displacement and the resulting 
use of encampment. In this chapter, I turn to the ways that contemporary 
philosophers have tried to grapple with the moral issues connected to refu-
gees and the ways that philosophers have understood our moral obligations 
to refugees. I provide an overview of the contemporary discussion of the ref-
ugee question through examining the work of six normative philosophers:1 
Michael Walzer, David Miller, Christopher Wellman, Seyla Benhabib, Joseph 
Carens, and Matthew Gibney. These theorists, though concerned about the 
broad question of what justice requires with respect to the treatment of ref-
ugees, focus predominantly on the obligations raised by refugees for West-
ern states in terms of resettlement. I refer to this as the ethics of admissions. 
The ethics of admissions focuses on the question of what moral obligations 
states have to foreigners who seek admission to their countries, and refu-
gees are thought of as one category of people seeking admission. They all 
agree that the fact that people are forcibly displaced from their states is an 
injustice that creates moral obligations for other states, yet they differ as to 
what precisely is entailed in our moral obligations. The six accounts that 
are represented here reflect different perspectives on this issue and show the 
lack of consensus on what moral obligations states have to refugees.
The first three authors, Walzer, Miller, and Wellman, set strong limits on 
our obligations to aid refugees. For Walzer, though we have some obliga-
tions to refugees based on the principle of mutual aid, these obligations 
are limited by the importance of creating and maintaining “communities 
of character” that allow individuals to be rooted in a political community. 
Though David Miller argues that refugees have claims to temporary sanctu-
ary, aid, and even to a state, when these claims conflict with a state’s right 
to self-determination, states may justifiably exclude refugees. Christopher 
Wellman argues that though we may have obligations to help refugees, 
states have no moral obligation to admit refugees for resettlement, a view 
that he grounds in the importance of freedom of association. Throughout 
the chapter I explain why I disagree with these views and suggest some 
reasons why they reflect a limited perspective on our obligations to refugees 
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given the reality of forced displacement in the 21st century. I also stress that 
the fact that they have little or nothing to say about what happens to those 
who Western states justifiably or unjustifiably refuse to resettle reflects the 
limited nature of their view.
Benhabib, Carens, and Gibney take a much broader approach and argue 
for much more extensive obligations to refugees. Benhabib argues that we 
have robust moral obligations to non-citizens, including refugees, who want 
to become members of our polities. These obligations are grounded in two 
features of our contemporary political life: our fundamental global interde-
pendence and the fact that human migration is not an aberration but a basic 
feature of human existence. For both Carens and Gibney, we have robust 
obligations to refugees grounded in the principle of mutual aid or humani-
tarianism. They both insist that Western states ought to consider resettle-
ment a duty and not merely an act of discretion and further, that we ought 
to work towards reformulating the global refugee regime and establishing 
ways of distributing resettlement that are just and do not disproportion-
ally burden some states. I agree in many ways with the arguments by these 
theorists and highlight what I think are the strongest arguments from each. 
In many ways, my arguments complement and enhance the work done by 
other philosophers who are concerned with what an ideal refugee regime 
would look like.
Yet I argue that even these views reflect a limited perspective in that they 
do not say enough about how refugees should be treated in the period dur-
ing their initial displacement and their repatriation or resettlement. Carens 
and Gibney in particular are right that given the current state of the refugee 
regime, resettlement ought to be greatly expanded and classified as a duty. 
However, given the current status quo—that states believe they have no 
legal obligations to resettle refugees, they recognize no moral obligation 
to resettle refugees, and are very unlikely to resettle large numbers—I will 
go on to argue that the duty to resettle needs to be supplemented with an 
ethics of the temporary, a morally acceptable way to house refugees and 
allow them to live with dignity while they are waiting to be resettled or to 
return to their home countries. We have an obligation to explore other ways 
that the refugee regime might be structured so that refugees are not kept in 
camps and are able to maintain their dignity and autonomy. In other words, 
while resettlement may be the ultimate goal, we have to morally scrutinize 
the ways in which the global community cares for the displaced while they 
are waiting for something more permanent since, I as discussed in Chapter 
One, this “temporary” period can last decades, even generations. In other 
words, even among the authors who argue in favor of more robust moral 
obligations, the ethics of the temporary is a neglected moral question.
In short, the goal of this chapter is to show the contributions various phi-
losophers have made towards our understanding of what morality requires 
of us in terms of our treatment of refugees. Yet I also aim to show what 
has been neglected by contemporary philosophers, namely the ethics of the 
temporary and the obligations we have to refugees that we are not able or 
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willing to resettle. I aim to remedy this lack in the subsequent chapters of 
this book.
§ Walzer, Miller, and Wellman
Michael Walzer is among the first philosophers to discuss our moral obliga-
tions to refugees. He initiated the debate by defining them in moral, rather 
than political or legal, terms (Walzer 1983). In his view, refugees differ from 
migrants in general because their claims have a stronger moral dimension. 
Refugees, he writes, “make the most forceful claim for admission. ‘If you 
don’t take me in,’ they say, ‘I shall be killed, persecuted, brutally oppressed 
by the rulers of my own country’ ” (Walzer 1983, 49). Because of the way 
that Walzer understands refugees, he argues that our moral obligations to 
them can only be met by admitting them to our country. For him, by defini-
tion, refugees are people whose “claims cannot be met by yielding territory 
or exporting wealth, but only by taking people in” (Walzer 1983, 48). This 
definition is significant because it lays the foundation for the philosophical 
accounts that followed. His foundational principle is that our obligations 
to refugees can only be met through admission to a country; there is no 
other way to aid vulnerable refugees except through admission. As such, the 
primary moral questions become whether or not we are morally obliged to 
let them in and on what ground. Other questions that follow from an affir-
mation of this question, such as which refugees to take in and how many, 
become secondary. Because of the influence of Walzer’s view on the nature 
of what it means to be a refugee, the questions that are raised in this book 
about the refugee regime in general and our obligations to the displaced 
while they are displaced have largely been ignored.
The question of our moral obligations to refugees goes to the heart of a 
tension in liberal political theory: how to balance treating all people equally 
and at the same time protecting a democracy’s ability to exclude some peo-
ple from citizenship. In other words, the question of how to morally justify 
exclusion while maintaining a commitment to universal human equality has 
posed a challenge for liberals, and thus any liberal position which holds 
that we can deny refugees admission to our country must do so in a way 
that does not deny the fundamental equality of refugees.2 For these two 
reasons—that refugees are defined as people whose legitimate moral claims 
can be met only by admission to a state, and the challenge to a coherent lib-
eral political philosophy—the ethics of admission has dominated the philo-
sophical landscape. Working out the ethical parameters around admissions 
has sparked a lively debate.3
Not only did Walzer define the terms of the debate, he also provided one 
of the most influential answers. He argues that states have a moral right to 
control their borders, grounded in the importance of creating “communities 
of character” that allow individuals to be rooted in a political community. 
Yet we also have obligations to help needy strangers, rooted in the principle 
of mutual aid.4 In his view, states have a moral obligation to take in refugees 
54 Refugees in Contemporary Political Philosophy
because of the sheer moral force of their claim, but it is up to states to decide 
which refugees and how many it is able to take without fundamentally chal-
lenging the nature of their communities. His goal was to balance moral 
equality with political closure. As a result, his position requires that we take 
the moral claims of the forcibly displaced seriously—theirs is a condition of 
“infinite danger”—yet it does not require states to do anything that would 
radically challenge their self-understanding, such as opening their borders 
and taking in large numbers of refugees with no affinity with the state (Wal-
zer 1983, 32). Ultimately although refugees, like all people, have a right to 
membership in some state, this right does not trump the right of individual 
states to self-determination. Since Walzer’s position on refugees has been so 
influential, it is worth looking at how he arrives at his conclusions in more 
detail.
He begins his discussion of immigration by noting that the “primary good 
that we distribute to one another is membership in some human commu-
nity” (Walzer 1983, 31). The reason membership is so important is because 
it structures all other choices regarding distributive justice—who gets to 
determine the shape of the political community through voting or holding 
office, who pays taxes, who receives social benefits, goods, and services. 
Even if you can participate in the market without political membership, you 
are cut off from provisions around security and welfare. More importantly, 
people without membership can always be expelled. This leads Walzer to 
conclude that being without political membership “is a condition of infi-
nite danger” (Walzer 1983, 32). Membership is not something that citizens 
distribute among themselves, but rather it is something that is given by citi-
zens to strangers or outsiders. Deciding how to distribute this to strangers 
requires that citizens make decisions about strangers and determine with 
whom they want to share their political communities.
There is a moral question posed by “necessitous strangers,” both eco-
nomic migrants and the forcibly displaced: do we have a moral obligation 
to admit them to our countries? Walzer disagrees with what might be under-
stood as the conventional view that holds that we only have negative duties 
to people who are not fellow citizens, duties not to kill, rob, or harm them, 
but no positive duties to provide aid since positive duties occur only among 
fellow citizens. He disagrees with this because there is in his view at least 
one positive moral principle that extends to all people regardless of citizen-
ship: the principle of mutual aid, also known as the Good Samaritan prin-
ciple. This principle holds that if two strangers meet and one is in need of 
help, the other person ought to help if the need is urgent and the risks and 
costs of helping are low.
Walzer notes that the philosophical ground of this principle is hard to 
specify; he thinks that Rawls is wrong to argue that this principle can be 
established simply by imagining what society would be like if this duty were 
rejected since this is not a duty that arises among citizens (who have much 
stronger duties to each other). It is a duty we have to people we do not share 
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a political life with. On the international level, outside of individual societ-
ies, we already do disregard the principle of mutual aid and do not find 
the consequences—millions of people dying from preventable causes, for 
example—to be intolerable. Walzer insists that the principle of mutual aid is 
more coercive for political communities than for individuals because there 
is a broad range of actions that a community can do to provide aid that 
only weakly impacts the members of the community. For Walzer, despite its 
vagueness, mutual aid is an external principle for the distribution of mem-
bership and it requires that we at least take seriously the demands of refu-
gees to be admitted to our country.
Recall that for Walzer, refugees must be understood as a group “of needy 
outsiders whose claims cannot be met by yielding territory or exporting 
wealth; they can be met only by taking people in” (Walzer 1983, 48). What 
must we do for victims of political or religious persecution, victims who say, 
“if you don’t take me in . . . I shall be killed, persecuted, brutally oppressed 
by the rulers of my own country” (Walzer 1983, 49)? Given the urgency of 
their need and our ability to help, Walzer claims that states cannot simply 
refuse to let in any needy foreigners. This is based on his endorsement of 
the Hobbesian idea that you cannot prevent people from seeking what they 
need to survive just for the sake of “things superfluous,” that is, anything 
other than what is needed for bare survival (Walzer 1983, 46–47). Does that 
mean we have obligations to admit refugees? Yes and no.
For Walzer, because of the principle of mutual aid, we are obliged to admit 
some refugees but, because of the importance of maintaining communities 
of character, it is up to each state to decide how many and which refugees 
they want to take in. He argues that one of the reasons that would obli-
gate a country to accept refugees is affinity, political, religious, or cultural. 
“The repression of political comrades, like the persecution of co-religionists, 
seems to generate an obligation to help, at least to provide refuge for the 
most exposed and endangered people” (Walzer 1983, 49). Yet he acknowl-
edges that the principle of mutual aid combined with affinity only works 
when numbers are small. When numbers are large, “we will look, rightfully, 
for some more direct connection with our own way of life” (Walzer 1983, 
49). Since communities are based on a sense of relatedness and mutuality, 
refugees “must appeal to that sense” (Walzer 1983, 50). For Walzer, refu-
gees are those people fleeing persecution, in relatively small numbers, who 
can appeal to states on the principle of mutual aid and based on their affin-
ity. Of the large numbers of people who are de facto refugees, but cannot 
make any kind of direct appeal to more affluent countries on the grounds of 
political, cultural, or racial affinity, Walzer has little to say. His view would 
seem to justify our political indifference to this group and gives us little rea-
son for taking seriously the harms of encampment or warehousing.
He acknowledges that his position on refugees doesn’t really help us to 
deal with the large numbers of refugees generated by 20th century politics 
and the fundamental dilemma that is at the heart of it: on the one hand, 
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everyone must have a place to live, “where a reasonably secure life is pos-
sible,” yet on the other hand, this is a right that cannot be enforced against 
any particular state (Walzer 1983, 50). We can mitigate the “cruelty of this 
dilemma” via the principle of asylum, according to which any refugee who 
has actually made an escape and found temporary refuge can claim asylum 
and not be expelled from this territory. “Though he is a stranger, and newly 
come, the rule against expulsion applies to him as if he had already made a 
life where he is: for there is no other place where he can make a life” (Walzer 
1983, 50).
The principle of asylum is grounded on two reasons: to deny it would 
require that we use force against “helpless and desperate people,” and the 
numbers are likely to be small and easily absorbed (Walzer 1983, 51).5 
Walzer argues that when asylum seekers arrive in Western countries, states 
should simply not resist. When it comes to asylum, states are not actively 
helping refugees but simply refraining from stopping people in need from 
taking what is needed. Walzer goes so far as to say that the claims of these 
needy foreigners are so strong that if “driven by famine in the densely popu-
lated lands of Southeast Asia, thousands of people were to fight their way 
into an Australia otherwise closed to them, I doubt that we would want to 
charge the invaders with aggression” (Walzer 1983, 46). Though the prin-
ciple of asylum, ultimately rooted in the principle of mutual aid, is so impor-
tant as to allow the invasion of thousands of needy people into a country, 
it ought not to transform admission policies that are rooted in a country’s 
understanding of itself. For Walzer, the balance between helping those in 
need and having sovereign control of immigration policies must always tip 
towards the latter.
Ultimately, states retain the right to control immigration and admissions, 
and this includes discretion to choose which refugees to admit and how 
many. The root of his argument is that political communities require closure 
in order to preserve the distinctiveness of cultures and groups. The distinc-
tiveness of cultural or communal life is something that most people value; 
it is the reason people often want to immigrate to a particular country and 
hence why migration is an important political issue. This is why political 
communities must “claim authority to make its own admissions policy, to 
control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants” (Walzer 1983, 39). 
He goes on to say that restrictions on immigration are justifiable in order 
to preserve communities of character. “The distinctiveness of cultures and 
groups depends upon closure,” writes Walzer, “and, without it, cannot be 
conceived as a stable feature of human life” (Walzer 1983, 39). Without 
closure there could not be communities of character, “historically stable, 
ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to 
one another and some special sense of their common life” (Walzer 1983, 
62).6 Without closure, with a global state, human beings would lose this cul-
tural distinction and we would be left with “radically deracinated men and 
women” (Walzer 1983, 39). The right to control admission and to exclude 
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some goes to the heart of communal independence and is at the core of the 
meaning of self-determination. This is not to say that countries are free to 
make decisions on immigration on any grounds—they must be subject to 
some constraints though Walzer acknowledges that he cannot specify fully 
what these might be; it ultimately remains a matter of political decision as to 
what kind of community citizens want to create and with what other people 
they want to share and exchange social goods (1983, 40).
In short, for Walzer a state’s right to control borders is rooted in a moral 
commitment to the importance of distinct communities and the need for 
roots and connection. He writes, “the collective version of mutual aid might 
require a limited and complex redistribution of membership and/or terri-
tory. Farther than this we cannot go” (Walzer 1983, 47). Paradoxically, 
the importance of community is what allows us, if necessary, to exclude 
people from a given territory. This right to self-determination embodied in 
immigration policy is never absolute; it must be subject to certain moral 
constraints, and states are never justified in refusing entry to at least some 
refugees when they are able to take them in. In this respect, Walzer is argu-
ing that the claims of refugees ought to be given much greater moral consid-
eration than they usually receive in domestic immigration policy, requiring 
states to either adjust their immigration policies or to distribute wealth to 
alleviate some of the suffering. Nonetheless, the right to self-determination 
is a right that trumps the right of refugees to a state.
When the problem of our moral obligations to refugees is framed in the 
way that Walzer frames it—as a tension between the moral right of states 
to control immigration as they wish and the right of all people to a political 
community—it appears that our morally appropriate responses to the forc-
ibly displaced are limited. If the primary way of aiding the displaced is by 
granting admission, and states are justified in not granting admission on the 
grounds of communal identity, then it seems that there is very little we can 
actually do to change this situation.
Though extremely influential, I think Walzer’s account is problematic for 
a number of reasons. First, his view of the problem with refugees—that 
they need a new home—is too narrow. He excludes other ways that states 
may be able to aid the forcibly displaced whom we choose not to admit, 
namely by refusing to support policies of encampment and warehousing, 
by funding local integration, and by insisting that aid money be contingent 
on respecting the basic rights of the forcibly displaced. The question that 
Walzer never raised is, what happens to people who states exclude on the 
grounds of preserving communities of character? As discussed in Chapter 
One, most forcibly displaced people remain in a position of statelessness for 
a prolonged period of time, where they are without political rights, com-
munity, or representation. Prolonged encampment and long-term displace-
ment, which are in many circumstances the result of uncoordinated policies 
of various sovereign states each acting to preserve their “communities of 
character,” are never raised as moral issues.
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In other words, for Walzer, an insufficient understanding of the global ref-
ugee regime led to an unhelpfully narrow perspective on our obligations. As 
described in Chapter One, the outcome of each country acting to preserve 
the interests and character of their states is a de facto policy of encampment 
and containment that systematically denies the human rights of millions of 
people for sustained periods of time. Because of this narrow perspective, 
other ways of aiding refugees besides resettlement (such as by refusing to 
support policies of encampment and warehousing, funding local integra-
tion, and insisting that aid money be contingent on respecting the basic 
rights of the forcibly displaced) are never considered.
David Miller, in taking up the issue of our responsibility to refugees, takes 
a similar tragic view of our obligation to help. He argues strongly for the 
injustice of permanent refugee camps yet does not see a way out of the situ-
ation given the “tragic choice” between the rights of refugees and the right 
to self-determination. He writes, “when a refugee applies to be admitted to 
a state that is able to guarantee her such rights, then prima facie the state in 
question has an obligation to let her in” (Miller 2007, 225). This, he is quick 
to point out, is not the same as a right to immigrate or a right to citizenship; 
it is only a claim to “temporary sanctuary,” a place where immediate secu-
rity can be guaranteed (Miller 2007, 202). States then have an obligation to 
admit refugees at least temporarily on the assumption that they will return 
to their home countries once the cause of their flight has lost its force. This 
he thinks is an appropriate solution for people fleeing civil wars and other 
temporary conflicts.
Another way to discharge the duty we have to refugees is to establish 
“safety zones” closer to their home. Once this is established, we can then 
deal with the root cause of the rights violation either by “sending in food 
and medical aid, or intervening to remove a genocidal regime from power” 
(Miller 2007, 225).7 Miller is aware of the danger of these temporary safety 
zones becoming permanent and argues that this would be unacceptable 
since we owe refugees more than just the protection of their basic rights. 
Refugees, he claims, “are owed the opportunity to make a decent life for 
themselves in the place that they live” (Miller 2007, 225). If it is the case 
that a refugee residing in a given country will not be able to return to his 
home, that country has to give him the opportunity to acquire full citizen-
ship. Miller insists that refugees cannot be kept in a temporary status for 
the long term. Refugee camps “must not become permanent settlements 
by default” (Miller 2007, 225). Yet Miller gives us no reason to think the 
displaced can challenge the state sovereignty that keeps them excluded and 
contained in refugee camps. As Chapter One demonstrated, this has become 
more or less the status quo.
Despite the injustices Miller lists above—that refugees have a right to a 
state, that long-term temporary status is not acceptable—he still holds that 
because states have a right to determine membership, there is no guarantee 
that “every bona fide refugee will find a state willing to take her in” (Miller 
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2007, 227). “At the limit,” he argues, “we may face tragic cases where the 
human rights of the refugees clash with a legitimate claim by the receiv-
ing state that its obligation to admit refugees has already been exhausted” 
(Miller 2007, 227). For Miller, refugees have a strong but not absolute 
right to a political community. It is worth pointing out that though Miller 
acknowledges that permanent refugee camps and long-term exclusion and 
displacement ought to be rejected morally, Miller seems to treat this sta-
tus quo as a less-than-ideal but nonetheless acceptable consequence of his 
views of immigration. For both Miller and Walzer, there is something tragic 
about the conflict between the right to self-determination and the rights of 
each person to belong to some political community; but both are willing to 
accept this conflict and ultimately seem to think of it as a morally serious, 
but marginal, situation.
Though Miller is in many ways aware of the problems with the contem-
porary treatment of refugees (such as refugee camps becoming permanent), 
he does not provide any resources for thinking about how to challenge the 
moral defects in the status quo. Though he acknowledges that refugees have 
strong claims on Western states, the moral obligations they give rise to are 
ultimately very weak. For him, refugees have a claim to temporary sanctu-
ary where they can be secure until they are able to return home. Yet this 
solution is inadequate for a number of reasons discussed in Chapter One. 
First, the norm for “temporary sanctuary” is now 17 years. This challenges 
what refugees are owed in this temporary period—while tents might be jus-
tifiable for a few months, people cannot be expected to live like this for 
years or generations; yet thinking about the claims of refugees as merely 
those of “temporary sanctuary” makes their terrible treatment appear nor-
mal and justifiable. As I argued in Chapter One, we must reconsider what is 
owed to refugees who are living in “temporary” situations that in fact last 
for decades. Second, the assumption that repatriation is the best outcome 
serves to justify long-term encampment and makes it less likely that other 
solutions such as resettlement or local integration will be pursued. The pro-
motion of repatriation, as I demonstrated in Chapter One, serves to give a 
moral foundation and thus support the practices of long-term encampment 
and warehousing. For these reasons, Miller’s approach to the problem of 
what we owe to refugees remains inadequate.
Like Miller and Walzer, Christopher Wellman agrees that our obligations 
to refugees are limited. He has written an account of why states do not have 
strong—or, rather, any—obligations to admit refugees. His account differs 
significantly from those of Walzer and Miller because it does not endorse the 
partialist claim that states have obligations to their fellow citizens in virtue 
of their connection to each other; he puts forth a universalist understanding 
of rights. That is, he does not think the right to exclude refugees is grounded 
on the need to protect unique cultures or preserve a people’s identity. On the 
contrary, he starts from the liberal view that holds freedom and autonomy 
to be the central focus of state protection. On the ground of freedom of 
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association, Wellman is able to show that though we may have obligations 
to help refugees, this does not include an obligation to admit refugees into 
our country. This position makes him unique in the literature—he is will-
ing to grant that the principle of the Good Samaritan requires that we help 
those in desperate need, including refugees, yet denies that we are required 
to admit refugees.
Wellman seeks to ground a state’s right to exclude all potential immi-
grants, even refugees from its territory, by appealing to the right of free-
dom of association. His argument for this is straightforward: freedom of 
association is highly valued in society, and this right includes the right not 
to associate with people we do not want to. He argues for the right of 
a state to freedom of association by showing how this parallels the right 
for individuals. In both marriage and religion—two domains of fundamen-
tal importance to humans—freedom of association is critical. This reflects 
the importance for all people of being able to have “dominion over our 
self-regarding affairs” (Wellman 2008, 110). Yet just as an individual has 
a right to determine whom she should marry, citizens have the right to 
determine who will share their political lives and can legitimately choose to 
exclude anyone they don’t want.
Wellman’s argument hinges on the analogy between states and individu-
als. He responds to the criticism that there are morally relevant differences 
between individuals and groups that could explain why individuals possess 
the right to freedom of association and groups do not by noting that by and 
large, most people presume that states have this right. States would not have 
the ability to take collective action or join with other entities without this 
right; NAFTA and the EU would not be imaginable without the presumptive 
right to freedom of association.
Wellman is careful to note that he is not arguing that freedom of asso-
ciation is an absolute right; it is merely a presumptive right that may be 
overridden by other factors. States have a right to order their affairs as they 
please, and this right of autonomy entails the right to include only those 
members it chooses to include, but this right can be outweighed by “suf-
ficiently compelling considerations” (Wellman 2008, 111).
If we follow Wellman in concluding that states, like individuals, have a 
presumptive right to freedom of association, and this right includes the right 
to not associate with some, then it is clear why it follows that states have a 
right to exclude any would-be immigrant, including refugees. We can note 
here how his position differs from Walzer: for Walzer, while states in general 
have no obligation to admit immigrants, they do have obligations to admit 
some refugees because of the nature of their moral claim on us and the fact 
that help cannot be exported in the form of food or aid. Wellman turns this 
idea on its head. For him, states have absolutely no obligation to admit 
refugees because of the right of freedom of association, but he acknowledges 
the Samaritan obligations that states have to “export” aid in some way. For 
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Wellman, this gives rise to strong obligations to help refugees, but not ones 
that include admission.
His argument for this position is as follows. In responding to the egali-
tarian objection to his view, Wellman insists that the injustice that needs to 
be addressed is poverty and the suffering of the poor, not merely inequal-
ity or moral luck (that citizenship is morally arbitrary since it is based on 
the place we happen to be born into rather than on morally relevant fac-
tors such as hard work). Our duty to aid the poor in other countries is 
rooted in our “natural duty to assist others when we can at no unreason-
able cost to ourselves” (Wellman 2008, 124). In short, for Wellman, we 
have natural duties to aid the poor, Samaritan duties, but these duties do 
not trump the presumptive right of freedom of association and hence, do 
not require that we admit refugees. This remains true even when he grants 
that contemporary structures of globalization entail that “virtually all of the 
world’s people now share some type of relationship” (Wellman 2008, 123). 
Because he endorses a view of relational egalitarianism, he is committed to 
the view that the more robust our relationships are, the deeper our obli-
gations and connections are. This is because despite the close connections 
between apparent strangers forged by globalization, relationships between 
co-citizens remain of a different nature and importance. Consequently, even 
though he acknowledges the “stringent duties” that we may have to foreign-
ers that are rooted in the duty to aid, these duties can be fully satisfied with-
out allowing them to immigrate into our countries and become members.
He gives support for this conclusion by again drawing an analogy with 
individuals. Just as no one would require individuals to fight poverty by 
insisting wealthy people marry poor ones, we cannot insist that wealthy 
countries fight global poverty by admitting the global poor. The right to 
freedom of association exists in a different and separate domain from our 
duties of distributive justice. Because of the importance of keeping these 
domains separated, Wellman insists that we can discharge our duties to 
refugees in other ways than resettling them. In particular, he argues that we 
could fulfill this obligation by “exporting justice” such as through military 
interventions that would rectify an unjust political environment and ensure 
the safety of would-be refugees. The example he provides is setting up no-fly 
zones in Iraq to protect Kurds from a government that had lost legitimacy 
because it was unwilling or unable to protect the basic rights of its citizens. 
Though he acknowledges that such action is not always easy or the best 
thing to do, it shows at a minimum that states can acknowledge obligations 
to help refugees who are in desperate need of a home without allowing that 
this obligation should trump the right to freedom of association.
While Wellman makes a compelling case for the right of states to exclude 
refugees for asylum and resettlement, his analysis fails to acknowledge the 
current global reality of mass displacement and the result that some coun-
try or countries cannot exercise the right to freedom of association. That 
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is, even if Wellman is right that freedom of association permits one nation 
to close its borders to all refugees, because the forcibly displaced must live 
somewhere, some other country must admit them. To point out a truism, 
because involuntary migrants are embodied creatures, they must inhabit 
some physical space on the earth.8 Because there is finite space on the earth, 
some state must forfeit its sovereign right to control its borders and exclude 
refugees and asylum seekers. There has to be at least one country that is not 
free to reject the displaced on the grounds of freedom of association.
In other words, Western states’ enjoyment of the right of freedom of 
association and the right to refuse all refugees requires some other state or 
states to give up this right, since refugees—people who have fled their own 
country—must have some state and territory to live in. This remains true 
even if the state that takes in refugees is compensated financially or politi-
cally (through better terms for trade, for example) since it is still true that 
some country would have to accept these terms and allow the displaced 
onto their territory. If Wellman would like to preserve the right of freedom 
of association on universal grounds, he needs to take seriously the larger 
context in which this right functions.
Note that this does not apply to immigration in general. If all countries 
were to decide to exercise their sovereign right of freedom of association 
and exclude all immigrants, such people would be able to stay where they 
are, even if they have a strong preference for emigrating. However, this is 
precisely how immigrants in general differ from forced migrants like refu-
gees and asylum seekers—they cannot stay where they are and continue to 
live a decent life and sometimes continue to live at all. If refugees are forced 
to return to their countries once they have left, then they may be killed, 
tortured, or experience other forms of intolerable suffering. The right of 
freedom of association as the ground for a state’s right to control immigra-
tion and membership seems to hold only for immigration in general but not 
for forced migrants in particular.
Wellman concludes that even though the right of freedom of association 
means that we have no obligations to admit refugees, we nonetheless still 
have obligations to help. For Wellman, refugees and asylum seekers can be 
assisted, like “impoverished foreigners,” through “exporting justice” (Well-
man 2008, 129). Though not always advisable, one way to help would be 
to “intervene, militarily if necessary, in an unjust political environment to 
ensure that those currently vulnerable to the state are made safe in their 
homelands” (Wellman 2008, 129). This would not constitute a violation 
of sovereignty in the country intervened in because a country that produces 
asylum seekers is no longer a legitimate state. The duty to help is a “disjunc-
tive duty”: if states choose not to admit people fleeing their home countries, 
aid must be exported so that they no longer fear their domestic regimes. He, 
like Miller, is suggesting that simply shutting borders and doing nothing for 
the plight of refugees is not an option.
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What I am suggesting is that given the 65.3 to 72 million people who 
lack a secure political community, military intervention to secure their states 
would either be impossible or mean committing ourselves to permanent and 
global warfare, often times with countries which in other respects are con-
sidered friends and allies (Pakistan, Iraq, etc.). Yet if we bracket his proposal 
for military intervention, one thing his work makes clear is that if we do 
have obligations to help refugees, they can extend beyond admitting them 
into our countries (though, as I will suggest, these aspects do not need to 
be mutually exclusive). I would like to suggest that we interpret Wellman’s 
proposal to “export justice” as a way of responding to our obligations to 
refugees by some of the broader proposals that I will make throughout the 
book, such as encouraging other countries to resettle refugees, supporting 
policies around “temporary local integration” rather than refugee camps in 
countries which host refugees, and ultimately, by working towards a global 
agreement to set up a just refugee regime.
In short, Wellman’s view, that the principle of freedom of association 
legitimizes a state’s right to exclude refugees, cannot hold in a global com-
munity where over 65.3 million people are forced to live outside of their 
homes and some state or states are required to host them on their territory. 
Further, military intervention as a way of exporting justice may turn out to 
be more morally problematic than resettling refugees. As such, Wellman’s 
view, like that of Walzer and Miller, does not adequately define our moral 
obligations to refugees.
§ Benhabib, Carens, and Gibney
In this section I highlight some alternative philosophical perspectives on 
forced displacement and show the ways in which more robust moral obli-
gations may be grounded. To this end, I discuss the views of Benhabib, 
Carens, and Gibney, who all argue that we have more robust obligations 
to the displaced. Their positions show that we need not be constrained in 
thinking about obligations to refugees in the ways that Walzer, Miller, and 
Wellman suggest. Yet the views of Carens, Gibney, and Benhabib are limited 
in several ways. First, all three authors still place the most emphasis on the 
ethics of admission and working out moral norms around resettlement. As 
a result, though they all express an awareness of some of the difficulties 
around the current treatment of the displaced in the refugee regime, no one 
devotes a sustained analysis to it. Second, they fail to apply the principles 
they develop to the harms of encampment and containment. There are a 
number of resources within their positions that help us to think more clearly 
about what we owe the millions of people who are displaced and will seem-
ingly never find a permanent home.
Seyla Benhabib’s work on migration provides rich resources for think-
ing about our moral obligations to refugees. Benhabib (2004, 2011) takes 
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up the issue of the morality of migration by considering “just member-
ship practices.” By just membership practices she means “principles and 
practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcom-
ers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities” (Benhabib 2004, 1, 
2011, 138–139). She aims to lay a moral foundation for democratic states 
to mediate between the legitimate claims of outsiders who seek entrance 
into a given state with the will of citizens that, often at least, would prefer 
to exclude many or all outsiders. Her most important contribution to the 
debate on our moral obligations to refugees is not, I believe, this normative 
position, namely that though there is a human right to membership, this 
right must be balanced with the will of democratic majorities. Though inter-
esting, this position ultimately does not further our moral obligations and 
lands us close to the current status quo (namely that we have some obliga-
tions to refugees but there is a lot of room for discretion). This aspect of her 
work can be broadly understood to be a contribution to the debate over the 
ethics of admission, the debate over who we are morally obliged to admit to 
our countries, and who we can justify excluding.
More significantly, her work shifts our thinking about membership prac-
tices per se. Benhabib argues that philosophers need to take seriously the 
new ways that membership exists around the world and that citizenship can 
be disaggregated without there being a violation of anyone’s rights. In our 
current philosophical discourse, we have an all or nothing approach—either 
you are a citizen of a state with the ability to claim rights or you are a dis-
placed person, outside the nation-state system, and at the mercy of host 
governments and humanitarian organizations which may or may not rec-
ognize your rights. What Benhabib points out is that one can imagine other 
forms of political membership that may be more appropriate for displaced 
people who live for prolonged periods of time in host states but nonetheless 
will never be integrated politically, via citizenship, in the country. It is worth 
looking carefully at her position.
Benhabib starts from the position that we do in fact have moral obli-
gations to non-citizens, including refugees, who want to become members 
of our polities and goes so far as to claim that there is a “human right to 
membership,” though no right to be admitted to a state.9 A human right to 
membership is not a right to be admitted to the country of your choosing. 
The right only becomes relevant once you have been admitted to a state. 
Benhabib distinguishes five stages of migration—emigration, entry into 
a foreign country, absorption of short or long duration (visitation, study, 
business), residency of significant duration, and finally naturalization (i.e., 
access to citizenship rights). Once an individual has been admitted to a state 
in the second stage and has fulfilled certain conditions, a right to member-
ship follows.10 These obligations to non-citizens on the part of states are 
grounded on (i) our radical interdependence, and (ii) the fact that human 
migration is not an aberration but a feature of human existence. Let me 
begin by explaining the latter point.
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For Benhabib, not only should migration not be treated as an anomaly 
that need not be taken seriously in normative theory (as Rawls does11), but 
rather she acknowledges a new contemporary reality where migration is a 
fact of life and non-citizens occupy various political positions. One of the 
grounds for Benhabib’s argument for a human right to membership is the 
observation that in our contemporary, globalized world, “new modalities of 
membership” have emerged as a result of trends in migration and the reality 
that many non-citizens of various statuses live in a given territory (Benhabib 
2004, 1). The result is that it no longer makes sense to think about politi-
cal membership as it had been thought of before: as a status given only to 
long-term residents of a given territory, united by a shared national identity 
and culture, and comprising political citizenship. Rather than fear these new 
forms of attachments and see them as threats to national stability, Benhabib 
argues that “subnational as well as supranational spaces for democratic 
attachments and agency are emerging in the contemporary world, and they 
ought to be advanced with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities” (Ben-
habib 2004, 3). Though this view of citizenship challenges conventional 
understandings of sovereignty, she insists that this challenge need not be 
feared but ought to be embraced. Benhabib’s account is particularly help-
ful since she acknowledges the importance of the role that transnational 
political actors—migrants, refugees, stateless people for example—play in 
contemporary political life and the need to find a place for them in our 
moral theory.
“Peoples are radically and not merely episodically interdependent” (Ben-
habib 2004, 93). This acknowledgment of our fundamental interdependence 
must be understood as the second ground of the right to membership. “The 
international system of peoples and states is characterized by such exten-
sive interdependencies and the historical crisscrossing of fates and fortunes 
that the scope of special as well as general moral obligations to our fellow 
human beings far transcends the perspective of the territorially bounded 
state-centric system” (Benhabib 2004, 37). Indeed, she argues that recogni-
tion of the economic interdependence of peoples in a world society is what 
is missing from both Kant and Arendt, and renders them of limited use in 
the contemporary world in which economic interdependence is inescapable 
(Benhabib 2004, 72).
For Benhabib, the correct way to understand justice and moral obliga-
tions is not from the point of view of citizens within states but from the 
“world society” perspective, a perspective that sees migration as a complex 
global phenomenon. This perspective holds that the state is one entity on the 
global stage but certainly not the only or even necessarily the most impor-
tant one. In the “global civil society,” there are a host of other forms of 
associations that play increasingly important roles—individuals who move 
between states (migrants, refugees, asylum seekers); global economic insti-
tutions like the WTO and IMF; and transnational political institutions like 
the UN and the European Union. This means that in an important sense, 
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the international political world has different levels of organization, asso-
ciation, and networks of interdependence that have different principles of 
organization (Benhabib 2004, 112).
It is from this perspective of a world society that we can correctly reason 
about our obligations across borders (Benhabib 2004, 37). According to 
this perspective, we ought to acknowledge the Kantian principle that if my 
actions affect the actions of others, then we have an obligation to regu-
late our actions under a common law that respects our equality as moral 
agents. Consequences of actions generate moral obligations, and once we 
become aware of how our actions influence the well-being of others, we 
must assume responsibility for the unintended and invisible consequences 
of our actions (Benhabib 2004, 104). The more we become aware of our 
interdependencies and the effects of our actions on others, the more respon-
sible we become. This leads her to conclude in agreement with Pogge and 
Beitz that radical interdependence and de facto migration means that we 
have obligations beyond the Rawlsian “duty to assist” (Rawls 2001). For 
example, we have become increasingly aware that our patterns of energy 
consumption have environmental implications for people on the other side 
of the planet; “there is a dialectic here between the growth of social knowl-
edge and the spread of moral responsibility” (Benhabib 2004, 104). One 
implication of this interdependence for Benhabib is that national policies 
and laws around citizenship and refugees should not be seen as unilateral 
acts of self-determination, where individual states exercise their right to 
determine the shape of their own communities. Rather, such decisions must 
be seen as “decisions with multilateral consequences that influence other 
entities in the world community. Sovereignty is a relational concept” (Ben-
habib 2004, 21).
Her moral argument for this right is as follows. If I am a member of a 
state in to which you are seeking membership, then I must be able to show 
you with good grounds, “grounds that would be acceptable to each of us 
equally,” why you can never join (Benhabib 2004, 138). In order for these 
grounds to be mutually acceptable, they cannot be based on the kind of 
being that you are; that is, they cannot be based on your race, religion, 
gender, etc. Such grounds would not be permissible because they would 
reduce your capacity to exercise communicative freedom to the characteris-
tics which were given to you by chance that you did not choose (Benhabib 
2004, 139). Criteria that do not deny your communicative freedom—such 
as qualifications, marketable skills, material resources, length of stay, and 
language skills—are acceptable.
Benhabib puts forth an argument in favor of a disaggregated model of 
citizenship, where the practices and institutions of citizenship can be sepa-
rated into three distinct categories: collective identity, privileges of political 
membership, and social rights and claims (Benhabib 2004, 145). This can be 
contrasted with what she refers to as the unitary model, where continuous 
residence in a territory is combined with a shared national identity, political 
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rights, and common administrative jurisdiction. The existence of such dis-
aggregated citizenship can be seen in the EU, where although the rights of 
European citizens are separated from those of non-citizens, there are differ-
ent rights and privileges that are afforded to non-members at local, national, 
and supranational levels. As a result, a person “can have one set of rights 
but not another: one can have political rights without being a national, as is 
the case for EU nationals” (Benhabib 2004, 146). The Dutch model seems 
to be one exemplary way of distributing rights. The Netherlands grants 
“city-citizenship” to foreigners after five years of residency and allows them 
to take part in citywide elections and form political parties. This is a way 
of granting political voice, agency, and representation to non-citizens who 
are long-term residents and allows their views and needs to be better rep-
resented in national political dialogues. This does not alter their citizenship 
status as such—they are still not permitted to move freely within the EU 
as other European citizens are, for example—but it does provide a crucial 
way to grant some political rights to non-citizen residents. The danger, as 
Benhabib acknowledges, is that some residents will be permanently alien-
ated from citizenship rights in this model but disaggregation seems to be the 
way political membership is moving. Because of its political importance, 
political philosophers ought to take this model more seriously in theorizing 
about citizenship.
Though Benhabib is at heart a cosmopolitan, she takes seriously the 
importance of local attachments. At the core of her work is the idea that 
there must be some mediation and convergence between the will of demo-
cratic majorities and international moral and legal norms. This work of 
mediation is best done, she argues, through “democratic iterations,” which 
are “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and learning 
through which universalist right claims are contested and contextualized, 
invoked and revoked, throughout legal and political institutions as well as 
in the public sphere of liberal democracies” (Benhabib 2004, 19). Elsewhere 
she writes that democratic iterations are “moral and political dialogues in 
which global principles and norms are appropriated and reiterated by con-
stituencies of all sizes, in a series of interlocking conversations and interac-
tions” (Benhabib 2004, 113). The idea of democratic iterations is roughly 
Benhabib’s response to the question “what do we owe refugees?” In short, 
the answer is not absolute, but open to a degree of variation depending 
on how individual states mediate between local claims and international 
norms. Such mediation will not lead to clear and predictable outcomes but 
has the benefit of avoiding coercive enforcement since states are able to 
make international principles compatible with their national orientations.
Benhabib is clear that our radical interdependence and the moral respon-
sibilities that this gives rise to must be balanced with the will of democratic 
states, and this constrains what we are obliged to do for refugees and others. 
Her belief in a human right to membership and the importance of disag-
gregated citizenship leads her to oppose practices that prevent people from 
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seeking access to Western countries, especially refugees. For example, as 
a result of the perceived will of the citizens of Europe, European Union 
officials have begun to cooperate with leaders of the countries from which 
many refugees flee (“sender” countries) in order to prevent asylum seekers 
from arriving on European shores and to facilitate their readmission to their 
home countries. This of course is terrible for the asylum seekers themselves, 
who are fleeing these states that they perceive as oppressive. In other words, 
the simple will of a democracy is not sufficient to justify policies around 
membership practices; these must also be balanced with the moral obliga-
tions that arise out of our deep global interdependence.
Ultimately Benhabib agrees with Hannah Arendt (whom I will discuss in 
more detail in the next chapter) on the current condition of refugees. She 
acknowledges that although we have made a lot of progress on our treat-
ment of refugees, Arendt’s claim that losing citizenship status is tantamount 
to losing human rights is not altogether wrong. “Even in one of the most 
developed rights regimes of our world, refugees and asylum seekers still 
find themselves in quasi-criminal status. Their human rights are curtailed; 
they have no civil and political rights of association and representation. The 
extension of full human rights to these individuals and the decriminalization 
of their status is one of the most important tasks of cosmopolitan justice in 
our world” (Benhabib 2004, 168).
Though innovative in many ways, Benhabib’s position does not help us 
to see how to extend our moral obligations to the displaced much beyond 
the status quo. Because so much of her work is focused on our moral obli-
gations to admit refugees, she does not consider how we ought to treat the 
millions of people for whom no one acknowledges a right to membership. 
Further, she thinks that states can deny entrance to people so long as the 
state does not deny their communicative freedom; a state must be able to 
give “grounds that would be acceptable to each of us equally” why an indi-
vidual cannot join (Benhabib 2004, 138). Grounds that do not deny com-
municative freedom are qualifications, marketable skills, material resources, 
length of stay, and language skills. This in many ways seems to parallel the 
justification that states that host large populations of displaced people give 
for not integrating them, temporarily or permanently. Namely, the justifica-
tion that the displaced can be denied membership is often precisely that they 
would be too much of an economic drain on the society since they lack skills 
and material resources, and may be linguistically, racially, and ethnically 
different. In Benhabib’s view, this would seem to be a sufficient reason to 
deny membership since it does not deny the communicative freedom of the 
displaced. Yet this is precisely the thinking that has led to the current status 
quo around refugee warehousing and long-term encampment.
Nonetheless, there are two essential elements from Benhabib’s analysis 
that are important for a richer understanding of our moral obligations to 
refugees. First, we must understand the problem of displacement from a 
global perspective, from the perspective of a “world society” (Benhabib 
Refugees in Contemporary Political Philosophy 69
2004). When we look at the problem of refugees from a state level and focus 
only on how many refugees we are obliged to admit, it is easy to ignore 
the question of what happens to the millions of people who are excluded 
from all states. It is also a perspective that allows us to see—and morally 
evaluate—non-state actors who play important roles in the refugee regime, 
such as the UNHCR and other NGOs. From Benhabib’s perspective, the 
complexity of migration and the increasing role of “global civil society” 
is not a fact to be lamented. Rather, it points to the reality that the older 
nation-state perspective is not the only one with moral or political signifi-
cance. It is from this perspective that we can begin to see how our intercon-
nection with others may ground our responsibility. For Benhabib it shows 
that we ought to take Kantian moral principles seriously and acknowledge 
that if our actions affect others, we have a moral obligation to regulate our 
actions so that they treat others as equals. In other words, we have to take 
seriously the consequences of our actions, intentional and unintentional, 
and the way they may have a collective impact.
This is why her claim that sovereignty must be understood as a relational 
concept is useful. Sovereignty, like individual autonomy, is a legitimate moral 
good and necessary for self-rule, yet it cannot be excised without consider-
ation of all those with whom a state is interconnected and interdependent. 
This is crucial for seeing the injustices in the refugee regime. Many of the 
harms of the refugee regime result not from the actions of a single harmful 
policy, but are often the collective result of many different states and inter-
national organizations all serving their own purposes. But since refugees 
and stateless people bear the brunt of the collective outcome of various 
states’ policies on refugees, they must be considered in seemingly sovereign 
decisions. National policies around displaced people cannot be understood 
as unilateral acts of sovereignty. The collective result of these policies is the 
de facto exclusion of millions of people from all states, a consequence that 
ought to be considered unacceptable even if the outcome is not the result of 
bad intentions.12 In order to avoid this outcome, states must take seriously 
the effect that their policies will have for the millions of displaced people.
The second aspect of Benhabib’s work that is important is her model of 
disaggregated citizenship, one where long-term residents are granted rights, 
but rights that may be different from citizens’ rights. On this view, mem-
bership in a state is not an all or nothing proposition but can be separated 
and the rights and responsibilities divided. This stands in contrast to the 
unitary model where citizenship is assumed to mean continuous residence 
on a territory combined with a shared national identity, political rights, and 
common administrative jurisdiction. There can be subnational as well as 
supranational spaces for democratic attachments that ought to be encour-
aged alongside normal political processes.
Concerning the rights of refugees, it is common to still think in terms of 
the unitary, all or nothing model. Either a displaced person is resettled in 
a third country or voluntarily returns to their home countries and receives 
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full citizenship; or the displaced person remains in refugee camps or urban 
spaces without the ability to claim even the most basic of rights, often for 
prolonged periods of time. A disaggregated model of citizenship would 
allow us to devise ways that refugees and stateless people could be incor-
porated into the territories in which they are living, either temporarily or 
permanently, in ways that our current approach does not. Her example of 
disaggregated citizenship in the Netherlands provides an example of what 
disaggregated citizenship in a refugee camp might look like. Long-term resi-
dents have “city citizenship,” which allows them to vote and form political 
parties, even though they are not considered citizens of the EU. They are 
able to take part in the political process, are granted basic rights, and are 
considered part of the political community though only in a limited way.
The model of disaggregated citizenship would help us to overcome what 
Aleinikoff calls the “membership bias” on the part of Western states, the 
assumption that what refugees want most is membership in a new state 
(Aleinikoff 1992). In his view, refugees themselves do not necessarily share 
this assumption. “It is at least plausible that refugees might prefer an ambi-
guity and flexibility that does not compel an immediate consideration of 
identity questions and that keeps options open for future return or resettle-
ment” (Aleinikoff 1992, 134). Benhabib’s model of disaggregated citizen-
ship would be a way of implementing this kind of ambiguity and flexibility 
and may be an improvement over the current ways that most people live 
out their lives in refugee camps, without access to political forums, and the 
ability to participate in their collective outcome or act with political voice 
and agency. Though, as Benhabib acknowledges, there is always a danger of 
permanent alienage, this danger is already the reality for the vast majority 
of long-term displaced people. A disaggregated model of citizenship would 
at least provide an alternative to this de facto outcome.
Two other philosophers, Joseph Carens and Matthew Gibney, try to 
reorient the moral approach liberal democratic states take towards refu-
gees. Carens’ recent work on immigration and refugees is concerned with 
reforming the global refugee regime even while he focuses on the moral obli-
gations of liberal democracies in particular. He acknowledges that although 
important, resettlement is actually “irrelevant to most” refugees because of 
the high number of refugees compared to the few places available for reset-
tlement (Carens 2013, 197). Further, he acknowledges that many refugees 
stay in camps for years, and this “clearly represents a terrible failure to meet 
the moral claims of refugees” (Carens 2013, 206). He derives two claims 
from this that are important. First, he argues that resettlement ought to be a 
duty and not merely an act of charity or generosity. If states acknowledged 
resettlement as a binding duty, like non-refoulement, resettlement may be 
able to address the needs of the displaced. Second, he argues that we ought 
to work out a way of distributing resettlement that is just and does not 
disproportionally burden some states. Gibney similarly argues for both of 
these duties, as well as the duty to work towards creating a national and 
international climate that is more favorable for refugee protection.
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For Carens, there are three possible grounds that can generate obligations 
to admit refugees. First, it is widely agreed that if states cause the production 
of refugees, they have stronger obligations to help them than do states that 
are not involved. In other words, causal connections generate moral duties. 
For example, many agree that we had stronger obligations to help Vietnam-
ese refugees during the Vietnam War than refugees fleeing conflicts that 
we were not involved with. Second, humanitarian considerations can also 
generate duties to help refugees. Because refugees often have such urgent 
needs, and because we are in a position to help them, this can give rise to 
obligations to admit refugees. Third, the normative presuppositions of the 
modern state system can give rise to obligations to admit refugees. Because 
the world is divided into sovereign states where each state is responsible for 
its citizens, obligations arise when this system breaks down, as it does in the 
case of refugees. States have a collective responsibility to correct the foresee-
able failures with this institutional arrangement by admitting people into 
their states whose government has failed to provide them safety and meet 
their basic needs. In this case, the duty to admit refugees arises from the 
claim of states to legitimately exercise power in a world divided into states.
In Carens’ view, the obligation of Western democracies to admit refugees 
arises most strongly from the second ground, the profound need of refugees 
and our ability to help (also known as Samaritan duties). While it would 
also be true that we have obligations to refugees that we helped create, this 
ground cannot account for our moral obligations in general. Further, he 
argues that while it would be pragmatically useful to be able to appeal to 
the self-interest of people living in the receiving states—they would be better 
off in some way—Carens doesn’t believe this can be done in a sufficiently 
robust way. Helping refugees is rarely in our best interest, and in many cases 
opposes what usually seems good or important for a state.
Our obligations towards refugees are grounded in humanitarian con-
cern for the urgent needs of the displaced. Once we take this seriously, we 
can begin to see, according to Carens, that refugees have two distinct sets 
of needs—needs in the long and short terms. What is unique about this 
approach is his emphasis that both sets of obligations are equally important. 
For Carens, because the primary consideration for refugees in the immediate 
aftermath of their displacement is safety, refugee camps may be appropriate 
as a response to a particular emergency. However, “this is not sufficient as 
a permanent solution” (Carens 2013, 203). Because all people have a right 
to membership in a society, refugees must either be allowed to settle in the 
country they are living in or be resettled in a new country.13 This is rooted 
in the moral principle that people cannot be kept in a temporary status 
indefinitely. “One implication of this idea of a right to membership,” he 
argues, “is that there is a limit to how long refugees can be kept in a tempo-
rary status” (Carens 2013, 204). In his view, the fact that time has passed 
for refugees living in camps does not make our moral obligations to them 
weaker; on the contrary, the longer refugees are in limbo, the stronger are 
our obligations to find a home for them. He insists that refugee camps are 
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“a terrible failure to meet the moral claims of refugees” (Carens 2013, 206). 
Yet unlike David Miller, who also agrees that refugee camps are morally 
problematic, Carens argues that the unacceptability of refugee camps gives 
rise to a duty to resettle refugees. For Miller, although camps are morally 
problematic, the right of self-determination still takes precedence and does 
not require states to resettle refugees if they do not want to. For Carens, 
by contrast, the current state of the refugee regime means that we have a 
“strong and extensive moral duty” to resettle refugees (Carens 2013, 198).
Matthew Gibney too argues that resettlement ought to be a duty, and 
this duty is rooted in the “humanitarian principle,” the principle that states 
have an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low.14 
Gibney grounds his view of the moral obligations of states in the humani-
tarian principle because he sees it as a way of compromising between the 
commitments of nationalism or partialism (the belief that the interests of 
compatriots ought to take precedence over others) and cosmopolitanism or 
impartialism (the belief that all people, regardless of nationality, ought to 
be given the same moral consideration). Because the humanitarian principle 
recognizes that there are duties that arise from our common humanity, as 
impartialists stress, it takes seriously the values that underlie this moral ori-
entation. But because it only obliges states to do what is “low cost,” it leaves 
room for states to determine their own policies, as partialists stress. For this 
reason, he argues that the humanitarian principle will be able to gain the 
widest possible acceptance as the ground for our moral obligations to refu-
gees. Though both Carens and Gibney understand this principle in a similar 
way to Walzer (who also argued that our obligations to refugees are rooted 
in a principle of “mutual aid”), they derive very different conclusions from 
it. For Carens and Gibney, the humanitarian principle entails that states 
shift the focus away from asylum and towards resettling refugees currently 
living in camps. They both claim that resettlement should be seen not as a 
supererogatory act—“burdens that states undertake separately from their 
duties under international law and less explicitly, common morality” (Gib-
ney 2004, 239)—but as duties or obligations.
For Gibney, this means that resettlement should take priority over 
non-refoulement as a moral principle.15 It’s not that there is an inherent 
tension between non-refoulement and resettlement; rather, Gibney is chal-
lenging the political choice to take more seriously the moral demands of 
asylum seekers (and the right of non-refoulement) over refugees in camps. In 
Gibney’s view, ethically speaking, we ought to give priority to resettlement 
over non-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement asserts implicitly 
that we have stronger obligations to those close to us, on our territory than 
those far away from us, regardless of their need.16 This link between aid and 
connection made sense prior to technological communication and global-
ization. But with current technology, “universal obligations to refugees can 
now be exercised universally” (Gibney 2004, 240). Further, refugees who 
are able to reach Western countries and claim asylum are often the ones 
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with contacts and resources and who are young and healthy enough to make 
the trip. These are not necessarily the refugees who are most in need. Ulti-
mately, as Carens also suggests, though resettlement ought to take priority over 
non-refoulement, we should not abandon the principle of non-refoulement 
given its wide moral acceptance. The point for Gibney is simply that much 
more concern ought to be directed towards resettlement.17
For Gibney, in addition to seeing resettlement as a duty, the humani-
tarian principle demands that Western states respect the principle of 
non-refoulement, boost efforts around the world to resettle refugees and, in 
the long term, work towards creating a national and international climate 
that is more favorable for refugee protection. The extent to which states 
are willing to uphold these obligations will depend on the way the idea 
of “cost” is interpreted. This gives rise to one further obligation grounded 
in the principle of humanity: states ought to try to shape the political cli-
mate so that these costs are interpreted in ways favorable to refugees. States, 
he writes, have “a supplementary duty to do what they can to create a 
domestic and international environment in which the amount of protection 
provided for refugees at low cost will be maximized” (Gibney 2004, 244). 
This could take the form of influencing the public’s opinion through public 
campaigns, supporting programs that try to overcome xenophobia and rac-
ism, engendering more bipartisanship, and promoting the value of asylum. 
When foreigners are misunderstood as legitimate threats, anything goes in 
terms of how states are permitted to deal with them (expanded detention, 
new deportation procedures, and indefinite detention are examples). States 
can do a lot to untangle the fear of refugees based on their character with 
a more legitimate fear of refugees based on their anonymity (i.e., that we 
don’t have knowledge about their backgrounds or intentions and, even after 
screening, the fear that ill-intentioned people will infiltrate our countries). 
This may help to overcome the “unprecedented consensus” among liberal 
democratic states and their citizens that refugees constitute as much a threat 
as an asset (Gibney 2004, 255).
Both Gibney and Carens also agree that states recognizing the principle 
of humanity as a ground for our moral obligations to refugees must also 
acknowledge they have a strong reason to participate in and promote coop-
erative burden sharing plans.18 For Carens, the factors that would determine 
what a fair allocation of responsibilities would entail are the following: 
receiving states’ absorptive capacity, population density, economic capacity 
(overall wealth and economic dynamism), cultural similarity, religion and 
ethnicity, and history of admitting immigrants. This process of allocating 
refugees wouldn’t need an enforcement body; just an international covenant 
to formalize the process. Gibney argues that to determine fair allocation 
of responsibilities for resettlement, we must look at the “integrative abili-
ties” of each state. He acknowledges that this is not a straightforward ques-
tion, since “integrative ability” is politically constructed and will depend on 
how states see their economy, history, cultural affinity, etc. Consequently, 
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he thinks the best way to determine how many refugees a state is able to 
integrate is by looking at the judgments that states themselves make about 
this question by examining their immigration policies and commitments. 
Carens, like Gibney, acknowledges that how the duty to resettle gets imple-
mented is bound to be contested; he points out, though, that even this would 
be an improvement. “At this point it would be a tremendous advance for 
most states even to acknowledge that they have a binding responsibility to 
resettle refugees” and hence to engage in public debates about how to dis-
charge this duty (Carens 2013, 215). Even the US, the country that resettles 
the most refugees, does not acknowledge a formal obligation but insists that 
it is a matter of charity.19
Finally, what if a state, like the US or Canada, decides that it has done 
enough to help refugees, even while there still remain millions of refugees 
in need of a permanent state? In other words, when can a state say that it 
has done enough? In Carens’ view, the answer is “almost never” (Carens 
2013, 219). Given the inability of refugees to meet their basic needs and to 
have their most basic rights protected, Carens thinks that it is hard for states 
to argue that their less imperative interests ought to take precedence over 
this. This view is of course not universally shared. Miller and Walzer argue 
that ultimately states have the final say on when they have done enough. 
For Carens, however, “the fact that a state has the moral right to make a 
decision does not entail the view that its decision is justifiable or that it is 
immune from criticism. Having the right to make a decision is not the same 
as having a right to act arbitrarily or with complete discretion” (Carens 
2013, 219). The example of the St. Lewis, the ship carrying hundreds of 
Jewish refugees during the Second World War that was turned away by 
the US, is the kind of example he has in mind. This case shows that often 
a state’s collective moral judgment can be deeply flawed. In other words, 
simply because a state believes they have done enough to help refugees is not 
sufficient to show that they in fact have done so.
Like Benhabib, both Gibney and Carens show how we might develop 
more robust obligations to the forcibly displaced. They are both helpful 
in pointing out that the principle of humanitarianism gives rise to a duty 
to resettle, along with a duty to fairly distribute this burden. Both norms 
would go a long way towards improving the refugee regime and the lives 
of millions of people and ought to be included in a just refugee regime. 
However, though Carens is concerned with how democratic states ought 
to treat refugees, he does not explicitly discuss the ways that policies and 
practices of democratic states impact the decisions of other countries. For 
example, he says that a “rich democratic state cannot create camps where 
refugees are prevented from having contact with the rest of the population 
and are provided only with basic levels of food, clothing, and shelter, even 
if the provision of such basic levels of support would be equal to what the 
refugees could have expected if their membership rights had been respected 
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in their country of origin” (Carens 2013, 204). However, he doesn’t discuss 
the extent to which we tolerate and even promote such policies on the part 
of states in other parts of the world, or at the very least, fail to challenge the 
acceptability of practices like these. Presumably, if it’s wrong for us to do it, 
it should be wrong for us to support it as well.
Carens and Gibney are right about the moral obligations that arise from 
the principle of humanitarianism—given the current state of the refugee 
regime, resettlement ought to be greatly expanded and thought of as a duty. 
However, the duty to resettle needs to be supplemented with an ethics of the 
temporary. That is, we ought to think much more seriously about a mor-
ally acceptable way to house refugees and allow them to live with dignity 
while they are waiting to be resettled or to return to their home countries. 
In addition to the obligations that Carens and Gibney argue for, we have an 
obligation to explore other ways that the refugee regime might be structured 
so that refugees are not kept in camps and maintain their dignity and auton-
omy. In other words, while resettlement may be the ultimate goal we should 
support, we have to morally scrutinize the ways in which the global com-
munity cares for the displaced while they are waiting for something more 
permanent, since, as I discussed in Chapter One, this temporary period can 
last decades, even generations.
The more expansive set of obligations that Benhabib, Gibney, and Carens 
argue for are helpful in seeing the moral status of the forcibly displaced. 
But their views still overwhelmingly focus on the ethics of admission and 
fail to take seriously the role that liberal democracies play in setting up and 
sustaining many of the injustices associated with the current refugee regime. 
As a result, though they all express an awareness of some of the difficulties 
around the current treatment of the displaced, no one devotes a sustained 
analysis to it. Benhabib, Carens, and Gibney each apply their principles only 
in a limited way to the issue of the harms of encampment and containment 
even though there are a number of resources within their positions that help 
us to think more clearly about what we owe the millions of people who are 
displaced and will never find a permanent home.
§ Conclusion
In conclusion, I’d like to turn to what I see as one of the primary limitations 
of the various philosophical views discussed in this chapter. The limitation 
has to do with how the problem around refugees is framed and an assump-
tion which underlies many of the approaches. What many of the authors 
in this chapter have been grappling with is how to give a foundation for 
our moral obligation to admit refugees while simultaneously maintaining 
an ethical basis for closure. For philosophers like Walzer and Miller, the 
primary philosophical question is to what extent we are obliged to admit 
refugees and on what basis we are justified in excluding people with urgent 
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moral claims. This question remains the dominant one whether you agree 
that we have much stronger obligations to admit refugees than we currently 
do (as people like Benhabib, Carens, and Gibney do) or that states are justi-
fied in closing their doors to “all potential immigrants, even refugees des-
perately seeking asylum from incompetent or corrupt political regimes” 
(Wellman 2008, 109). Though not the only concern, justifying including or 
excluding the displaced from our political communities can be seen as one 
of the biggest concerns for philosophers of immigration and refugees.
The question that is rarely raised in the debate is: what happens to people 
who we justifiably exclude? Do we have any moral obligations to people 
who remain outside of all political communities? Such people remain in a 
position of statelessness for a prolonged period of time, where they are with-
out political rights, community, or representation. Prolonged encampment 
and long-term displacement, which are the result of uncoordinated policies 
of various sovereign states, are never raised as moral issues by normative phi-
losophers, as I argue they ought to be. The reason these questions are never 
raised, I argue, has to do with how we understand international institutions 
in the global political system.
If we look at an institutional analysis of human rights put forth by people 
like Thomas Pogge (2008) and Charles Beitz (2009), we see an idealized 
picture of how human rights are supposed to function. Though human 
rights are the rights we have by virtue of being human, they are nonethe-
less addressed to us as members of particular states. In Beitz’s view, human 
rights ought to be understood on a two-level model, where human rights 
apply first to the political institutions of states, including their constitutions, 
laws, and policies; states bear “the primary responsibilities to respect and 
protect human rights” (Beitz 2009, 108). When states fail to protect and 
fulfill human rights, international institutions are supposed to step up. The 
second level only comes into play when states are not able to respect, pro-
tect, and fulfill human rights. Under these circumstances, “the international 
community and those acting as its agents” become responsible for human 
rights (Beitz 2009, 108).20 For Beitz, a “government’s failure to carry out 
its first-level responsibilities may be a reason for action for appropriately 
placed and capable ‘second-level’ agents outside of the state” (Beitz 2009, 
109). In other words, because human rights are “matters of international 
concern” (Beitz 2009, 109), when individual states fail to uphold and pro-
tect human rights, “appropriately placed and capable” international institu-
tions must step in and assume responsibility.
For Beitz, then, if a state fails to protect the human rights of one of its 
members and she becomes a refugee, and no other state sees it in their inter- 
est to take her in, then “the international community and those acting as 
its agents” become the responsible parties. Refugees remain protected, 
and thus it makes sense that we have no other obligations to refugees who 
remain, justifiably or unjustifiably, outside of our states since we are able 
to assume that international institutions are mandated to protect them. The 
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assumption underlying normative philosophical discussions around refu-
gees, then, is that international agents like the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) or some similar body will bear the responsibility to 
respect and protect the human rights of those forcibly displaced from their 
homes.
As discussed in detail in Chapter One, the reason that this assumption is 
problematic is because of a number of features of the international sys-
tem. The consensus, for the most part, is that not only does the interna-
tional community often fail to respect and protect the human rights of 
refugees, but often the system itself contributes to their systematic dehu-
manization.21 For Agier, humanitarian organizations that work with refu-
gees and displaced people ought to be seen not as a systematic form of 
care for vulnerable populations, but as a mode of sovereign power and 
control, an entity which has the power of life and death over the displaced 
(Agier 2011, 65).22 In his words, international organizations that step up 
to help refugees in the name of human rights protection are “no more than 
a euphemistic justification for controlling the undesirables” (Agier 2011, 
211). Rather than protecting the interests and rights of the displaced, as 
I noted in Chapter One, the UNHCR has come to be seen as serving the 
interests of Western states that, for the most part, entail keeping large por-
tions of stateless people away from their borders.23 In the words of one 
scholar, “states funding the UNHCR have managed to cultivate a shift in 
the organization’s ethic from one of facilitating resettlement to one largely 
concerned with containing refugee flows close to the regions of displace-
ment” (Franke 2009, 317).
This has led to what Verdirame and Harrell-Bond have called the “Janus 
face” of refugee humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is in part cosmopolitan 
and caring, and in part, “often callous, sometimes cruel, and—nearly always— 
ineffectual” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 333). In this way, “power 
exercised under a humanitarian guise was not so different from power in 
other guises” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 333). What is unique, 
however, in this relationship is that the power of humanitarian organiza-
tions in refugee camps is not curtailed by law nor limited by external over-
sight. This is because the laws of host countries often cease to apply in 
refugee camps; “camps are spaces that are virtually beyond the rule of law” 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 334). This situation leads Agier to con-
clude, “the humanitarian world is a totalitarianism that has power over 
life (to let live or survive) and death (to let die) over the individual that it 
views as absolute victim” (Agier 2011, 196). In short, the assumption that 
international organizations can bear the responsibility for refugees if states 
justifiably exclude them—and ought to be given the power and resources to 
do so—is extremely problematic.
If we add to this two well-known facts about contemporary refugee 
experience, we see further why the normative approach is limited. First, 
the vast majority of refugees will never be resettled in Western resettlement 
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states; currently less than 1% of people deemed refugees by the UNHCR 
are ever resettled,24 and there is no reason, given the current political state 
of affairs and economic crises, to think that this will improve dramatically 
in the near future. Second, the vast majority of refugees will be stateless for 
15 years or more, so the norm is long-term displacement rather than short- 
term, emergency situations.25 The vast majority of people in situations of 
long-term displacement live in refugee camps that are governed by human-
itarian organizations.26 As Loescher puts it, “the majority of the world’s 
refugees are not offered permanent asylum or opportunity to integrate into 
local communities by most Third World governments. Rather, they are kept 
separate and dependent on external assistance provided by the international 
community” (Loescher 1993, 9). In other words, given that the vast major-
ity of displaced people will spend the duration of their lives outside of states, 
the vast majority of refugees and stateless people will be unaffected by the 
ethics of admissions.
What I have demonstrated above is that normative philosophical analysis, 
with its emphasis on the ethics of admissions, provides an insufficient moral 
analysis of our obligations to refugees. The failure of the international com-
munity to step in and assume the responsibilities for the displaced in lieu of 
states means that we can no longer take for granted that a refusal to admit 
refugees means that some other solution will be found.
What I suggest is that given this contemporary reality, it is important to 
ask two questions. First, what, if anything, do we owe to the millions of 
people who live for decades in refugee camps without the prospect of being 
resettled in a new state or able to return to their own states? Second, given 
that the institutional understanding of human rights is insufficient to grap-
ple with the contemporary experience of refugees and encampment, how 
can we reframe the harm of statelessness in order to better address this 
reality? In order to address these questions, we need to take seriously that 
in losing membership in a political community, one loses something funda-
mental to the human condition. I refer to this as the ontological deprivation 
of statelessness. Once we take these ideas seriously, we can see that it is 
urgent to find ways to protect the dignity of the displaced while they are in 
these in-between situations, between home and a durable solution, between 
being a citizen of one state and a citizen of another. A phenomenological 
understanding of the experience of being without a state is missing from 
these normative analyses. The aim of the following chapter is to develop 
such an account.
Notes
 1 I refer to philosophers who are interested in thinking about our moral obliga-
tions to refugees, such as the ones I discuss in this chapter, as normative philoso-
phers to distinguish them from continental philosophers, whom I will discuss 
in Chapter Three, who are more interested in a phenomenological understand-
ing of refugees. I’ve chosen to use this term to avoid the sometimes ambiguous 
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phrase “liberal philosophers,” since “liberal” can have different connotations in 
different contexts, though most normative philosophers are liberal in the most 
general sense.
 2 Not all philosophers believe this can be done. Philip Cole, for example, argues 
that the question of membership shows that “there is an irresolvable contradic-
tion between liberal theory’s apparent universalism and its concealed particular-
ism” (Cole 2000, 2).
 3 For example, Singer and Singer (1988), Carens (1992), Barbieri (1998), Cole 
(2000), Gibney (2004), Nyers (2006), and Wellman (2008), among others, have 
all written about our moral obligations to refugees. Although there is no con-
sensus on the question of obligations, one important point is agreed upon by all 
these authors: the question of whether we are obliged to admit refugees to our 
country is the primary moral question.
 4 As we will see in the discussion below, both Walzer’s and Wellman’s views of 
refugees are rooted in the principle of mutual aid, but they draw very different 
conclusions. For Walzer, this principle gives rise to the obligation to admit some 
refugees but allows latitude in terms of choosing which refugees and how many 
to admit. For Wellman, duties to refugees based on the principle of mutual aid 
do not trump the right to freedom of association and thus do not give rise to any 
obligations to admit refugees, only to “export justice” to help them.
 5 We need only think of any of the measures taken by EU, Australian, or Ameri-
can officials to prevent the thousands of “helpless and desperate people” from 
reaching their shores (discussed in Chapter One) to realize that these conditions 
simply do not hold in the contemporary world.
 6 It is worth pointing out Joseph Carens’ criticism of this point. Cities in the US 
seem to have very distinct characters—Boston is very different from Miami, LA 
is very different from South Bend. Yet this has not required that cities close their 
borders and only permit residents like themselves (Carens 1992). It is not clear 
then that “communities of character” do require the right to exclude. Also see 
Scheffler (2007).
 7 Though both Miller and Walzer think that military intervention is a way to dis-
charge our duties to refugees, politically speaking it is highly implausible. West-
ern states have been reluctant to intervene to stop even terrible abuses of state 
power. Indeed, Samantha Power has shown that we have very rarely intervened 
to stop even genocide when death tolls are in the hundreds of thousands and 
there are effective methods to do so (Bosnia is the one exception) (Power 2013). 
Given this tremendous reluctance to get involved militarily in genocides or other 
civil conflicts for any reason, it hardly seems like a plausible solution to think 
that states will intervene militarily on behalf of refugees. In some ways, this is 
asking even more than to allow refugees to resettle.
 8 I am taking this insight from Jeremy Waldron, who made a similar claim for 
homeless people in the US (Waldron 1991).
 9 The other aspect of a right to membership is an injunction against denaturalization.
 10 There are a number of other rights entailed in the right to membership. For 
example, there is a right to know how to become a citizen that obliges the state 
to make conditions for naturalization clear, transparent, and accessible, rather 
than subject to bureaucratic will. Further, states cannot criminalize simply being 
an immigrant or foreigner—such a person must have due process, the right to 
representation in one’s language, and the right to council. These are the civil and 
political rights that must accompany a human right to membership.
 11 Rawls writes, “a democratic society . . . is to be viewed as a . . . closed social 
system . . . in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by 
death” (Rawls, Political Liberalism 1993, 41). Further, his methodological start-
ing point for his analysis of global justice in Law of Peoples is that the causes 
80 Refugees in Contemporary Political Philosophy
of migration (human rights violations by non-liberal and non-decent regimes) 
would no longer exist: “the problem of immigration is . . . eliminated as a serious 
problem in a realistic utopia” (Rawls, Law of Peoples 2001, 9).
 12 Thomas Nagel argues that “radical poverty” is unacceptable primarily because 
of its outcome, not because of the intentions of the actors who created it. He 
writes that radical inequality is wrong even if it is not the result of anyone doing 
anything illegal or morally wrong, and thus any system that permits this outcome 
is morally objectionable. For Nagel, “the pure workings of market exchange, 
governed entirely by supply and demand, do not constitute a legitimate institu-
tion of property if they permit certain kinds of outcomes” (Nagel 2008, 54).
 13 Carens argues that there is a right to membership implicit in the Refugee Con-
vention. “In effect, the Convention says that it is not enough to provide refugees 
with physical safety. People have a right to membership in a society. If they can-
not any longer be members of their country of origin, they must be given access 
to membership in some other state” (Carens 2013, 203–204).
 14 In Gibney’s view, the principle of humanitarianism is also rooted in a “duty of 
charity” found in the natural law tradition. For example, see Locke: “so Charity 
gives every man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from 
extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise” (Locke, first treaty, 
sec 42; quoted in Gibney 2004, 232).
 15 For Gibney, there are also practical benefits to this change in perspective: reset-
tlement can be arranged before refugees arrive in a country and thus there is 
greater predictability, less risk, and greater financial ease.
 16 Carens too argues that we ought to “break the link between claim and place” 
(Carens 2013, 216).
 17 This is in line with Carens’ view that it would be imprudent to abandon the 
principle of non-refoulement because it does not prioritize those most in need (as 
Singer and Singer argue) precisely because it would be imprudent to abandon a 
principle of aid that is already widely accepted (see Singer and Singer [1988] and 
Carens [1992]).
 18 Ferracioli argues that what must precede the establishment of a more just refugee 
regime is a large increase in resettlement. For her, the international community 
should move “collectively and progressively” to increase their quotas in order 
to alleviate some of the motivational constraints to reformulating the refugee 
regime (Ferracioli 2014, 139).
 19 According to the 1980 Refugee Act, the legal framework for the US action on 
refugees, the official US position denies any duty or obligation to resettle ref-
ugees. The Refugee Act explicitly states that “the underlying principle is that 
refugee admission is an exceptional ex gratia act provided by the United States 
in furthering foreign and humanitarian policies” (quoted in Singer and Singer 
1988, 116).
 20 He notes that this second level of international concern and action is perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of contemporary human rights practice (Beitz 
2009, 115).
 21 “UNHCR is the main authority that exercises power and effective control in 
camps; combined with its role in the status-determination process, this power 
means that UNHCR is not simply unable to promote respect for the rights of 
refugees, but is often responsible for the violation of these rights” (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005, 17).
 22 “There is a specific order and organization of power in the camp and more gen-
erally in the place of humanitarian intervention, which the concept of ‘human-
itarian government’ is designed to express as closely as possible. This power 
defines its own space as one of exception, a frontier, an out-place in the sense 
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that individuals are treated and managed as nameless victims devoid of identity” 
(Agier 2011, 213–214).
 23 As noted in Chapter One, the reason the UNHCR is so interested in fulfill-
ing the interests of the West is that they are dependent on them for funding. 
“Financed by donations and periodic appeals, rather than as a structural part of 
the United Nations, it has always been constrained by the interests of the rich 
‘donor nations’ ” (Stevens 2006, 54). Likewise, keeping the displaced in camps 
can be seen as an effective funding strategy—in camps, the displaced can be seen 
and counted, and thus support the UNHCR’s claims for funding. This is what 
allows Verdirame and Harrell-Bond to conclude that “UNHCR continued to 
support the encampment policy because of its perceived attraction to donors” 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, 17). In other words, what determined the 
UNHCR’s policy was not protection of refugees, but institutional survival in a 
competitive funding environment.
 24 Specifically, less than 1% of the 10.5 million people that the UNHCR considers 
refugees are ever recommended by the agency for resettlement (cited on the web-
site for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: http://www.unhcr.
org/pages/4a16b1676.html).
 25 In the view of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-
eties, most forced migrants are either in a situation of protracted displacement or 
are permanently dispossessed. Of the 10.4 million people the UNHCR considers 
refugees, 70% are in protracted exile (International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 2012, 9 and 17).
 26 Arendt was perhaps the first to notice this phenomenon in The Origins of Totali-
tarianism, first published in 1948. She writes that the internment camp, which 
prior to WWI was the exception rather than the rule, “has become the routine solu-
tion for the problem of domicile of the ‘displaced persons’ ” (Arendt 1978, 279).
I have been arguing throughout this book that we ought to morally scruti-
nize how the forcibly displaced are treated while they are between homes 
and the use of refugee camps as a way to deal with large-scale, protracted 
refugee situations. I have suggested that once we understand the refugee 
regime and the harms that arise from it, we have a moral obligation to reject 
the policy of long-term encampment as the de facto solution to the problem 
of unwanted and superfluous people in the world. In order to do this, we 
need to expand our approach to thinking about moral obligations. For a 
number of reasons, the primary moral obligation states and their citizens 
have considered is the obligation to resettle refugees. Yet I have shown in the 
previous chapters why this is insufficient: it fails to consider our treatment 
of refugees while they are awaiting a solution and does not take seriously 
encampment as a moral harm. I argue throughout the book that we have 
obligations to ensure that the displaced live dignified lives while they are 
awaiting a more permanent solution.
In this chapter, I seek to deepen our understanding of the harm of encamp-
ment in order to support my claim that we ought to reject encampment as 
a solution. Using the work of Hannah Arendt, I demonstrate that forced 
displacement (or statelessness, as she sometimes refers to it) entails two 
distinct harms that must be analyzed separately. The first harm is legal/
political—the loss of a political community and a legal identity in the form 
of citizenship. Arendt’s first critique of statelessness is that it entails the loss 
of a legal identity and a political community, and it is only within this politi-
cal community that human rights can be protected. Despite over 50 years of 
changes in international law and human rights conventions around stateless 
people and refugees, their rights—both legal and human—remain funda-
mentally precarious outside the nation-state.
Though this is a crucial point in understanding statelessness, this is not 
Arendt’s most fundamental critique of statelessness. If this were the only 
harm of statelessness, we might say that the harm could be addressed by 
simply insisting on more resettlement or quicker repatriation, and refu-
gee camps, since they are necessary in order for these solutions to occur, 
would be seen as unproblematic. Arendt argued that there is a much more 
fundamental loss that comes with statelessness, one to which prolonged 
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encampment contributes. I refer to this loss as the ontological deprivation, 
that is, the loss of something fundamental to a person’s humanity. I argue 
that ignoring the agency of refugees for long durations through policies of 
encampment and containment constitutes a moral harm to refugees. Taking 
seriously the ontological deprivation of statelessness has important conse-
quences for how we think about our moral obligations.
The ontological deprivation has three different dimensions: the loss of 
identity and reduction to bare life; the expulsion from common humanity; 
and finally, the loss of agency understood not as a subjective disposition, but 
an ability to have your words and actions be recognized as meaningful and 
politically relevant. I make two points about the nature of the ontological 
deprivation. First, when stateless people are placed into camps or allowed to 
disappear into crowded urban centers with no formal recognition, this exclu-
sion itself represents a fundamental harm. Many believe that refugee camps 
are a matter of practical necessity—there is nowhere else to put large groups 
of unwanted people. Yet for Arendt, I argue, it is important to see these camps 
as morally problematic because they effectively exclude people from what she 
referred to as “the common world.” This expulsion from the common world 
is a fundamental aspect of the ontological deprivation. This point supports my 
argument that encampment ought to be seen as a moral harm. Second, I argue 
that we must understand this exclusion as a form of abandonment, in Giorgio 
Agamben’s sense of the term. Abandonment for him does not mean that state-
less people are left to themselves, but rather that they remain directly impacted 
by us through their formal exclusion. Their very identities and modes of exis-
tence are defined almost entirely by their exclusion. Agamben terms this form 
of abandonment the inclusive exclusion. This in turn grounds the connection 
I use to establish responsibility for forced displacement in Chapter Four.
Importantly, once we take seriously the ontological deprivation as a dis-
tinct harm, other moral obligations and ways we ought to help the displaced 
become more evident. Addressing the ontological deprivation of stateless-
ness may require that we think about ways that stateless people may be able 
to keep a meaningful political identity, and resist a reduction to bare life, 
even though they may be formally bereft of citizenship or political mem-
bership. Once these two sets of harms are pulled apart, we will see that 
even though we have had limited success in addressing the political harm 
of a lack of citizenship (i.e., by resettling stateless people in new political 
communities or repatriating them to their old ones), there are nonetheless 
other ways to address the second kind of harm, the ontological deprivation. 
Refugee policy, supported by Western states, ought to be concerned with 
addressing the ontological deprivation of statelessness, and not merely the 
political harm of a loss of citizenship.
§ Arendt on Statelessness—The Legal Dimension
One of the first philosophical analyses of statelessness can be found in 1948 
in Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. Her analysis begins with the 
84 Hannah Arendt and the Ontological Deprivation of Statelessness
observation that starting shortly after World War I, the nature of forced 
migration began to change. While there had always been “war refugees,” 
what was unique about people fleeing after WWI is they “were welcomed 
nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere. Once they had left their home-
lands they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became 
stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were right-
less, the scum of the earth” (Arendt 1978, 267). For Arendt, there is a direct 
causal connection between losing your national citizenship, becoming state-
less, and becoming, in her words, “rightless.”
To clarify her terminology, Arendt distinguished between de jure state-
less people, people who have lost their citizenship as a matter of recogniz-
able fact and meet the legal definition of statelessness, and de facto stateless 
people, people who are effectively without citizenship though they have 
retained their legal identity. The de jure stateless were relatively small in 
number, and thus Arendt considered them to be a relatively small problem. 
Similarly, refugees who met the legal definition of a refugee, as someone 
fleeing individual political persecution, were not the real issue for Arendt. 
In fact, she claimed that they were not a “genuine political problem,” since 
besides being relatively few in number, the asylum laws that existed at the 
time did act as a genuine substitute for national laws (Arendt 1978, 295). By 
contrast, de facto stateless people comprised the “core of statelessness” for 
Arendt and were in her view identical with “the refugee question” (Arendt 
1978, 279). For Arendt, de facto stateless people included all people who 
were forcibly displaced and without any form of effective citizenship or 
political belonging, regardless of how they were categorized legally (i.e., 
as refugees, asylum seekers, forcibly displaced, sans papiers, internally dis-
placed persons, war refugees, etc.). People in this situation, whether they are 
referred to as refugees or stateless people, are, in her words, fundamentally 
rightless; they belong “to no internationally recognizable community what-
ever” and are thus outside “of mankind as a whole” (Arendt 2003, 150).1
What did it mean to become rightless for Arendt? Rightlessness has both 
a legal/political dimension and an ontological one. Legally, it meant that 
once you cease living under the jurisdiction of your domestic law, you are 
without the protection of any other law (Arendt 1978, 286). In other words, 
once you are removed from your own national law, there is no effective 
way to treat you as a legal subject and you remain outside the pale of the 
law.2 This is tied to her critique of human rights, which were understood 
as natural and inalienable and thus without the need for positive law to 
protect them. For her, “the loss of national rights was identical with the loss 
of human rights” (Arendt 1978, 292). Thus, for stateless people, as soon as 
they lost their citizenship and had only their humanity and human rights 
to protect them, it turned out that there was no institution willing and able 
to guarantee them. Human rights proved impossible to enforce outside of 
a political community. If the legal meaning of statelessness is the absence 
of a meaningful legal identity, the political meaning of statelessness is the 
absence of a rights ensuring community.3
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This point has been somewhat mitigated since Arendt wrote this in 1948, 
with the advent of numerous human rights treaties and declarations, the 
1951 Refugee Convention, and treaties concerning stateless people, which 
were all designed precisely to deal with people who had lost the protec-
tion of their home states. Despite this legal progress, as many scholars have 
pointed out, the legal protections of refugees and stateless people remain 
fundamentally precarious.4 From the point of view of normative philoso-
phy, it is important to highlight that though there is a legal framework in 
existence for the protection of refugees, many states are still reluctant to 
acknowledge significant obligations to refugees. The most widely accepted 
obligation, non-refoulement, is often respected in principle though not in 
practice. Further, few states acknowledge positive obligations to help refu-
gees by admitting them to their states or granting them the right to resi-
dence. Most nations feel that they ought to help refugees and that it would 
be wrong simply to let them die of starvation or exposure, but few see it as a 
moral, political, or legal obligation except in the most minimal sense. Given 
this, Arendt’s fundamental critique of the way stateless people are treated 
when they are outside of their state remains true: “the prolongation of their 
lives is due to charity and not to right, for no law exists which could force 
the nations to feed them” (Arendt 1978, 296).
To summarize, Arendt’s first critique of statelessness is that it entails 
the loss of a particular identity and a political community, and it is only 
within this political community that human rights can be protected. Despite 
over 50 years of changes in international law and human rights conven-
tions around stateless people and refugees, their rights—both legal and 
human—remain fundamentally precarious outside the nation-state. Though 
this is a crucial point in understanding statelessness, this is not Arendt’s 
most fundamental critique of statelessness. If this were the only harm of 
statelessness, we might say that the harm could be addressed by simply 
insisting on more resettlement or quicker repatriation, and refugee camps, 
since they are necessary in order for these solutions to occur, would be seen 
as unproblematic. Yet as I argue below, Arendt argued that there is a much 
more fundamental loss that comes with statelessness, one which prolonged 
encampment contributes to. It is the loss of certain fundamental features of 
our humanity. I refer to this loss as the ontological deprivation. This loss, 
I argue, ought to be taken more seriously in our moral theorizing around 
refugees.
§ The Ontological Deprivation—Bare Life  
and Individual Identity
The ontological deprivation has three different dimensions: the loss of iden-
tity and reduction to bare life; the expulsion from common humanity; and 
finally, the loss of agency, understood not as a subjective disposition, but 
an ability to have your words and actions be recognized as meaningful and 
politically relevant. Below I explain each aspect in detail.
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What concerned Arendt was not merely the way that being forced outside 
a state transformed a person’s legal identity; she was concerned with the 
way it transformed a person’s identity as such. In her words, statelessness 
deprived a person “of all clearly established, officially recognized identity” 
(Arendt 1978, 287; italics added). From a purely legal or institutional point 
of view, this might not seem like an important matter, but from the perspec-
tive of the experience of refugees, it is crucial. Arendt, herself a refugee, 
argued that one of the hardest things for refugees is being undistinguished 
from a giant, nameless mass. Indeed, the main complaint of refugees, from 
all strata of society, in her view is that “nobody here knows who I am” 
(Arendt 1978, 287).5 This anonymity is not only existentially difficult; there 
is a practical side. Individuals who are seen as having a unique identity have 
a greater chance to survive, to gain resources, and even to access oppor-
tunities for resettlement. As she puts it rather bitterly, chances of survival 
increase with a name, “just as a dog with a name has a better chance to 
survive than a stray dog who is just a dog in general” (Arendt 1978, 287).
In the transformation of identity that occurs in the process of becoming 
stateless, one’s formerly meaningful identity is replaced with a new one, 
that of a human being in general. This for Arendt is a tragic loss and one 
of the worst identities a person could have. The loss of human rights suf-
fered by stateless people is paradoxical because when a person became a 
human being in general, “without a profession, without a citizenship, with-
out an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and specify himself,” 
his private identity, “which, deprived of expression within and action upon 
a common world, loses all significance” (Arendt 1978, 302). Stateless peo-
ple appeared to the outside world as “nothing but human beings,” entirely 
innocent and without responsibility (Arendt 1978, 295). Importantly, this 
human status did not give rise to respect, awe, or humanitarian sentiment, 
as Enlightenment thinkers thought it would, but quite the opposite: “the 
world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” 
(Arendt 1978, 299). According to the traditional view of human rights, if 
a human being loses her political status, she should be able to fall back on 
her natural, inalienable human rights. “Actually the opposite is the case,” 
writes Arendt. “It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a 
fellow-man” (Arendt 1978, 300).
In other words, once a person is stripped of her political persona and citi-
zenship, she appears as an abstract human being who, precisely because of 
this abstraction, does not appear to be fully human. Though Arendt intro-
duced this observation into political philosophy, it is Giorgio Agamben who 
has done the most to elaborate and develop it.6 Through his work, this 
dimension of political existence has come to be known as bare life. For 
Agamben, bare life refers to the separation of biological life from political 
existence. Though this separation is a common feature of all political life, it 
becomes especially important in modernity.
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There is a significant political impact to this. Agamben insists that the 
separation of bare life from political life is not an accidental feature of con-
temporary politics or the result of misguided policies, and thus, something 
that can easily be fixed with a new international agreement or more gen-
erous domestic policies; rather, for him it is fundamental to the way the 
modern nation-state is structured such that it is incapable of dealing with 
stateless people who have become “nothing but human” and must, by defi-
nition, keep them in a permanent state of exclusion. As such, on his account, 
when human beings are separated from their political persona, they by defi-
nition cannot be included in common political life.
Let me briefly recap his argument for this.7 Agamben traces the ambiva-
lent relationship between politics and bare life back to Aristotle. For him, 
there were two fundamental kinds of life: zoë, the biological life that we 
share in common with animals, and bios, the kind of life that is distinctive 
to human beings, embodied in our political capacities for speech and action. 
Aristotle argued that zoë, biological life, ought to be excluded from the 
polis since politics was concerned with what was distinctly human. Agam-
ben takes Aristotle’s work to be the original foundation of politics, and 
thus for him, the original foundation of politics is the exclusion of bare life. 
This relationship is transformed in modernity, where bare life becomes the 
source of sovereignty. What the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen, for example, demonstrates is that the state receives its justifica-
tion from its ability to protect the biological life of its citizens. It is impor-
tant to note the double movement here: though bare life moves to the center 
of politics—the justification of sovereignty is the state’s ability to protect the 
bare life of its citizens—bare life is immediately understood as the life of citi-
zens.8 In other words, though bare life becomes important to politics, this 
life becomes inseparable from a political dimension. Consequently, bare life 
that is not also the life of a citizen is by definition excluded from the politi-
cal. This is what Agamben means when he writes, “there is no autonomous 
space in the political order of the nation-state for something like the pure 
human itself” (Agamben 1998, 20).
The implications for stateless people on this view are clear. Stateless peo-
ple, as a form of bare life not mediated through citizenship, are excluded 
politically not merely as a contingent outcome of political circumstances, 
but as a structural feature of modern political life. If Agamben is right about 
the structural relationship of bare life to the nation-state, then we must con-
sider stateless people as a relatively permanent feature of the contemporary 
political landscape. This explains, at least in part, why long-term displace-
ment is the norm and not the exception, and further, why we ought to think 
about moral norms that may govern people in this relatively permanent 
state of exclusion.9
Taking his cue from Agamben and Arendt, the French anthropologist 
Michel Agier elaborates on the way that bare life manifests itself in the cur-
rent refugee regime. As he puts it, the way in which refugees are bare life is 
88 Hannah Arendt and the Ontological Deprivation of Statelessness
that they “are certainly alive, but they no longer ‘exist’, that is, they no longer 
have a social or political existence apart from their biological one” (Agier 
2008, 49). This is so in his view because of the way that stateless people are 
seen and treated in refugee camps. In his experience working in refugee camps 
around the world, refugees are seen by the others as having two fundamental 
features—they are both victims and undesirable: because they are undesirable, 
they are excluded from all political communities, yet they are still included 
in a way because they are seen as victims in need of humanitarian concern.
This view is held in part because of a requirement for humanitarian aid: 
that the people seeking it ask for it not as individuals, members of a particu-
lar nation or group, but only as “human beings.” In other words, refugees 
can only make claims for humanitarian aid and protection as bare life. This is 
the rationale for the existence of humanitarian agencies—they are supposed 
to protect people qua human being, not qua particular identity, and thus 
stateless people must assume this standpoint in order to receive aid. With 
the loss of identity and reduction to victimhood, aid can come from states 
or regions that may be either friendly or hostile. This requires the “social 
and political non-existence of the beneficiaries of aid” (Agier 2011, 133). 
Rather than being political subjects, they become objects of humanitarian 
aid, bodies to be cared for and protected.10 This political non-existence is 
a requirement of humanitarian aid since aid cannot be given to a person 
qua a member of a social group or citizenship but simply on the basis of 
one’s humanity. Hence in refugee camps individuals must identify as bare 
life simply in order to survive. In this sense, humanitarianism acts against 
politics by producing exceptionality and presenting the displaced as victims 
who are guilty, vulnerable, and undesirable, “all incompatible with those of 
the subject and the citizen” (Agier 2011, 215). It is the way that this specific 
identity is constructed, claims Agier, that prevents us from integrating the 
fate of the displaced with the fate of humanity in general, and permits us to 
treat them as entirely superfluous (Agier 2008, 30).
Yet this does not mean that refugees do not strive to be more than this.11 
Agier narrates various stories of protests against humanitarian organiza-
tions and the UN in camps. In one story, for example, he begins by describ-
ing the de facto way that refugees make a life for themselves in camps: by 
selling their ration cards or crossing over the border to work illegally. When 
NGO workers learned about this, they became outraged that their help was 
being taken advantage of and decided to institute stricter measures such as 
head counts. When refugees discovered that this small amount of freedom 
was being taken away, there were huge protests (Agier 2011, 55). It is clear 
that refugees do speak and act in these largely depoliticized spaces, and thus 
that they do retain at least a partial political dimension.12 For Agier, when 
refugees speak out in the name of refugees or the vulnerable, politics is 
introduced in the camp (Agier 2011, 156).
Yet despite speaking up and acting in various ways, political agency 
within camps is ultimately limited because refugees are not recognized in 
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their own speech. Their voice or speech has no meaning because it is not 
recognized as political, only as the claims of an unmediated victim whose 
well-being and autonomy lie in the hands of humanitarian agents who act 
on their behalf; their voice has no ability to lead to meaningful results. He 
writes, “undesirable as well as vulnerable, they can be forced to remain or 
to leave from one day to the next, they see ‘their’ camp disappear, accord-
ing to the unfathomable goodwill of the international organizations that 
opened it” (Agier 2011, 196). Because refugee voices cannot be heard in 
camps, they cannot have the full political existence they strive for. For 
Agier, camps are paradoxical in this way: everything is possible yet noth-
ing really develops; people can act in the gap between the emergency and 
the resumption of life, yet this action never sustains the meaning that is 
hoped for.
Didier Fassin provides a clear example of how bare life functions in the 
contemporary refugee regime. Fassin demonstrates that asylum seekers in 
France are largely discredited and the stories they tell are assumed to be 
untrue. Speech is replaced instead by the body, which is thought to better 
demonstrate the truth. He argues that there is a tension between the low 
rate of granting refugee status to asylum seekers in France and its claims 
to uphold human rights. For Fassin, this has been “resolved ideologically 
by increasingly discrediting the word of asylum seekers so as to justify the 
progressive reduction in the rate of acceptance of their request” (Fassin 
2012, 109). Officials claim to be getting tougher on “bogus refugees,” but 
under these conditions, “the asylum seeker’s accounts, long the only evi-
dence testifying to their story and justifying their request were no longer 
sufficient to confirm the truth of the alleged persecution. The body, which 
could have retained a trace of it, came to be seen as potentially providing 
tangible proofs” (Fassin 2012, 110). Words of asylum seekers are no longer 
seen as truthful; the body—as evidenced by medical experts—is now the 
only source of truth for asylum seekers. This in his view is the “new regime 
of truth,” where truth is no longer sought in asylum seekers’ words but 
“of which their body stills bears the trace, in the form of the physical con-
sequences of torture that only medical examination is competent to state” 
(Fassin 2012, 111).
The point of the section above is to argue that Arendt’s insight that 
stateless people are seen as “nothing but a human being,” or bare life in 
Agamben’s words, remains important to understanding the experience of 
statelessness. Having lost the identity that was bound up with their citizen-
ship, they are now seen by the outside world in this abstract formulation, 
one that is by definition devoid of a political basis. The reduction of stateless 
people to bare life allows stateless people to be excluded from the common 
world, as I discuss below. Conversely, if we wish to address the ontological 
harm of statelessness, we need to think about ways that stateless people may 
be able to keep a meaningful political identity and resist the reduction to 
bare life, even though they may be formally bereft of citizenship.
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§ Rejection from the Common World and Abandonment
In this section, I make two points about the nature of the ontological depri-
vation. First, when stateless people are placed into camps or allowed to 
disappear into crowded urban centers with no formal recognition, this 
exclusion itself represents a fundamental harm. Many citizens of Western 
states think that refugee camps are a matter of practical necessity—there 
is nowhere else to put large groups of unwanted people. Yet for Arendt, 
I argue, it is important to see these camps as morally problematic because 
they effectively exclude people from what she referred to as “the common 
world.” This expulsion from the common world is a fundamental aspect of 
the ontological deprivation. Second, I argue that we must understand this 
exclusion as a form of abandonment, in Agamben’s sense of the term. Aban-
donment for him does not mean that stateless people are left to themselves, 
but rather that they remain directly impacted by us through their formal 
exclusion. Their very identities and modes of existence are defined almost 
entirely by their exclusion. Agamben terms this form of abandonment the 
inclusive exclusion. Both of these aspects are important in understanding 
the ontological harm of statelessness.
Michel Agier draws a clear picture of the way that stateless people are 
forced outside of the common world. Refugees are often physically outside 
of the geographically recognized world. Refugee camps, for example, are 
sometimes not even on maps, though they may have existed for a decade 
or longer.13 Stateless people are economically outside the common world, 
since the stateless are not permitted to engage in the global economy except 
through being passive recipients of the world’s charity for their minimal bio-
logical existence. Finally, they are socially and politically outside the com-
mon world, since they are denied social integration and political rights or 
agency in the states where they reside (Agier 2008). Since refugees are not 
permitted to integrate into the communities where they reside and very few 
are ever resettled, stateless people spend the duration of their lives outside 
of any social or political community and thus are effectively excluded from 
the common realm.
For Arendt, this physical, economic, social, and political exclusion has an 
extra dimension—taken together, they represent the exclusion of stateless 
people from the “common world.” This is because in her words, we live 
in “one world” that is completely interconnected, such that being expelled 
from one place effectively means that you are expelled from all places since 
there is no uninhabited space that a person could move to. Arendt notes that 
when one loses citizenship, one also loses “a distinct place in the world,” and 
the possibility of finding a new one is severely reduced (Arendt 1978, 293). 
Segregated into camps or forgotten in urban spaces, stateless people no lon-
ger have a meaningful place in the common world. This is why statelessness, 
which entails physical, economic, social, and political exclusion, represents 
an exclusion from the common world as such.
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For her, the common world “is not identical with the earth or with 
nature. . . . It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of 
human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit 
the man-made world together” (Arendt 1998, 52). The common world is 
(at times) synonymous with the public realm, which “gathers us together 
and yet prevents our falling over each other” (Arendt 1998, 52). In other 
words, the common world is both what relates us to each other as beings 
who must share the same worldly space, and separates us from each other 
and allows us to maintain our individual identities. In this sense, the com-
mon world is the ground of plurality, our uniqueness and difference that is 
so fundamental to politics.
Having been excluded from this realm of shared meaning, experience, and 
fabrication, stateless people have a kind of worldlessness, and are uprooted 
and rendered superfluous. She writes that to be “uprooted means to have 
no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be super-
fluous means not to belong to the world at all. Uprootedness can be the 
preliminary condition of superfluousness” (Arendt 1978, 475). To be ren-
dered superfluous means that you cease to matter to the world and cease 
to be able to affect the world in a meaningful way. Arendt’s controversial 
claim is that individuality without some form of public, political expres-
sion lacks meaning. She writes that when a refugee represents “nothing but 
his own absolutely unique individuality,” because it is deprived of “expres-
sion within and action upon a common world,” it “loses all significance” 
(Arendt 1978, 302).
To be rendered superfluous and to no longer be able to affect the world 
in a meaningful way represents a loss of dignity. In her words, “respect 
for human dignity implies the recognition of my fellow-men or our 
fellow-nations as subjects, as builders of worlds or cobuilders of a common 
world” (Arendt 1978, 458). Thus being prevented through statelessness 
from being a “cobuilder” of the common world means that a person in this 
position has lost something fundamental. This in turn makes it all the more 
difficult for people to see their fundamental human dignity in their condi-
tion of statelessness. In short, for Arendt, to be excluded physically, eco-
nomically, socially, and politically, as stateless people are, from the common 
world constitutes part of the ontological deprivation because this means 
that an individual loses her place in a common public space from which 
action, speech, and hence identity become meaningful. It is the loss of the 
ground from which one can engage meaningfully with others and with the 
world that is shared in common.
The exclusion from the common world and the worldlessness of stateless 
people constitutes the ontological deprivation in a second way, described 
by Agamben. For Agamben, being excluded from the common realm 
means that stateless people remain in a state of abandonment. Because 
modern nation states cannot deal politically with bare life, they are forced 
to keep it outside of politics in what he refers to as a state of abandonment. 
92 Hannah Arendt and the Ontological Deprivation of Statelessness
To be abandoned for Agamben does not mean that states simply put aside 
stateless people and no longer have anything to do with them. Rather, in 
Agamben’s analysis, states remain in a relationship with what that they 
have abandoned in the form of an inclusive exclusion (a concept I return 
to in more detail in Chapter Four). States formally exclude stateless people 
as non-citizens and even criminals, yet stateless people remain dependent 
upon a given state both for their material needs (since they are formally 
excluded from economic activities, they are reliant on the international 
community and their states of residence for all material goods), as well 
as their identities. They are defined by their exclusion—as either refugees, 
asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, economic migrants, etc.—and this 
definition has a direct bearing on their chances for survival and future pros-
pects. In this sense, to say that stateless people are abandoned by humanity 
is not simply to say that they are ignored; rather, they continue to exist in 
relation to the other entities—countries in the Global North and Global South, 
the UNHCR, other NGOs—through their vulnerability and dependence on 
them, both for their material needs and their ontological status and defini-
tion. Stateless people are excluded as members of a given state but included 
in that they receive their identity and status by virtue of this exclusion. 
Abandonment of course is not a morally neutral state; to be abandoned is 
to be left in a condition of exposure under the threat of violence (Agamben 
1998, 18).
What precisely does it mean to say that stateless people have been “aban-
doned” by the world? Stateless people are abandoned by states, both in 
the Global North, where many refugees would like to resettle, and in the 
Global South, where the vast majority of refugees live, in the sense that 
no country is willing to resettle or integrate large numbers of refugees. In 
Chapter One, I discussed in detail the challenge that large-scale refugee 
populations appear to pose for states, politically and economically. Because 
refugees also seem to be a challenge to the very basis of state sovereignty 
and the state’s ability to control membership, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that states are anxious to distance themselves from stateless people. 
However, the assumption is that when this happens, international institu-
tions are supposed to be able to step up and protect the rights of people 
by virtue of their humanity, rather than citizenship. This is precisely the 
reason that the UNHCR was created by the United Nations in 1950. 
But the conclusion reached by many who study the refugee regime is 
that this does not happen.14 So, despite the scale of the office for the 
UNHCR, refugees essentially have no one acting on their behalf, and 
no one who can speak for their interests or rights;15 they have no one to 
represent them.16 In short, Arendt appears to be right that once a person 
becomes stateless and is rejected from the common world, phenomeno-
logically, if not legally, the forcibly displaced person remains in a state of 
abandonment.17
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§ Meaningful Speech and Action—The Thorny  
Question of Agency
In this chapter, I have argued that the harm of statelessness occurs on two 
levels—the legal/political and the ontological. Thus far, we have seen that 
the ontological deprivation consists in a transformation of identity from 
individual citizen to human being in general or “bare life,” and the effec-
tive removal of stateless people from the common realm of humanity and 
abandonment. There is one more crucial element in the ontological depriva-
tion that arises directly as a result of the first two transformations: because 
they are no longer part of the common world and no longer have a political 
persona to speak through, stateless people lose the ability to act. The final 
aspect of the ontological deprivation is that statelessness renders a person 
unable to speak and act in a meaningful way. In this sense, a stateless per-
son has lost her political agency, her ability to act in the specific Arendtian 
sense of the term, as the freedom to act with others and have her actions 
and speech recognized. There are two important features of action: first, it 
is only through action that we reveal who we are as individuals and are able 
to mark our place in the world; and second, action in a given public space is 
the very essence of freedom.
Agency for Arendt is tantamount to the ability to act. To act in the most 
general sense means to begin, to set something into motion, which can nei-
ther be predicted nor controlled. Action thus is “unexpected,” and the “fact 
that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected 
from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable” (Arendt 
1998, 178). Arendt often speaks as though action and speech were the same 
thing, because they both “contain the answer to the question asked of every 
newcomer: ‘Who are you?’ ” (Arendt 1998, 178). In other words, in action 
and speech, “men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal 
identities and thus make their appearance in a human world” (Arendt 
1998, 179).
Action’s power to disclose human identity is connected with a second 
fundamental feature of action—to act and to be free are the same thing. 
“Men are free,” writes Arendt, “as long as they act, neither before nor after; 
for to be free and to act are the same” (Arendt 1993, 153). This aspect of 
Arendt’s thought is often jarring to contemporary readers who understand 
freedom as an inner disposition or subjective state connected to the will, 
where I am free when I can do what I will or desire to do. Freedom is not 
a subjective state or inner disposition for Arendt. For her, freedom is a fun-
damental human experience that is actualized primarily in political action, 
where a person discloses her uniqueness in conjunction with other people. 
“Freedom,” writes Arendt, “is actually the reason that men live together 
in political organization at all. Without it, political life as such would be 
meaningless” (Arendt 1993, 146). Action is by definition intersubjective, 
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not subjective, in that it requires the presence and recognition of others in a 
common, public realm. “Without a politically guaranteed public realm, free-
dom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance” (Arendt 1993, 149).
Given Arendt’s understanding of action, and its connection to freedom 
and identity, it is not surprising that the fundamental harm of statelessness 
is that a person loses the ability to speak and act in a meaningful way. How 
are stateless people deprived of the capacity for action and hence agency? 
First, because they are outside of the common world and public realm, they 
lack a space in which their actions can be seen and words understood. This 
is why Arendt insists that stateless people are in a fundamental condition 
of rightlessness even though they have certain rights in principle, such as 
freedom of expression or opinion. Without a political community, regard-
less of whether one is able to say what they think and believe, opinions and 
actions cease to matter. So fundamental is speaking and acting in a human 
life that Arendt defines the most fundamental right, the right to have rights, 
as the right “to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions 
and opinions” (Arendt 1978, 296). Conversely, the deprivation of human 
rights “is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in 
the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Arendt 
1978, 296). To be sure, it’s not that stateless people are no longer capable 
of these things but rather, in the condition that they are in, their words 
and actions can no longer be seen and recognized as being meaningful.18 
In Hayden’s words, the problem with statelessness is that stateless people 
are at risk of “becoming irrelevant to the world in that their actions and 
opinions no longer matter to anyone; it’s as if they cease to exist” (Hayden 
2009, 65).
This aspect of the ontological deprivation is connected to the exclusion 
of stateless people from the common world and reduction to bare life. For 
Arendt, our participation in the common world allows us to disclose our-
selves meaningfully through speech and action. Our humanity—hence our 
dignity—is fundamentally bound up with being able to reveal ourselves in 
speech and action in the common realm. Thus the harm of being excluded 
from the common realm is that one cannot act, in Arendt’s sense, and hence 
reveal one’s unique identity and individuality. One no longer has a com-
mon public realm to give one’s actions and identity meaning. Dramatically, 
Arendt claims that “a life without speech and without action . . . is literally 
dead to the world” (Arendt 1998, 176).
I want to stress that for Arendt, the loss of the ability to act is such a 
fundamental loss not because it means that a person can no longer speak 
or act, but rather, they are no longer judged according to this but instead 
according to what is “merely given” about their existence—the fact that 
they are human beings in general. This highlights that for Arendt speech 
and action are intersubjective—they require the presence and recognition 
of others. Without a meaningful public persona and public stage on which 
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to appear, stateless people are judged not according to their actions and 
opinions—according to “who” they are—but according to how they are 
seen by others—according to “what” they are. This is why stateless people 
can be treated as bare life, as bodies without a meaningful identity that are 
indistinguishable from other suffering bodies. The stateless person has lost 
“his place in community, his political status in the struggle of his time and 
the legal personality which makes his actions and part of his destiny a con-
sistent whole” (Arendt 1978, 301).
To summarize, the ontological deprivation contains three separated but 
interdependent elements that together show that statelessness deprives peo-
ple of certain essential features of their humanity. This deprivation, if taken 
more seriously when theorizing about our moral obligations to refugees, 
gives rise to a different set of moral obligations. Or so I will argue. Before 
I turn to that, I would like to address a common objection to Arendt’s and 
Agamben’s critique of statelessness. The objection is that Arendt and Agam-
ben fail to adequately represent the agency of refugees and stateless people, 
and thus their position is too extreme a criticism of statelessness. What 
I show below is that while this criticism leveled at their positions is true to 
an extent, their fundamental insight about statelessness nonetheless remains 
relevant. I seek to clarify and defend Arendt and argue that the ontological 
deprivation should still play a role in our understanding of statelessness, 
and in our thinking of how to rectify the harm of statelessness.
The criticism that Arendt and Agamben exaggerate the loss of agency 
of refugees and stateless people is made in at least three different ways. 
A first criticism is based on what many people know about refugee camps: 
namely, that in many cases, they are breeding grounds for various forms 
of political violence. Hamas in the Palestinian territory and the Interaha-
mwe in Rwanda are all examples of political agency exercised by refugees. 
Given this, it appears that Arendt and Agamben are overstating the extent 
to which refugees become bare life and cease to be political agents.
A second criticism comes from Dunn and Conns (2012), who focus on 
Agamben’s analysis of bare life and argue that his analysis of refugees as 
bare life is inaccurate. They argue that for Agamben, refugees are socially 
dead and without any capacity for political action. They are thus objects of 
bureaucratic action but not subjects who have the power to influence their 
own lives.19 Yet this is contrary to their observations through their work in 
refugee camps. Refugees, in their experience, do shape the way they are gov-
erned in important ways. They are able to rebuild normal lives—not in the 
sense that they are able to attain their pre-conflict “normal,” but they are 
able to have social and economic lives that are more than just mere biologi-
cal survival. “It’s a life that, however makeshift, unpleasant, or uncomfort-
able is stable and relatively predictable, and which makes sense” (Dunn and 
Conns 2012). Thus rather than being seen as devoid of agency, they must 
be understood as exercising a “burdened agency” (Meyers 2011) in that 
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though they have to work within enormous constraints, they are still able to 
reassemble a regular existence.
Finally, a similar but more philosophically grounded criticism can 
be found in Jacques Rancière’s reading of Arendt. Rancière is critical of 
Arendt’s interpretation of human rights as ending in “either a void or a 
tautology” (Rancière 2004, 302). If human rights are the rights of citizens, 
then they are simply the rights of people who already have rights, and thus 
a tautology. If they are the rights of the unpoliticized person, the person who 
is “nothing but a human being” and thus without rights, then they amount 
to nothing and are simply void. What he argues instead is that politics is 
precisely about staging a dissensus (a dispute about what is given) over this 
exact question. In Rancière’s well-known phrase, the Rights of Man are the 
rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights 
that they have not (Rancière 2004, 302). Politics is about the back and 
forth between the first inscription of rights and the dissensus where they 
are put to the test—and this is why they can be invoked even in refugee 
camps (Rancière 2004, 305). “These [rights] are theirs when they can do 
something with them to construct a dissensus against the denial of rights 
they suffer. And there are always people among them who do it” (Rancière 
2004, 305–306). In Schaap’s interpretation of Rancière, politics is the stag-
ing of a dissensus in which those who are deemed to lack speech make 
themselves heard as political animals (Schaap 2011). In other words, Arendt 
and, by consequence, Agamben, are wrong to think that stateless people 
lack agency. For Rancière, stateless people are able to stage a dissensus to 
demand their rights and challenge the status quo, and thus can speak and 
act in a very meaningful way.
The critiques above add something important to our understanding of 
statelessness. It is important to point out that becoming stateless and “noth-
ing but a human being” does not mean that this is how people see themselves 
or that they are not capable of doing anything meaningful in their lives. It 
also does not mean that they never have the capacity for speech and action. 
The authors above are quite right to point out that many stateless peo-
ple contest this status, engage meaningfully and creatively with each other 
and the communities that they find themselves in, and maintain agency in 
important ways. The critique is correct in that Arendt and Agamben do not 
take this aspect of agency seriously enough.
Yet, I argue below that this criticism does not render the importance of 
the ontological deprivation void. To understand why not, we must employ 
Arendt’s contested categories of the public and the private. I argue below that 
politically and publicly, stateless people are still treated as bare life or “noth-
ing but human.” Politically speaking, their words, opinions, and actions still 
do not “matter,” in the sense that they are not acknowledged or valued by 
others—neither by the humanitarian organizations that care for and control 
them, nor by states where they reside or hope to reside. This is evident in the 
ways that their interests are taken or fail to be taken into consideration; the 
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way that their claims are assessed in asylum hearings; and the more general 
way that stateless people are represented in our political landscape. Though 
there are exceptions to this—people who are able to make themselves seen 
and heard—the vast majority of stateless people remain a “what’—a body 
to be cared for, a life to be preserved—rather than a political subject. For the 
outside world, especially for the political agents who make important deci-
sions about their lives, they are still fundamentally seen as bare life, bodies 
devoid of a political existence. Speech and action for Arendt must be recog-
nized by others in order to be meaningful and genuine. This is particularly 
important when it comes to making political demands and claims—they 
make their claims to material necessities and human rights as bodies in need, 
not as political subjects. While it is true that stateless people have much more 
agency privately and socially than Arendt and Agamben give them credit 
for, this public, political deprivation of status remains fundamental and, as 
I argue in the Conclusion, needs to be philosophically addressed.
Let me address each critique in turn. The first critique held that because 
refugee camps often produce military and violent forces, they must be under-
stood as being political spaces and the people in them, political agents. How-
ever, though this is a common way of understanding armed groups, Arendt 
would not have agreed with this. For her, violence is not politics; in fact, it’s 
the very opposite. Violence in Arendt’s view is instrumental in nature—it is a 
means to achieve a given end. Regardless of what the end is and whether or 
not it is morally justifiable, the means of violence is not the same as action. 
This is because violence has to do with “making” and is thus connected to 
the activity of fabrication. Action, by contrast, is not a means to a given end 
but about beginning, starting something which is unpredictable and through 
which “something new comes into the world” (Arendt 1993, 166). Action is 
precisely about spontaneity, self-disclosure, and collaboration. This is why 
action, for Arendt, is tantamount to freedom, while violence is connected to 
necessity and lack of freedom. If the primary examples of refugee actors are 
Hamas and the Interahamwe—two groups known for the use of violence 
to achieve particular political ends—then Arendt would deny that they are 
indeed political actors. Violence becomes necessary where genuine political 
power is absent.
Second, to respond to Dunn and Cons (2012), while it is correct to say 
that refugees in camps exercise a “burdened agency” rather than a lack of 
agency, it remains true that there is something lacking for them as public, 
political actors. They have no political persona, no mask to speak through, 
and ultimately often fail to be seen as political actors making claims to their 
rights. In other words, stateless people are still treated as “bare life” and 
make their claims as such (for material goods to preserve this life), even if 
they are able to manipulate NGOs, reappropriate resources and materials, 
and exercise agency within this identity. This remains a fundamental loss 
for stateless people, even though they can survive and make a relatively 
“normal” life without it.
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For Arendt, what the ontological deprivation entails is that speech and 
action are no longer meaningful, not to ourselves and those close to us, 
but to those who are different from us and to those in front of whom we 
try to distinguish ourselves. In other words, without the political, personal 
speech lacks meaning; it is a “fool’s freedom” because it gains no recogni-
tion either from local NGOs, the UN, host states, or Western states that 
may resettle them. What they have lost is action in the Arendtian sense as 
self-disclosive and world-building. On the contrary, because stateless people 
are seen merely as “what” they are—bodies to be cared for or people who 
threaten the state—they are often considered to be liars who will say any-
thing to get into “our” country or take more resources. Their speech is 
thus disvalued, dismissed, and certainly not seen as meaningful. Without 
a meaningful political identity within the context of the common world, a 
fundamental dimension of speaking and acting is lost.
In other words, Arendt may agree with Dunn and Cons that stateless 
people are agents in the sense that they can follow their wills and desires on 
occasion, even though they face obstacles, and so life in refugee camps may 
be similar to life at home. Yet they still lack agency in the Arendtian sense, 
understood as the freedom to act in concert with others in a way that dis-
closes a self and gives it a worldly reality. Agency, then, for Arendt is more 
than just a subjective experience of how an individual feels about herself 
or perceives her ability to get things done. She still lacks the intersubjective 
recognition that would allow her identity to be meaningful and thus give a 
foundation to her speech and action. Despite how she may feel about her-
self, the public, political aspect of her existence remains lost.
Let me draw on an example discussed by Didier Fassin to make this point 
clearer. He tells the story of Marie, a Haitian woman who sought asylum in 
France in 2000. The reason she sought asylum was that she was gang raped 
in Haiti in the context of generalized political violence. She was denied asy-
lum in France because the gang rape was not thought to be politically moti-
vated and too ordinary to amount to persecution to justify asylum (only 
3.3% of Haitian applicants received asylum during that period in France) 
(Fassin 2012, 142). Like the 80% of asylum seekers whose applications are 
turned down, she became an illegal immigrant. After two years of living in 
isolation and becoming increasingly sicker, malnourished, and depressed, 
she finally saw a doctor. They learned that she was HIV positive and suf-
fering from advanced AIDS, the result of the gang rape experienced in 
Haiti. She sought and won residence on medical grounds, granted under the 
so-called humanitarian rationale. “Her words about the violence she had 
suffered were doubted, but ultimately her body spoke for her” (Fassin 2012, 
142). I use this example to show that for Marie, her words and actions were 
meaningless to the authorities who had the power to define her either as 
a legitimate person entitled to asylum and citizenship, or as illegitimate, a 
liar, and illegal. It was only when her body, her bare life, made her suffering 
and trauma clear that she could be believed. This, I think, is what Arendt 
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has in mind when she argues that statelessness makes speech and action 
impossible—there was simply nobody who found her words meaningful.
Finally, to respond to Rancière’s criticism of Arendt, it is important to note 
that in a fundamental way, Arendt would agree with him. For Arendt, human 
beings always have the capacity to begin, to start something new, since this 
is rooted in the fundamental human condition of natality. I quoted Arendt 
earlier as saying that the “fact that man is capable of action means that the 
unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is 
infinitely improbable” (Arendt 1998, 178). The fundamental human condi-
tion of natality means that all people have the capacity to begin, and action 
is “the actualization of the human condition of natality” (Arendt 1998, 
178). But under the condition of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007)20—where 
stateless people are not recognized as agents who speak (despite the fact that 
they might) but as objects to be cared for or protected from—this capacity is 
precisely what is erased (though never entirely eliminated). This is why the 
deprivation of statelessness is an ontological deprivation—it deprives people 
precisely of this human capacity in a fundamental way.
For Arendt, even in the worst of times, such as in the concentration camps 
of World War II, people were able to begin. For her, politics is precisely 
these completely unexpected and improbable beginnings. Indeed, she ends 
her reflections on totalitarianism with a quote from St. Augustine to this 
end: “that a beginning be made man was created” (Arendt 1978, 479). 
Thus Arendt would fundamentally be in agreement with Rancière that 
people—whether in concentration camps or refugee camps—retain this 
capacity to act since it is the very core of our human condition. But there are 
forms of political life that contribute more and less to our humanity. Refu-
gee camps systematically deny refugees this opportunity and make it as diffi-
cult as possible. Again, it is not to say that it is impossible to act—something 
Arendt explicitly denied—but refugee camps create the conditions where 
such action is unlikely and difficult, and so not a form of political life that is 
conducive to fulfilling our humanity. In short, Rancière is right to point out 
the importance of the capacity for acting and speaking, and contesting the 
status quo that stateless people retain even in the worst condition. Yet this 
does not invalidate Arendt’s fundamental point.
§ Conclusion
I have argued above that we ought to take seriously the ontological depri-
vation of statelessness, theorized by Arendt and Agamben, in our analysis 
of our moral obligations to refugees and stateless people. I have suggested 
that refugee camps and other spaces of containment may provide for their 
biological life, but deprives stateless people of a place in the common realm 
of humanity and the ability to be recognized as speaking and acting agents. 
Statelessness deprives people of certain essential features of their humanity, 
and this deprivation, if taken more seriously when theorizing about our 
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moral obligations to refugees, gives rise to a different set of moral obliga-
tions. Given that the vast majority of stateless people are never resettled 
and remain displaced for prolonged periods of time, we ought to be con-
cerned with ethical norms that will help stateless people mitigate, if not 
entirely overcome, the ontological deprivation and remain part of the com-
mon realm of humanity, even while they are formally excluded from politi-
cal membership. I conclude this chapter by discussing some suggestions for 
ways to overcome the ontological deprivation and return refugees to the 
common world, even though they may remain refugees.
First, if we recognize the ontological deprivation as a legitimate and seri-
ous harm, we must reconsider the use of refugee camps as a way to contain 
and confine refugee populations over the long term. Indeed, as I have sug-
gested in other chapters, we must reject refugee camps as the de facto way 
of containing large-scale refugee flows. Refugee camps—not for the sake of 
emergency aid but as a long-term solution—deprive refugees of a place in 
the common realm of humanity, contribute to their reduction to bare life, 
and impair the ability of refugees for agency, their ability to be recognized as 
speaking and acting agents. In this way, framing one of the harms of forced 
displacement as the ontological deprivation helps us to see that encampment 
constitutes a serious moral harm in and of itself.
Second, the average length of time a person will live as a refugee without 
formal political belonging or protection is close to 20 years. Given the fact 
that displacement is neither exceptional nor short-term, we must consider 
ways of remedying the ontological deprivation even while people remain 
displaced. In other words, while the current political climate means that it 
is virtually impossible that all displaced people will find a permanent home 
in a political community (either through resettlement in a Western state, 
since less than 1% will ever be resettled, or through repatriation to their 
home states), and thus have the political harm of statelessness rectified, this does 
not mean that the ontological deprivation of statelessness can’t be remedied.
How might this occur? One obligation, then, is to think of ways that 
the long-term displaced can be reintegrated back into the common world, 
even though they may remain without citizenship. Such a reintegration may 
take many different forms. An example discussed in Chapter One is the 
“temporary local integration” of refugees while a permanent durable solu-
tion is negotiated, as advocated by the US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants (USCRI). Here the UNHCR would fund programs that allow 
stateless people to integrate locally, such as by funding educational pro-
grams, primary schooling for children, and co-op and other work programs. 
Rather than funding camps that segregate people from the common world, 
the UNHCR would fund education, employment, and social services within 
states that host refugees that would both allow stateless people to be inte-
grated into a political community (temporarily, until a more permanent 
solution is found) and would be materially beneficial to host states (Smith 
2004). Importantly, in such a scenario, refugees would have the ability to 
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participate in governance and be able to hold others accountable for their 
failure to uphold human rights.
Second, given the influence (financially and politically) that Western states 
exercise at the UNHCR, members of these states ought to advocate for a 
more ethical aid policy concerning refugees one that respects them as mem-
bers of the common realm and political agents. This may entail, for example, 
insisting that when refugee camps are necessary as the only way to provide 
aid, they respect human rights. Currently, though the Refugee Convention 
lists rights that all refugees have even while displaced—including the right to 
earn wages, the right to education, the right to public assistance at the same 
level as nationals, the right to courts and travel documents, and, perhaps 
most importantly, the right to freedom of movement—they are routinely 
denied to stateless people, and this is seen as morally unproblematic. An 
ethical policy ought to take the denial of the humanity of stateless people 
more seriously in our policies concerning them.
To be sure, I do not mean to claim that the above suggestions would pro-
vide a comprehensive solution to the global refugee crisis. Rather, they are 
meant simply to point in the direction that our ethical thinking might take. 
My aim in arguing for the ontological deprivation is that when the harm 
of statelessness is reframed in this way, we see that many other obligations 
become at least conceivable. If the harm is partly that stateless people are 
excluded from the common realm and cannot be recognized as political 
agents, then philosophers ought to be concerned with thinking about ways 
that this harm can be mitigated if not entirely eliminated in the current 
global political context. We must be concerned with our ethical obligations 
to the millions of people who will never be resettled in the West and will 
spend decades living in refugee camps that are supported, at least in part, by 
the policies of our states. Yet as many have pointed out, it is not easy to see 
who bears the responsibility for discharging this duty. I turn to this challeng-
ing question in the next chapter.
Notes
 1 More precisely, because refugees and stateless people belong to no recognizable 
community, they cannot be held politically responsible for anything and are “the 
absolutely innocent ones.” In Arendt’s view, it is this innocence that condemns 
them to a position outside of humanity (Arendt 2003, 150).
 2 It is worth remembering Arendt’s idiosyncratic test for this. “The best criterion,” 
she writes, “by which to decide whether someone has been forced outside the 
pale of the law is to ask if he would benefit by committing a crime. If a small 
burglary is likely to improve his legal position, at least temporarily, one may be 
sure he has been deprived of human rights” (Arendt 1978, 286). The stateless 
person benefits by committing a crime and being prosecuted for it because as a 
criminal, the stateless person has a status and is treated like a normal, national 
citizen, with rights and protections. As a criminal, she is practically a citizen, 
since she will be treated according to the law. She is judged by her actions, not 
merely her status, and has thus regained a form of equality.
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 3 For Patrick Hayden, this shows that human rights for Arendt are both con-
tingent and historical—they can be neither exercised nor protected outside a 
political community, and can only be guaranteed “by those actual others of 
cosmopolitanized historical humanity with whom we must necessarily share a 
world” (Hayden 2009, 65).
 4 The general consensus seems to be that human rights of people who lack the 
protection of a national identity and effective citizenship are at best precarious 
and at worst, non-existent. The title of a recent book on the subject, Are Human 
Rights For Migrants?, is telling (Dembour and Kelly 2011). For a more Arend-
tian analysis, see Gündoğdu (2012, 2015).
 5 This is a sentiment that Arendt reported in her own biographical account of life 
as a refugee in “We Refugees” (Arendt 2008).
 6 That Agamben’s concept of bare life is the necessary consequence of Arendt’s 
view of statelessness is a position also held by Jacques Rancière. For him, “the 
radical suspension of politics in the exception of bare life is the ultimate conse-
quence of Arendt’s archipolitical position” (Rancière 2004, 301).
 7 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that we follow Agamben’s analysis concern-
ing refugees to its conclusion. I agree with many of the critiques of Agamben that 
he is too extreme in the conclusions that he reaches. I do, however, want to argue 
that his development of the concept of bare life and the relation of abandonment 
remain important concepts in helping us develop a fuller understanding of state-
lessness in the contemporary world.
 8 We see this in the first three articles. In the first article, natural life is equated with 
the possession of rights (“Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” 
Article 1). In the second article, we learn that the legitimacy of a state rests on 
its ability to preserve these natural rights (“The aim of every political associa-
tion is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man,” Article 
2). But in the very next article, it becomes clear that the natural rights that the 
state is supposed to protect are the rights of citizens, not human beings as such. 
It is the protection of the natural life of citizens that is the basis of sovereignty 
(“The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation,” Article 3). By 
Article 6, the Declaration refers to the rights of “all citizens” rather than “men” 
as it had in the first Article (“All citizens have the right to participate . . .” “All 
citizens, being equal before [the law] . . .”).
 9 That refugees and stateless people are exemplars of bare life has been much dis-
cussed in recent years. For examples of scholars using Agamben to discuss the 
problem of refugees and statelessness, see Jenkins (2004), Doty (2007), Basaran 
(2008), Haddad (2008), Coleman and Grove (2009), Owens (2009), Jennings 
(2011), Hagmann and Korf (2012).
 10 Though this reduction to victimhood might have its origins in a practical 
necessity—the functioning of humanitarian organizations—because this identity 
gets solidified, it has much deeper consequences. In Agier’s view, it prevents us 
from integrating the fate of the displaced with the fate of humanity in general, 
and permits us to treat them as superfluous (Agier 2008, 30). In other words, 
their status as victims and bare life justifies their exclusion from the common 
world and renders it morally unproblematic.
 11 This reflects a limitation in Agamben’s analysis of refugees. In the view of Agier, 
Agamben’s critique of refugee camps goes too far by denying the possibility for 
anything other than dehumanization and social and political death. He fails to 
take seriously the ways individuals are still able to resist, speak, and act, though 
in limited ways, within refugee camps.
 12 Agier at times has an overly simplistic view of politics as simply making speeches 
or acting against what you are told. He does not take seriously enough that 
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speech and action can only be political if there is someone to recognize it as such, 
someone to take it seriously as disclosing something worth considering.
 13 See Bauman (2007, 38) for examples of this. Though of course the internet and 
digital technology have made refugee camps much more visible in recent years, 
they still remain spaces that are physically hard to access, even for journalists 
and scholars.
 14 This is the consensus of a number of scholars who study this issue (Hyndman 
2000, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, Franke 2009).
 15 Other international refugee organizations and local NGOs are similarly unable 
to help stateless people. Because other humanitarian organizations and refugee 
NGOs work closely with the UNHCR, they are often reluctant to go against 
them and to advocate for refugees in ways that would have been challenging to 
the UNHCR. Local NGOs in developing countries often do not include refugees 
in their work, since their focus is on local problems.
 16 Lack of political representation thus remains a problem since Arendt first 
noticed it in The Origins of Totalitarianism. One of the main problems for state-
less people was that they “had no government to represent and protect them” 
(Arendt 1978, 269, italics added).
 17 Agier describes this condition existentially as “no-longer-being-in-the-world” 
(Agier 2008, 15).
 18 Rancière takes up this point and argues that politics is precisely about deciding 
what counts as genuine political speech and what is mere noise (Rancière 2004).
 19 There are others who argue that refugees demonstrate significant agency in ref-
ugee camps. See, for example, Nyers (2006) and Krause (2008). Even Agier, 
despite his sympathy with Arendt’s and Agamben’s interpretations of the refugee 
experience, also notes many ways that refugees exercise agency in camps (Agier 
2011).
 20 Specifically, this kind of injustice is akin to Fricker’s description of a testimonial 
injustice, where a speaker’s credibility as a knower is downgraded due to her 
identity. This constitutes a harm to the individual as a knower and undermines 
her “very humanity” (Fricker 2007, 44).
I have been suggesting throughout this book that our moral obligations 
to refugees and the forcibly displaced include the rejection of long-term 
encampment and the mitigation of the ontological deprivation. Thus far 
I have tried to motivate this argument by explaining the nature of these 
harms and trying to account for why they have not received the moral atten-
tion that they deserve. I have argued that whatever obligations we have 
to refugees, they must include an ethics of the temporary. Yet I have also 
claimed that it is important to take seriously the fact that most states deny 
responsibility for refugees. Most states hold that because the suffering of 
refugees is great, they ought to help them out of a humanitarian impulse 
or a Good Samaritan principle. Though they may recognize the duty of 
non-refoulement and perhaps even a duty to resettle some refugees, most 
states do not believe that the principle of mutual aid generates other more 
robust obligations, such as large-scale resettlement or even the sufficient 
funding of organizations that aid refugees. Most states are clear that helping 
refugees is a matter of benevolence, not responsibility. This denial of respon-
sibility has led to the situation of encampment and long-term statelessness, 
and their concomitant violations of human rights and dignity.
This is not a problem unique to refugees and forced migrants. Theorists of 
global justice who focus on other complex, multi-institutional, global prob-
lems such as poverty and climate change face similar hurdles in establish-
ing responsibility. When a problem, however serious, is not caused by the 
actions of one particular state nor can be traced causally to any given entity, 
traditional accounts of responsibility cannot provide a sufficient ground for 
responsibility. How do we determine who is responsible for addressing the 
problem? An inability to answer this question in a way that is satisfying, 
morally as well as politically, is without a doubt one of the big stumbling 
blocks that prevent a more robust response to global displacement.
In this chapter I review at length three non-traditional models of global 
responsibility that are important for developing a plausible account of 
responsibility for global displacement. I go into the details of each account 
to show their validity and intuitive plausibility, despite being different from 
our traditional ways of thinking about responsibility. I suggest that Iris 
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Young, David Miller, and Thomas Pogge, supplemented with the work of 
Elizabeth Ashford and Gillian Brock, provide us with tools to develop an 
account of responsibility for displacement that does not require that an indi-
vidual or state be causally connected to the given harm and is not rooted in 
a traditional phenomenology of agency, where we are responsible for only 
what we experience ourselves as having caused (Scheffler 2003). I develop 
each account at length in order to show why their views of responsibility 
ought to be taken seriously.
There are three key elements that I take from their accounts that, I argue, 
are useful in establishing responsibility for forced displacement. First, we 
ought to understand some of the injustices in the global refugee regime as 
forms of structural injustice, that is, as moral wrongs that are not inten-
tional or deliberate but the result of independent agents acting according 
to their own interests. To be sure, not all of the harms and injustices of the 
contemporary treatment of refugees can be understood in this way; many 
are simply straightforward moral harms in the sense that they violate clearly 
accepted moral duties or legal principles. Yet I nonetheless argue that seeing 
some dimensions of the current refugee regime, long-term warehousing in 
particular, as structural injustices is both accurate and helpful in grounding 
responsibility. Second, we ought to shift the focus of responsibility from 
outcome to remedial responsibility, focusing on who ought to remedy the 
harm rather than who caused it. Finally, in order to determine remedial 
responsibility we ought to expand the way we think about our connection 
to global displacement and the refugee regime. All three authors I examine 
have much to say about how we ought to think about our connections to 
global structures and they urge us to interrogate more deeply the ways we 
are connected to both the causes of global displacement and the outcomes, 
namely prolonged encampment and the violations of human rights and dig-
nity discussed in Chapter One. The ground for our remedial responsibility 
is our co-participation in a global system from which Western states derive 
significant benefits.
While these authors give us the tools to begin the task of rethinking our 
connections to forced displacement, I suggest that we turn to Giorgio Agam-
ben, who saw the relationship between refugees and the state differently than 
many currently do. Though Agamben’s writing on refugees has been much 
criticized,1 I argue that we ought to take seriously the connection he refers to 
as the “inclusive exclusion.” For him, the international order is constituted 
through a relationship between inside and outside, between excluded and 
included. Sovereign states are not merely connected to those forced out-
side of them through historically contingent political circumstances, but are 
co-dependent at their very foundation. I argue that politically speaking we 
ought to take this ontological connection much more seriously than we do.
Ultimately what I hope to establish in this chapter is a reframing of how 
we think about the ways in which Western countries are connected to the 
problem of global displacement and consequently, the way that we see our 
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responsibility for this problem. Seeing the ground of responsibility in the 
ways I suggest in this chapter is important, since it grounds our obligations 
to reject encampment and take seriously the ethical treatment of the dis-
placed while they are displaced.
§ Three Alternative Models of Global 
Responsibility—Global Order
Moral responsibility is usually grounded in one of two ways. In the clear-
est cases, we are causally connected to what we are morally responsible 
for. Indeed, most people believe that they are only morally responsible for 
their voluntary actions and the foreseeable effects of these actions. One of 
the reasons many think that we have relatively weak obligations to forced 
migrants, especially those not already on our territory claiming asylum, is 
that receiving states often bear little or no responsibility for causing their 
plight. In our ordinary use of the term, we see ourselves as responsible for 
remedying a problem only when our voluntary actions caused the prob-
lem, and we knew, at least in part, what the outcome would be. It is hard 
to ground a country like Finland’s obligations to accept refugees from the 
Syrian civil war on the ground that they in some way caused the situa-
tion that led to the mass displacement, since their direct voluntary actions 
did not contribute to the civil war that is causing people to flee the coun-
try. Even in cases where a country is causally responsible for the condi-
tions that cause displacement—such as America’s interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan—responsibility is often denied since mass displacement was 
not the intended outcome. Grounding responsibility for refugees in a causal 
connection is thus unlikely to yield an acceptance of robust obligations to 
refugees.2 As we have seen over and over, states are anxious to avoid respon-
sibility. It is clear that traditional modes of responsibility do not get us very 
far when it comes to accepting responsibility for refugees.
One way to ground moral responsibility to those we do not already have 
a connection to is through the Good Samaritan principle, also known as the 
principle of mutual aid. This principle holds that if someone’s need is great 
and we are in a position to help at a low cost, we ought to do so, regard-
less of whether or not they are a fellow citizen or share affiliation with us 
in some other way. As we saw in Chapter Two, Carens, Walzer, Miller, and 
Gibney all refer to this principle. For these authors, this is the ground of our 
obligation to needy non-citizens like refugees and asylum seekers that gener-
ates the obligation to resettle at least some refugees. Yet this too has yielded 
weak normative obligations for involuntary migrants, especially the kind 
that I’ve suggested have been neglected. At best, it engenders the sort of atti-
tude that underlies the current status quo: refugees and displaced people are 
not our responsibility or problem, but out of beneficence and generosity we 
will help to the extent that we deem sufficient. With conventional models of 
responsibility in place, it has been fairly easy to avoid any robust attribution 
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of responsibility for the crisis of global displacement. Below, I examine the 
work by three theorists who challenge this dominant paradigm of respon-
sibility in relation to global problems and develop more robust accounts of 
responsibility that are applicable to the problem of responsibility for forced 
displacement.
One of the earliest and most influential reconsiderations of responsibility 
comes from Thomas Pogge. Pogge himself does not see his work as provid-
ing a new account of global responsibility; he sees his project in a more 
limited way as merely showing why we have a negative duty to refrain from 
harming the global poor, rather than a positive duty to aid (as Peter Singer 
and others have claimed) (Singer 1972). Even if this is the case, the ground 
of his claim that we have a negative duty to the global poor is instructive 
for building a viable account of responsibility for global problems. His view 
of global justice is premised on the claim that the causes of severe poverty 
and inequality must be understood as resulting from the structure of the 
global economic order, and not solely the result of poor decision making 
or bad luck on the part of poor states. Nor can the global economic order 
be understood as a neutral set of economic rules immune from critiques of 
justice. Members of Western states and their governments are responsible 
for global poverty insofar as we contribute to and benefit from the global 
economic order (Pogge 2008, 2004).
Many deny that Western countries are responsible for global poverty 
since we do not see ourselves as having caused the poverty. On this view, 
the primary causes of global poverty come from the poor states themselves 
in the form of corrupt leadership or other kinds of mismanagement of 
resources, aid, and loans. Pogge acknowledges that though it may appear at 
first glance that poor states are responsible for their own poverty, Western 
states have fundamentally created the conditions that allow for this in a 
number of ways. First, Western states and the international community in 
general treat the corrupt governments of poor states as entitled to repre-
sent their people, and thus, these governments gain their legitimacy, at least 
in part, by this international recognition. Even more directly, our govern-
ments have helped put in place many repressive governments and sold them 
weapons that helped them stay in power. Additionally, Western states confer 
resources and borrowing privileges on countries that fail to represent the 
interests of their people. That is, we recognize corrupt regimes as entitled 
to sell natural resources and to borrow money in the name of their country 
and people, privileges that facilitate oppressive rule and encourage coup 
attempts and civil wars (Pogge 2004).
Pogge makes a compelling case for the fact that we ought to think of our 
connection to, and hence responsibility for, global poverty in a very different 
way. For him, not only are we responsible because we in a sense help to sus-
tain global poverty, but we are responsible because we directly benefit from 
it. Take three examples. First, when we purchase natural resources from poor 
or corrupt states, we are able to purchase them at much lower rates than if 
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we were purchasing them from states who were not so desperately in need of 
revenue. Second, World Trade Organization rules, as a further example, per-
mit “affluent countries to protect their markets against cheap imports (agri-
cultural products, textiles and apparel, steel, and much else) through tariffs, 
anti-dumping duties, quotas, export credits, and huge subsidies to domestic 
producers” (Pogge 2010, 20). Such measures make it less profitable for poor 
countries to export their goods so much so that according to some estimates, 
developing countries would realize a gain of $100 billion dollars annually 
if these measures were not in place (Pogge 2010, 20). The benefits develop-
ing countries receive are directly at the expense of the global poor. Third, 
Western states largely benefit from the globalization of intellectual property 
rights, through agreements like TRIPS, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. TRIPS requires participants to grant 20-year monopoly pat-
ents on many innovations, including seeds and medicines, and has resulted in 
huge profits for Western pharmaceutical companies while limiting access to 
medicines and seeds of many of the poorest in the world. This structure also 
discourages research in diseases that affect the global poor more than those 
in developing countries, and benefits those in the developing world by focus-
ing on ailments that are important to them. In short, Western states can be 
said to be responsible for the global economic structure that harms the poor 
because of the disproportionate benefits received by Western states.
This leads to Pogge’s conclusion that our responsibility is not merely to 
help the global poor by providing aid to help relieve the suffering imposed 
by their own states or through natural disasters. Rather, our responsibility 
is to stop harming the global poor—a strictly negative duty—by reforming 
the global institutional order in a way that is just. “We should not think of 
individual donations as helping the poor but as protecting them from the 
effects of global rules whose injustice benefits us” (Pogge 2008, 23). In other 
words, we are responsible for reforming a global order we impose that con-
tributes to severe poverty around the world. The question of responsibility 
for global injustice has to do with reforming the global order so that aid 
becomes less necessary.
What Pogge’s arguments show is that global poverty emerges out of a 
kind of global interdependence that Western states have been reluctant to 
recognize. Responsibility is rooted in this previously unseen interconnection 
that has played a role in the prosperity of some countries and impoverish-
ment of others. Addressing global poverty then must not be understood as 
a kind of benevolence but rather a way of redressing a harm that Western 
states both caused and benefit from. Pogge sets the foundation for thinking 
of global responsibility as rooted in global interdependence, a crucial step 
for understanding responsibility for global displacement, as I argue below. 
But equally important, Pogge demonstrates the importance of connecting 
responsibility to those who benefit from injustice.
Elizabeth Ashford takes up Pogge’s framework but argues that a different 
understanding of responsibility ought to emerge from it. She argues for an 
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account of responsibility of individuals in Western states to the global poor. Ash-
ford begins by noting that for most people the West’s failure to eliminate global 
poverty either through institutional reform or aid is not seen as problematic 
or something that individuals or institutions should be held accountable for. 
By contrast, Ashford argues that this ought to be understood as a human 
rights violation and a failure of responsibility. Unlike Pogge, who thinks 
that human rights are claims against social institutions and only indirectly 
against the individuals who participate in them, Ashford thinks that respon-
sibility for human rights violations lies directly with individual agents. She 
argues that this responsibility is shared by many people but grounded in our 
co-participation in unjust social institutions and through our conformity 
with unjust social norms. She attributes much responsibility for global pov-
erty to individual agents in relatively wealthy Western countries. Given the 
contemporary social context, individuals are implicated in responsibility for 
human rights violations such as global poverty because of their participa-
tion in global and domestic social institutions. For Ashford, this shows that 
direct responsibility for violating human rights cannot be limited to official 
agents, but extends to others based on their participation in informal social 
mores and cultural norms.
Ashford’s account of responsibility is rooted, like Young’s account, as 
we will see below, in the everyday acceptable behavior of millions of peo-
ple that, for her, is structured by their participation in domestic and global 
social institutions, as well as their conformity with standard social norms. 
The harms of global poverty are not the result of direct intentional harms, 
but the “ongoing effects that systemically result from certain aspects of the 
normal behavior of millions of agents” (Ashford 2014, 103). Ashford uses 
Parfit’s harmless torturers scenario to illustrate this point. In this scenario, a 
group of a thousand torturers administer agonizing electric shocks through 
a central system that randomly distributes them among prisoners. Though 
no particular agent’s actions can be said to be responsible for a given pris-
oner’s pain, they nonetheless clearly constitute a grave moral harm. Yet this 
harm cannot be seen by focusing solely on the particular actions of indi-
vidual agents. As Ashford insists, “in order for the violation to be seen, each 
agent’s action must be evaluated in the context of what other agents are 
doing” (Ashford 2014, 103).
Her claim is that ultimately direct responsibility for severe poverty as a 
human rights violation is shared by agents of affluent countries who par-
ticipate in the operation of the global economic order. But further, members 
of affluent states share responsibility because they uphold social norms and 
practices that contribute to a given harm like poverty. In Ashford’s examples, 
the pursuit of profit at any cost, the imperative to maximize growth, and the 
insistence by consumers on purchasing the cheapest products all contribute 
to extreme poverty. For these two reasons, individuals are implicated in 
the infliction of severe poverty. Take sweatshop labor for example. While 
it is clear that a particular employer may be directly harming a particular 
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victim, the employee, what is less clear is the role that members of affluent 
states play in this harm. Ashford argues that moral responsibility accrues to 
all those who participate in a global economic order that creates the back-
ground conditions that make it rational for people to choose employment in 
sweatshops over the status quo (abject poverty). Responsibility is shared by 
a vast number of agents to varying degrees.
§ Global Poverty as Structural
A second influential account of responsibility for global justice comes from 
Iris Young, who argues that we ought to treat certain global harms as 
kinds of structural injustice, which she understands as the unintended but 
unjust outcome of the actions of millions of differently positioned individu-
als acting according to normally accepted rules. While Pogge’s stress is on 
the set of global rules and policies that ultimately benefit Western states, 
Young’s focus is on the way that the practices that most people regard as 
morally acceptable can still yield unjust results such as sweatshops in the 
global South, in which many of the most vulnerable people in the world 
labor in terrible conditions for our benefit (Young 2011, 95). For her, when 
global injustice is understood in this way, a new account of responsibility 
is required.
According to Young, injustice must be viewed from two irreducible differ-
ent points of view: the interactional and the institutional. The interactional 
model asks us to look at the ways in which our actions and the actions of 
others contributed to an injustice. Did I lie, cheat, or steal, and did these 
actions result in the given injustice? On the other hand, we must also ask 
how we contributed “by our actions to structural processes that produce 
vulnerabilities to deprivation and domination for some people who find 
themselves in certain positions with limited options compared to others” 
(Young 2011, 73). The institutional perspective asks us to look at how we 
contribute to unjust institutions and structures that result in a particular 
harm or injustice. It is from the institutional point of view that we can see 
how our actions contribute to structural injustice. What I suggest below is 
that though we have taken seriously the interactional point of view—the 
ways in which states help or fail to help refugees through resettlement 
policies—we have given insufficient attention to the latter, institutional per-
spective, the ways in which our policies contribute to structural injustice. 
It’s not that the first perspective is incorrect; merely that it is not the whole 
story. By viewing encampment as a kind of structural injustice, we are better 
able to see the ways that we contribute to the domination and deprivation of 
long-term encamped refugees through our policies of containment.
Young’s account of structural injustice provides a novel framework with 
which to understand global injustice. Structural injustice refers to an unjust 
set of background conditions and the distinct harms that arise as a result of 
these conditions. They are distinct from harms that arise through individual 
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interaction and state policies and institutions. The term refers to situations 
in which something is morally wrong, but there is no clear causal expla-
nation, that is, they are not the result of a victim’s bad choices, bad luck, 
the wrongful actions of some persons, or overtly discriminatory laws and 
policies, or other powerful institutions. Young defines structural injustice as 
arising “when social processes put large groups of persons under systematic 
threat of domination or deprivation at the same time that these processes 
enable others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for 
developing and exercising capacities available to them” (Young 2011, 52). 
It occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to 
pursue their particular goals and interests within the limits of accepted rules 
and norms. For example, global poverty may be understood as a structural 
injustice, and sweatshop labor is a harm that results from it. The injustice 
that many people must perform labor under terrible conditions is not the 
result of malicious intentions on the part of factory owners or managers, 
nor bad choices of the workers; rather, the choice to work in sweatshop 
conditions is a reasonable one, given the background of extreme poverty 
and inequality.
Put another way, global poverty makes particular individuals vulnerable 
to the harms of sweatshop labor because of their position vis-a-vis certain 
global social structures. Global poverty constrains the range of options 
available to certain people and makes certain outcomes possible, though not 
necessary (whether a person will end up employed as a sweatshop worker 
will depend on other factors such as their own choices, brute luck, and the 
actions of others). As Iris Young puts it, people who are in a social struc-
tural position affected by structural injustice are vulnerable to harm, and 
their situation differs from people not in this situation in terms of the range 
of options available to them and the kinds of constraints on their actions. 
Whether a person in this position actually experiences harm, or experi-
ences specific kinds of harm, will depend on a number of factors (their own 
choices and actions, luck, the choices and actions of others), but the injus-
tice is that some are made vulnerable to these harms because of the social 
structural position they are in, while others are not and may even benefit. 
The key point, though, is that a harm results not from an injustice, delib-
erate or otherwise, done by a particular person, policy, or law (we cannot 
attribute sweatshops to the choices of greedy owners, corrupt governments, 
cruel bosses, etc.). The source of the harm, as I discuss below, is the actions 
of large numbers of people acting according to accepted rules and practices.
One crucial difference between structural injustice and other more well 
understood forms of injustice, such as wrongful actions by individual or 
discriminatory laws and policies, is how it comes about. Iris Young explains 
that structural injustice arises from the actions of many people (thousands 
on a domestic level; millions on a global level) acting according to normal 
rules and morally neutral or even morally positive practices (Young 2007, 
48).3 In other words, structural injustice emerges from people living their 
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everyday lives and pursuing their own interests. The results, however, are 
social-structural processes that create channels for action, channels which 
guide people to act in certain ways and constrain them in others. People 
are not restricted in any obvious and direct way, but nonetheless the ways 
choices are made and actions taken are directly affected. This is true for how 
all social structures are created. What makes some unjust and others neutral 
or positive are the results that they have on individuals.
There are two features of Young’s analysis that are crucial for think-
ing about responsibility for the current problem of mass displacement and 
encampment. The first is that thinking about harms as structural forces us 
to pay attention to outcomes, rather than intentions. For example, Young 
makes clear that poor people’s vulnerability to homelessness can, at least in 
many cases, be understood as the result of structural features of society, and 
not necessarily the result of unjust policies, bad luck, or ill will on the part of 
landlords. The lack of affordable housing in many cities is a structural fea-
ture. Indeed, she insists that a lack of affordable housing will be “predictable 
and explainable” in areas where developers target high-income renters and 
large-scale nonprofit housing is absent.4 The lack of affordable housing and 
the vulnerability to homelessness that many poor and working class people 
experience is also not the result of repressive state policies, but the outcome 
of people pursuing their own interests within ordinary legal channels. Simi-
larly, we can say that mass displacement and encampment are predictable 
features of a system of sovereign states where people are forced to leave for 
various reasons but have no right to entrance in any other country. Though 
there may be many problematic policies around refugees and displacement, 
the problem is not primarily the result of malicious policy or cruel intentions 
on the part of any one state or the UNHCR. Rather, we can see it as the 
outcome of many different states acting in accordance with their own spe-
cific goals around immigration and economic development. States see it as 
being in their interest to prevent the displaced from entering or integrating 
into their societies, and this is grounded in the morally defensible right of 
self-determination. The problem is that the outcome is long-term encamp-
ment and mass exclusion from political communities. What Young shows 
so clearly is the need to take seriously this outcome, even if the intentions 
behind it are not morally problematic.5 Unless we move beyond examining 
the morality of individual decisions (such as whether or not it is morally 
permissible for a particular state to exclude refugees and stateless people), 
we cannot address the structural features of global injustice.
Second, Young makes a distinction between guilt and political responsi-
bility that is important for our analysis. Following Arendt’s use of the terms, 
Young argues that guilt applies only to deeds and can be applied only where 
an individual can be singled out for what she has done. By contrast, political 
responsibility can be attributed to those who support governments, institu-
tions, and practices that commit harms. It is a way of connecting individuals to 
certain kinds of moral harms, but without conflating this connection to moral 
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culpability. Duties are strict moral rules that tell us exactly what is required 
of us. Responsibility, on the other hand, is more open to interpretation as to 
what actions are called for. The difference between responsibility and duty 
maps onto Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Respon-
sibility arises when actions are taken in our name. So though we—as citizens 
of Western states, as members of the international community, etc.—may 
not be guilty for causing mass displacement, or intentionally placing thou-
sands of people for years on end in camps, we are nonetheless responsible 
for this outcome and have a political responsibility to redress it. To have 
a political responsibility, as opposed to a duty, for Young means we have 
an obligation to address whatever harm we are connected to. We have a 
responsibility to remedy structural injustice, and though this is no less strin-
gent than a duty, it involves more discretion for agents to determine what 
actions to do to discharge it. It is up to the agents who have responsibility 
to decide what to do.6
One of the challenges that comes with seeing global injustices as struc-
tural is that assigning responsibility is daunting. That we acknowledge it as 
an injustice means that someone ought to be held responsible, yet because 
it is structural and reproduced through the morally acceptable actions of 
different actors, pinpointing responsibility is not obvious. The usual meth-
ods of assigning responsibility rely on tracing a causal chain and assigning 
responsibility to the most proximate cause. Because of these constraints, 
Young develops her own model of responsibility she deems more appropri-
ate to this kind of injustice. She calls this the social connection model of 
political responsibility.
Grounded in her social connection model, Young argues that individuals 
bear responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their 
actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes. “Responsibility in 
relation to injustice thus derives not from living under a common consti-
tution, but rather from participating in the diverse institutional processes 
that produce structural injustice” (Young 2011, 105). More specifically, for 
Young we can determine the way we are connected to a structural injustice 
by thinking through some parameters of reasoning that individuals can ref-
erence to think about the ways they are implicated in structural injustice 
and the responsibility they have to remedy it. There are four “parameters”: 
power, privilege, interest, and collective agency.
The first parameter in determining responsibility is power. Young sug-
gests that the more actual power or influence over a process that produces 
unjust outcomes, the more responsibility ensues. The anti-sweatshop move-
ment seemed to adopt this principle by focusing on those with the most 
power to change conditions for the workers producing their garments, 
namely multinational designers and retailers. Pragmatically speaking, since 
we cannot respond to all the injustices we are connected to, it makes sense 
to focus on those that we have the greatest capacity to address. Second, 
one is responsible to the extent that one has relative privilege in relation 
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to the unjust structure or is the beneficiary of the processes that produce 
structural injustice. For example, middle class clothing consumers, while 
not necessarily powerful in regards to the injustice of sweatshops, are none-
theless privileged vis-à-vis the sweatshop workers. Privilege is relevant for 
Young because it means that those individuals are better able to change their 
practices without suffering deprivation. Third, responsibility maps onto the 
extent of our interest in the structural injustice. For example, victims of 
structural injustice have a unique interest in remedying it, and thus share 
responsibility for changing the structures (along with others, to be sure).7  
Those with the most interest in a particular injustice are often in a privileged 
position to know what needs to be done and how things ought to change. 
Refugees, for example, often have a lot to say about how they would pre-
fer to be treated, under what conditions they would like to return home, 
and how the global refugee regime might be changed in order to genuinely 
benefit them, though they are rarely consulted about this. Finally, we are 
responsible to the extent that we have a “collective ability,” that is, we are 
in positions where we can draw on the resources of organized entities and 
use them in new ways to promote change (Young 2013, 147). In this sense, 
unions, churches, student groups, etc., have a particular kind and degree of 
responsibility because they can help to coordinate action.
Her account can be understood as situated between a cosmopolitan con-
ception of responsibility and a nationalist one. From a cosmopolitan per-
spective, membership in a state is not relevant in assigning responsibility; 
rather, we have obligations to all of humanity to relieve suffering, though 
membership in a state may be the most efficient way to discharge this duty. 
A nationalist perspective says that our primary obligations are towards 
fellow citizens. Though we have some obligations that transcend borders 
(such as mutual aid), these obligations are not as strong or deep as the 
obligations of justice we have by virtue of sharing membership in a political 
state. Our responsibilities are always first and foremost to fellow members. 
Young thinks that both of these positions are limited. Against the cosmo-
politan perspective, she argues that it’s far too demanding and doesn’t take 
seriously enough the value that people put in their place of membership. 
Against nationalists, she insists that nationality is arbitrary from a moral 
point of view and it discounts the relationships we have with people out-
side of our states. Her view, she argues, mediates between these two posi-
tions. It takes seriously the cosmopolitan intuition that we have obligations 
that extend beyond those to whom we are explicitly connected. But rather 
than all of humanity, Young finds a way to delineate those to whom we 
are responsible—namely, those with whom we participate in institutional 
processes that produce structural injustice. Her position allows us to take 
seriously our situatedness within a given state but not to artificially limit our 
responsibilities to this ground.
One of the most important features of Young’s account is that deter-
mining responsibility for structural global injustice requires that we judge 
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background conditions. On the usual liability model, a particular harm is 
considered a deviation from an acceptable norm; there is an assumption that 
background conditions are just and morally acceptable, even if not perfect. 
The harm then is considered a discrete, bounded event that breaks from the 
normal state of affairs. Seeing harm as resulting from structural injustice, 
however, requires that we interrogate the background that it emerged from 
and prevents us from assuming that the background conditions are just and 
morally acceptable.
Two other features of the social connection model are important as well. 
First, Young insists that responsibility in this sense ought to be primarily 
forward and not backward looking. The goal is not to look backwards to 
determine the cause of the harm in order to find an individual to blame. 
Rather, because the injustices she is concerned with are ongoing, it becomes 
important to think about how to transform the processes that cause injus-
tice so that they are better in the future. The only reason to look backwards 
is to try to understand how the injustice has come about so that it can be 
rectified in the future. Second, the social connection model of responsibil-
ity is always a shared responsibility in the sense that while an individual or 
individual state bears responsibility, they do not bear it alone. The ground 
of my responsibility is my participation in structural processes that have 
unjust outcomes, and so we must take seriously that there are others who 
share responsibility in this sense. Because responsibility is shared, it must 
be discharged through collective action. While Young has in mind the col-
lective action of individual citizens as opposed to the state, it’s not hard to 
imagine that on the international level collective action would entail col-
lective action on the part of states. That is, it would require states working 
together to reform international structures that lead to long-term displace-
ment and encampment.
Finally, Young acknowledges that perhaps the biggest obstacle to address-
ing structural global injustice is that powerful agents often have an inter-
est in perpetuating them. Again, it’s not that they intend the outcome, but 
they may have an interest in the predictable, foreseeable consequences of 
an action. Especially if they believe that the purpose behind the action is 
legitimate, powerful agents may be even more reluctant to change them. 
Given the analysis in Chapter One, it’s not hard to see how this obstacle 
will arise concerning global displacement. Powerful Western states benefit 
from policies that lead to encampment by having large numbers of people 
unable to make asylum claims and exercise their legal right to seek asylum. 
The motivation behind many of these policies can be understood as neutral 
or even morally positive; recall that the moral basis for containment is that 
it is best for refugees to be returned to their home countries once conflict 
has ended, and thus it is better that they be housed “temporarily” in camps 
in neighboring countries rather than being integrated or moved to a third 
country further away. Pointing out this limitation is often one of the first 
things that needs to be accomplished.
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§ Causal versus Remedial Responsibility
A third major contribution to theories of responsibility for global justice 
comes from David Miller, whose view is importantly different from that of 
both Pogge and Young.8 One of Miller’s most fundamental distinctions is 
crucial for an account of responsibility for global displacement—outcome 
and remedial responsibility. Outcome responsibility is the responsibility that 
arises from the consequences of our actions. In terms of refugees, we would 
be outcome responsible for refugees if we created the situation that made 
people refugees, for example by persecuting a particular ethnic minority or 
potentially by supporting a regime that did so. As previously discussed, 
most accounts of responsibility for refugees hinge on outcome responsibil-
ity and as a result, artificially limit the responsibility that Western states take 
for this issue. On the other hand, remedial responsibility is the responsibility 
we have to remediate or fix a situation. This kind of responsibility can be 
linked to outcome responsibility but can also be established in other ways. 
Remedial responsibility must be assigned in some way and may be justi-
fied or unjustified, but unlike outcome responsibility, cannot be correct or 
incorrect.
Under what conditions can someone or some group be held remedi-
ally responsible? For Miller, we start with something that is in need of a 
remedy—in our case, the millions of stateless people living in camps—and 
ask whether there is anyone who can correct this situation. In doing so, he 
brackets the question of the source of the harm and focuses on the moral 
unacceptability of the harm in question. The worry in this approach is that 
the duty to aid the situation will remain undistributed—if we cannot pin-
point a causal agent, there will be no specific agent able to discharge the 
duty. The challenge, then, is to find a way of identifying an agent who is 
responsible since there is no obvious agent causally tied to the situation.
For Miller, we can say that someone is remedially responsible for a cer-
tain situation if they are connected in one of the following six ways; this 
is Miller’s connection theory of remedial responsibility. First, we may be 
remedially responsible if we are also morally responsible for the situation. 
To be morally responsible for Miller means you are outcome responsible 
and act in a way that displays moral fault. In his examples, an artist is 
outcome responsible for a beautiful work of art she has created, but not 
morally responsible since she is not the author of her talent; an untalented 
gardener is outcome responsible for the lawn not being green, but, assum-
ing he tried his best, is not morally blameworthy since it is not the kind of 
error that is subject to moral blame or praise (Miller 2007). Second, you 
may be outcome responsible for a situation, though not morally responsible. 
In Miller’s example, you may engage fairly in business and cause someone 
else to go out of business. In this case you are outcome responsible for your 
competitor going out of business but not morally responsible. Third, you 
can be remedially responsible if you are causally responsible. Miller uses 
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this category to distinguish acts that had an effect that was not intentionally 
caused nor was the effect reasonably foreseeable. For example, if I fall and 
knock someone off a ladder, I caused the person to fall and thus am causally 
responsible, but am not outcome responsible since I could not have antici-
pated the effects of my action.
Beyond those three somewhat standard ways of drawing connections 
between individuals and certain outcomes, Miller goes on to develop grounds 
for three less conventional ones. For Miller, we may be remedially respon-
sible if we receive a benefit from the harm, though not responsible in any of 
the three ways discussed above. Though this may be a way of establishing 
remedial responsibility, it is not a particularly strong one in Miller’s view. In 
common sense morality we do not often think that people have obligations 
because they have gained some benefit from a situation that has resulted 
in someone else’s harm. Being linked through community is another way 
that Miller thinks we may be remedially responsible. Community—family, 
nation, religion—picks people out as bearers of responsibility, and thus may 
make us remedially responsible though not causally so.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for questions of global justice, 
Miller argues that we may be remedially responsible if we have the capacity 
to help or ability to supply a remedy. In Miller’s example, if I am the only 
person walking along a riverbank and a child falls in, I am responsible for 
saving him. Capacity as a way of justifying remedial responsibility blends 
two elements—effectiveness and cost. In other words, the person who has 
the capacity to fix a situation may be the person who can do this the most 
effectively (the best swimmer, in the above example, if there is more than 
one person who sees the child fall in) or the person who would bear the 
smallest cost (of two possible rescuers, perhaps the person least afraid of 
strong currents). Evaluating not only who is capable of helping but also 
who can do so most effectively and at the lowest cost must be part of the 
calculation.
Miller is careful to note that often more than one connection can be made 
between a particular state of affairs and various individuals. While it would 
be tempting to rank the kinds of connections that can be made, this is not 
totally plausible, especially for the last three modes of connection. Rather, 
we must bear in mind that in reality “assigning remedial responsibility 
involves applying multiple criteria which are opaque” (Miller 2007, 107). 
There is no formula that can resolve disputes, only better and worse argu-
ments that can be made to justify various intuitions.9
Miller is ultimately interested in defending an account of collective 
national responsibility in which, under appropriate circumstances, mem-
bers of a national community ought to be held responsible for the gains 
and losses they create for themselves and others (and these can be inher-
ited across generations). This is a form of outcome responsibility that he 
argues is the first way one should track responsibility. Contra Pogge,10 he 
argues that it is often the case that individual states can be held outcome 
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responsible for their impoverishment because of historical decisions or cul-
ture; at the very least, he argues, there is a shared responsibility between the 
global order and specific countries in terms of outcome responsibility. West-
ern states, he argues, cannot for the most part be held outcome responsible 
for global poverty.
Yet Miller is aware that many poor states cannot or will not discharge 
their responsibility for their country’s poverty. In this case, citizens of West-
ern states have a remedial responsibility to the world’s poor. There are some 
circumstances in which this is particularly clear. First, Western states have 
remedial responsibilities towards the world’s poor when the poverty is the 
result of a past injustice and we can establish a causal link between the 
past injustice and the contemporary harm. This responsibility is grounded 
in the fact that states in this case are also outcome responsible. Second, 
we have responsibility to the global poor when there is a failure to imple-
ment fair terms of cooperation, that is, economic rules of interaction that 
are fair to both sides. This, he claims, is clearly the case at present. In his 
view, fair rules would allow poor countries reasonable opportunities to 
develop and allow them to choose between different policies for achieving 
this. He writes, “a fair international order cannot simply mean a free mar-
ket in which nations and corporations pursue their interests without regard 
to the consequences for vulnerable poor people. The responsibility of citi-
zens of rich countries is to ensure fairness in this sense” (Miller 2007, 253). 
In this way, his conclusion is not far from Pogge’s and Ashford’s, though 
Miller stresses that Western states are remedially but not outcome respon-
sible for global poverty. Importantly, when people are so poor that they fall 
below a minimum threshold and rich countries are able to aid them, the 
responsibility to address poverty should be considered a duty of justice, not 
merely beneficence. In sum, Miller claims that his view is superior to Pogge’s 
because Pogge encourages us to think that poverty will disappear if we fix 
the resource and borrowing privileges. For Miller, this clearly would not 
make local sources of poverty disappear, and this is why it’s important to 
ask where responsibility for world poverty really lies and not assume that it 
lies with those agents able to discharge remedial responsibilities (in this case, 
wealthy Western states).
Gillian Brock combines elements of both Miller’s and Young’s analysis 
of responsibility. Recall that for Young, structural injustice implies that the 
background conditions of our experiences are themselves morally problem-
atic. Brock takes up this idea and focuses our attention on responsibility 
for the baseline conditions that allow an injustice like global poverty to 
emerge. When there is “systematic injustice in the background conditions,” 
our responsibility is to remedy this (Brock 2014, 122). Brock sees global 
poverty as a systematic injustice, one that “involves people having to endure 
a situation where their basic entitlements are routinely ignored, remain 
unconsidered or insufficiently considered by those who have responsibilities 
to respect such basic entitlements” (Brock 2014, 141). In the case of global 
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poverty, what Brock has in mind is this. Poverty reduction requires a num-
ber of conditions in poor states—economic growth, an effective state, active 
and engaged citizens. Western states can play either a positive or negative 
role in these conditions, and for the most part, we have played a negative 
one by supporting institutions in the global economy that undermine the 
capacity for poorer states to develop effectively.
She draws on two examples. Because of the way Western states invest in 
developing ones, there is pressure to create favorable tax environments by 
creating tax havens. This leads to illegal activity such as bribery, organized 
crime, and tax evasion, all of which ultimately destabilize the international 
economy. Though there are ways around this—such as the creation of uni-
tary taxation for multinationals and participation in the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative, which make it more likely that poor citizens 
would benefit from natural resources—most Western states have failed to 
do this. Second, developing countries support the “brain drain”—allowing 
skilled health workers (i.e., doctors and nurses) to immigrate to the develop-
ing world without any kind of compensation.
Brock argues that because practices like the ones listed above and others 
prevent people from living decent lives, we help to sustain poverty and harm 
the poor. Because we are morally culpable for global poverty, we are respon-
sible for changing the global order and our patterns of behavior. Yet she 
acknowledges that it’s a big claim to say that citizens of Western states have 
a moral responsibility to bring about an international order that undermines 
rather than sustains global poverty. To support this claim, Brock draws on 
David Miller’s distinction between outcome and remedial responsibilities. 
Based on Miller’s account, we may hold citizens of Western states remedi-
ally responsible for harmful actions performed on their behalf. Remedial 
responsibility for Brock is rooted in the ways we are connected to the global 
poor. First, we benefit from the structure of the global economy. The aver-
age citizen of Western states, she writes, benefits from unjust tax and migra-
tion policies that keep prices on consumer objects low. As a result of low 
prices for consumer goods, we have more disposable income to spend and 
the state has more income to tax in order to improve roads, schools, and 
other public goods. She writes, “the benefits of unjust enrichment spread to 
all citizens, even the morally scrupulous” (Brock 2014, 138). Even if I buy 
only fair trade goods, and refuse anything made in sweatshops, the benefits 
of having the kind of economy we do mean that I, and individuals who 
make similar spending choices, still benefit. Further, having a large supply 
of health care workers means that I’m likely to have more access to doctors, 
nurses, and other health care providers.
For Brock, we are also connected to the global poor causally insofar as 
we are implicated in practices that encourage deprivation. For example, 
tax evasion originates in and is sustained by actors in Western states. We 
are also remedially responsible because of our capacity—we can assist the 
global poor at a lower cost and through effective institutions. Finally, we are 
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remedially responsible because we have the capacity to help. Capacity com-
bines two components: cost and effectiveness. Western countries are able to 
help at a lower cost and in a more effective way than most states. Because 
of all these levels of connection, Brock concludes that we can assign reme-
dial responsibility to citizens of affluent states and their governments who 
act on their behalf. The responsibility is to reform policies that create the 
background conditions of poverty and contribute to deprivation, through 
“reasonable modifications” to taxation, migration policy, and other inter-
national rules (Brock 2014, 141).
§ Elements of a New Ground of Responsibility
The previous discussion of responsibility for global poverty established a 
number of crucial features of a more robust account of responsibility for 
global justice, which, I argue below, can be applied to other global prob-
lems such as mass displacement and the global refugee regime. Global pov-
erty shares a number of features in common with the problems of global 
displacement—neither can be attributed solely to discrete wrongs or omis-
sions by specific agents but involve causal chains of numerous people around 
the globe; no specific agent can be singled out as fully responsible; both take 
place within complex systems that have little central structure; both result 
in grave moral harms; both seem changeable with sufficient political will, 
but such will would require a serious change in public attitudes on the issue; 
both injustices are sustained because they support important economic and 
political interests. There are also important differences. Many more people 
are affected by severe poverty than by displacement (even though numbers 
of the displaced are growing); the public tends to be more fearful of migrants 
and more likely to see them as threats than the global poor.
Despite these differences, I want to suggest that we can use tools from 
Young, Miller, and Pogge to develop an account of responsibility for dis-
placement that does not require that an individual or state be causally con-
nected to the given harm. What I have tried to demonstrate in the previous 
section is that Pogge, Young, and Miller provide three alternative ground-
ings for responsibility that are not rooted in a traditional phenomenology of 
agency (where we are responsible for only what we experience ourselves as 
having caused) (Scheffler 2003). I have tried to draw out the merits of each 
view and make a case for why their views of responsibility ought to be taken 
seriously. Having established the intuitive plausibility of their views, I now 
turn back to the question of responsibility for global displacement.
How can their views supplement and improve our ways of thinking about 
responsibility, both for the causes of refugees and for the way we respond to 
mass displacement via the global refugee regime? There are three crucial 
elements. First, we ought to understand some of the injustices in the global 
refugee regime, such as encampment, as forms of structural injustice, that is, 
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as moral wrongs that are not intentional or deliberate but the result of inde-
pendent agents acting according to their own interests. Second, we ought 
to understand our responsibility for global displacement as remedial, that 
is, we are responsible for fixing the problem in front of us because of the 
various ways we are connected to the situation, even though we did not 
cause it. Finally, in order to determine remedial responsibility, we ought 
to expand the way we think about our connection to global displacement 
and the refugee regime. The ground for our remedial responsibility is our 
co-participation in a global system from which Western states derive signifi-
cant benefits. All three models require us to interrogate much more deeply 
the ways in which we (Western states, citizens of these states, members of 
the international community, funders of the UNHCR, etc.) are connected to 
both the causes of global displacement and the outcome, namely, the pro-
longed encampment and violations of rights.
§ Refugee Regime as Structural Injustice
Many of the harms associated with the refugee regime ought to be under-
stood as forms of structural injustice. Recall that for Young, structural injus-
tice is the unintended outcome of the actions of many different individuals 
and collectives acting on accepted norms and for morally positive or neutral 
purposes. It refers to situations in which something is morally wrong, but 
there is no clear causal explanation or clear intention on someone’s behalf 
to cause harm. It occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institu-
tions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests within the limits of 
accepted rules and norms.
Some of the worst harms associated with displacement arise in this man-
ner. Prolonged encampment, for example, and the violations of dignity and 
rights that go along with it, is clearly morally wrong, yet it is not the result of 
deliberate or explicit policy. As I showed in Chapter One, it arises as a con-
sequence of various sovereign states acting according to their interests and 
encouraging international organizations like the UNHCR to do what seems 
best for the displaced, namely keeping them in camps close to their countries 
of origin, for their own safety and for the sake of facilitating repatriation. 
No state is acting on an immoral principle, since they are acting to protect 
their citizens and the well-being of their states, and, in principle at least, 
acting in the interest of the displaced themselves. States are acting accord-
ing to a widely accepted moral norm, namely that states have a sovereign 
right to control admission to their state. Nonetheless these processes create 
structural barriers that prevent the displaced from accessing resources, such 
as security, education, and health care, and ultimately a permanent solution, 
and contribute to one of the worst harms of displacement, encampment.
The reason it’s helpful to use Young’s conception of structural injus-
tice to talk about some of the injustices surrounding the refugee regime 
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is precisely because it helps us to avoid unhelpful talk of causality and 
ill-intentions. While the sources of displacement—civil war, genocide, polit-
ical repression—can be understood as straightforward injustices, and the 
individuals responsible for these are certainly morally culpable, the injus-
tices around the refugee regime are better understood as forms of structural 
injustice. The current crisis around displacement is not the result of Western 
countries actively trying to harm refugees by keeping them in camps; nor is 
it the result of corrupt officials from international organizations trying to do 
the bidding of powerful countries to maintain access to funds. In most cases, 
the actors in the global refugee regime are acting according to their interests 
and pursuing what they think is the good. Yet Young’s account allows us 
to say that even in the absence of culpable wrong-doing or cruel intentions, 
an injustice is being committed. Because it is an injustice, regardless of how 
it arose, we are called on to fix it. This, I think, is a helpful supplement to 
the traditional way of understanding the injustice around the global refugee 
regime and the requirement of responsibility. It leaves room for moral cul-
pability, but permits us to foreground structural harms.
If we understand the harms involved in the global refugee regime in this 
way, it becomes easier to see why a new account of responsibility is called 
for. At the same time, it complicates the question of responsibility in a par-
ticular way. Because warehousing and other injustices in the global refugee 
regime are structural, it is particularly difficult to assign responsibility. That 
we acknowledge it as an injustice means that someone ought to be held 
responsible, yet because it is structural and reproduced through the morally 
acceptable actions of different actors, pinpointing responsibility is not obvi-
ous. On what grounds can we say that some entity, such as Western states, 
is responsible for rectifying this structural injustice?
§ Remedial Responsibility
In order to answer that question, we must move away from a traditional 
understanding of responsibility and shift towards thinking about respon-
sibility as remedial, in David Miller’s sense of the term. The usual mode of 
understanding responsibility maps onto Miller’s concept of outcome respon-
sibility, where we are responsible only for what we knowingly and intention-
ally caused. Remedial responsibility, on the other hand, is not necessarily 
linked to causality (though it may be) but starts by addressing the question 
of who is going to fix a situation or rectify an injustice. To use Miller’s 
example, if a teacher comes back to her kindergarten class and finds a mess 
on the floor, her question, “who is responsible for this?”, might mean two 
things. It could mean, “who made the mess?”, that is, who caused it. Or, it 
could mean, “who is responsible for fixing it?” This may refer to the person 
who was supposed to be in charge, or perhaps the group of students whose 
turn it was to clean up messes. What Miller is so helpful in doing is showing 
that this distinction is rooted in our everyday sense of responsibility, where 
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we acknowledge both kinds of responsibility. In many discussions of global 
issues such as poverty and displacement, we artificially restrict responsibility 
to outcome responsibility and ignore remedial responsibility. Miller shows 
how important it is that this kind of responsibility be discharged, especially 
when outcome responsibility either cannot be determined or the person who 
is outcome responsible is unable or unwilling to discharge it.
One of the reasons we are apt to focus on outcome responsibility is that 
it is much easier to assign a party to it. Who did the action that resulted 
in the harm that needs to be addressed? If this straightforward question 
can be reasonably answered, assigning outcome responsibility is possible. 
However, assigning remedial responsibility is not so straightforward. Unlike 
outcome responsibility, it cannot be causally traced back to a particular 
source. The only thing we can do is to consider arguments that may justify 
remedial responsibility. Remedial responsibility, because it simply must be 
assigned rather than discovered, may be justified or unjustified; unlike out-
come responsibility, it cannot be correct or incorrect. Justifying who might 
be remedially responsible for “fixing” the global refugee regime, rather than 
who is causally responsible for the situation, shifts how we think about the 
way Western states may be connected to the refugee regime.
§ How to Justify Remedial Responsibility?
Miller, Young, and Pogge have much to say about how we might think 
about remedial responsibility that can be applied to the injustices around 
the refugee regime. For all three thinkers, what is required is that we shift 
the way we think about our connection to global harms like poverty or 
displacement.
For Miller we become remedially responsible because of our connection 
to an injustice. Recall that for Miller, we start with something that is in 
need of a remedy—in our case, the millions of stateless people living in 
camps—and ask whether there is anyone who can correct this situation, 
bracketing the question of the source of the harm. Once we do that, we 
must look to see who, if anyone, is connected to the situation in one of the 
six ways he thinks can generate remedial responsibility: moral, outcome, 
causal, benefit, privilege, and capacity. While Western states may or may 
not be morally, outcome, or causally connected to a given refugee crises, 
they are certainly connected to the global refugee regime through capacity, 
privilege, and benefit.
Miller argues that we may be remedially responsible if we have the capac-
ity to help or ability to supply a remedy. In Miller’s example, if I am the only 
person walking along a riverbank and a child falls in, I am responsible for 
saving her since I have the capacity to do so at a low cost to myself. Addi-
tionally, for Miller, we may be remedially responsible if we receive a benefit 
from the harm, though in his view this is not a particularly strong way 
to ground responsibility. Receiving a benefit from a particular harm—for 
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example, being able to buy cheaply made clothes because laborers work 
under “sweatshop” conditions—binds and connects otherwise unconnected 
entities in morally significant ways.
It is not difficult to see how Miller’s argument can be applied to the rela-
tionship between Western states and the global refugee regime. Western 
states have both the capacity to help and receive benefits as a result of the 
situation. That Western states have the capacity to help solve global issues 
is rarely disputed. However, it is not as obvious how Western states benefit 
from the current refugee regime. For one, by denying political obligations 
to aid refugees and displaced people not on their shores, the legal frame-
work for the refugee regime allows most countries to treat refugees and 
displaced people as a matter of discretion—they may choose to help or not, 
but they violate no moral or political norm if they choose not to. Further, 
though funding the refugee regime is costly, Western states are able to avoid 
the more politically weighty costs of hosting large numbers of ethnically 
and religiously diverse people within their territories, spending state rev-
enue on social programs for a large group of non-nationals, and dealing 
with the environmental damage and disease burdens that come with large 
population increases. These certainly constitute benefits that Western states 
receive because of the current structure of the refugee regime that connects 
Western states directly to the problems associated with the refugee regime. 
That we have a remedial responsibility based on our capacity—effectiveness 
and cost—is the same as with global poverty; we have the capacity to aid 
effectively and at a relatively low cost. Once we move away from outcome 
responsibility for refugee situations, we can attend to the subtler ways that 
we are connected to the phenomenon of global displacement and the injus-
tices around warehousing and human rights violations, and see the ways in 
which these connections ground our responsibility.
§ Responsibility as Grounded in Participation
Young argues that individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice 
because they contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust 
outcomes (Young 2011, 105). Responsibility here derives from our inter-
dependence in global processes of cooperation and competition in which 
we seek benefits and realize our own aims and projects. So though we are 
not guilty or liable in a legal sense for an unjust action or moral harm, our 
co-imbrication means that we must take responsibility for remedying the 
injustices that arise as outcomes of our actions. “Responsibility in relation 
to injustice thus derives not from living under a common constitution, but 
rather from participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce 
structural injustice” (Young 2011, 105).
It is worthwhile to recall Young’s distinction between responsibility on 
the one hand, and guilt on the other. Young argues that guilt applies only 
to deeds and can be applied only where an individual can be singled out for 
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what she has done. In other words, someone is responsible in virtue of their 
guilt only if we can trace the harmful outcome back to their specific actions, 
similar to the way we ascribe outcome responsibility for Miller. By contrast, 
political responsibility can be attributed to those who support governments, 
institutions, and practices that commit harms or whose actions contribute 
to structural harms. It is a way of connecting individuals to certain kinds of 
moral harms, but without conflating this connection with moral culpability. 
Political responsibility may arise when actions are taken in our name, when 
we contribute through financial or political support, or when we engage in 
practices that uphold a particular injustice. So though Western states may 
not be guilty for causing mass displacement, or intentionally placing thou-
sands of people for years on end in camps, we are nonetheless responsible 
for this outcome and have a political responsibility to redress it because of 
our participation in this global system.
For Young, thinking through the ways we are connected to structural 
injustice is a challenge, both for individuals and for collective entities that 
we support, such as states and international organizations. Her “param-
eters of reasoning” are an attempt to breakdown this large task into more 
meaningful pieces. For her, we can see our connection to structural injustice 
via power, privilege, interest, and collective agency. Young insists that the 
more real power or influence over a process that produces unjust outcomes, 
the more responsibility ensues. In terms of power, it is hard to deny the fact 
that Western states have a great deal of power and influence in how cri-
ses around global displacement are dealt with. As we saw in Chapter One, 
international refugee aid agencies like the UNHCR are largely funded by 
Western states and can feel pressure to act in ways that support their agendas. 
This is what Young means by power. For her, simply having power is a deep 
way of connecting individuals and collective agents to structural injustice.
Further, we can see how privilege and collective agency apply to Western 
states as well. For Young, one is responsible to the extent that one has rela-
tive privilege in relation to the unjust structure or is the beneficiary of the 
processes that produce structural injustice. Western privilege comes through 
its influence over policies and practices around the refugee regime, as well 
as through benefitting from processes that keep millions of needy people far 
from our shores. When this privilege is truncated—such as when the thou-
sands of child migrants entered the US in the summer of 2014 or when thou-
sands of migrants entered southern Europe in 2015—political crises ensue. 
So while the benefit of encampment isn’t always realized, these examples 
show why Western states are so insistent that the displaced be kept far away 
and benefit from this at least in the majority of cases. Because of the role 
that Western states play in leading or influencing large global institutions 
such as the World Bank, IMF, and UNHCR, that it has the collective ability 
to change policies and practices is without question.
For Young, political responsibility is always a shared responsibility in the 
sense that while an individual or individual state bears responsibility, they 
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do not bear it alone. Because responsibility is shared, it can only be dis-
charged through collective action. In terms of global displacement, collec-
tive action must take place at the international level. Given Western states’ 
ability to engage in collective action, at least some of the time, we can see 
why they are well suited to discharging political responsibility. This would 
require states working together to reform international structures that lead 
to long-term displacement and encampment. Young’s parameters of reason-
ing give us a clear picture as to how Western states are connected to struc-
tural injustice and hence bear responsibility for it.
Young acknowledges that perhaps the biggest obstacle to addressing 
structural global injustice is that often powerful agents have an interest in 
perpetuating it, not changing it. This is particularly true if people believe 
that the purpose behind their interests is morally legitimate (such as the pro-
tection of state sovereignty). Powerful Western states benefit from policies 
that lead to encampment by having large numbers of people unable to exer-
cise their legal right to seek asylum and thus have an interest in maintaining 
them. The motivation behind many of these policies can be understood as 
neutral or even morally positive; recall that the moral basis for containment 
is that it is best for refugees to be returned to their home countries once 
conflict has ended, and thus it is better that they be housed “temporarily” 
in camps in neighboring countries rather than being integrated or moved to 
a third country further away.
For Young, our political responsibility gives rise to certain obligations. 
One that is particularly relevant for our topic is that responsibility for struc-
tural global injustice requires that we judge background conditions. On the 
usual model of responsibility, a particular harm is considered a deviation 
from an acceptable standard or status quo that is considered morally accept-
able and ordinary. We judge the harm, and rarely the background that gives 
rise to it. For example, if a person is mugged on the street of a poor neigh-
borhood, we are interested in the crime and the criminal, not the conditions 
that may have led to the poverty or the lack of state security that would give 
rise to such a crime. The crime is considered a discrete, bounded event that 
breaks from the normal state of affairs. Yet if we are talking about struc-
tural injustice, we are required to interrogate the background itself, since 
structural injustice is precisely the set of unjust structural conditions that 
constrain some and benefit others.
With Young’s account, it is important to interrogate not only our policies 
around refugee admission but also the background that allows us to hold 
such positions and exclude millions of people, even when this means that 
these people will live for extended periods outside a political community. In 
other words, while our policies around immigration may themselves be just, 
the structural injustice comes from the very structure of the international 
system that permits countries sovereign control of borders on the one hand, 
and puts millions of people outside of the nation-state system on the other. 
Young’s account of political responsibility asks us to question this phenom-
enon, and not merely particular policies around resettlement.
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Brock further develops the idea of responsibility for the baseline condi-
tions that allow an injustice such as encampment to emerge. Recall that for 
Brock, when there is “systematic injustice in the background conditions,” 
our responsibility is to remedy this (Brock 2014, 122). Brock sees global 
poverty as a systematic injustice, one that “involves people having to endure 
a situation where their basic entitlements are routinely ignored, remain 
unconsidered or insufficiently considered by those who have responsibili-
ties to respect such basic entitlements” (Brock 2014, 141). For Brock, while 
Western states may not single-handedly create global poverty, they can play 
a role—either for better or worse—by supporting institutions in the global 
economy that undermine the capacity for poorer states to develop effec-
tively (such as by promoting just taxation and migration policies). Once we 
turn our attention to baseline, background conditions as Young and Brock 
insist that we do, we can attend to the ways in which our policies and prac-
tices help to shape an unjust global refugee regime.
Pogge also argues that the ground of our responsibility is our contribu-
tion to a larger global system that benefits us. Recall that for both Pogge and 
Ashford, the global economic order is set up and sustained by Western states 
in their interests. For them, participation in a global economic order that 
systematically harms the global poor makes Western states, and the indi-
viduals in them, responsible for global poverty. For Pogge this responsibility 
gives rise to purely negative duties—we must simply stop harming the global 
poor, and we can do this through institutional reform. For Ashford, this 
responsibility also gives rise to duties on behalf of individuals to change the 
attitudes and norms that allow extreme global poverty to go unchallenged.
As Pogge shows, global poverty is not caused by bad decisions made 
within poor states, but is better understood as the result of policies around 
trade, immigration, and resource allocation that are made at an interna-
tional level. Global interdependence grounds responsibility, particularly the 
responsibility to refrain from harming through this global structure. Ashford 
shows how this responsibility extends to individual citizens within states 
who uphold social norms and practices that contribute to the harm. Because 
of global interdependence, problems that seem domestic in nature—such as 
poverty or displacement—must be interrogated to see the ways in which 
they are connected to larger global structures and policy decisions by other 
states in order to determine responsibility. This is something that has not 
been done for global displacement for the most part.
How do members of Western states contribute to the unjust outcome of 
mass encampment? The most direct way is through benefiting from policies 
and practices that guard our sovereign right to control membership and that 
keep displaced peoples far from our territory. Further, as discussed exten-
sively in Chapter One, Western states play a formative role in the global 
refugee regime, not by causing displacement but by creating the norms 
and conditions around which the international community responds to the 
situation. This response has, not surprisingly, put Western interests ahead 
of the interests of the displaced in many ways. The West, fearful of mass 
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migration, has sought to contain the displaced close to the sites of displace-
ment and as far as possible from Western shores. Even though this was 
done in the service of a moral principle—it’s best for people to live in their 
own states and thus repatriation, not resettlement, ought to be the preferred 
solution—it has the effect of protecting Western states from large influxes 
of migrants and more or less ensuring the encampment of millions of people 
for prolonged periods of time as they wait for a permanent solution. As the 
primary funders of the global refugee regime and the UNHCR, Western 
states have played a crucial role in shaping this global regime and ensuring 
that it benefits Western states as much as possible. As Pogge points out, 
there would be nothing wrong with acting in our own interests if not for 
the fact that doing so also causes severe moral harm to others, in this case 
for the displaced. In this way, our participation in and support of the global 
refugee regime, which in many ways not only fails to help as much as it can 
but harms the displaced, creates the ground of our responsibility to reform 
this global institution to bring it more in line with moral norms.
There is one final way that we can ground a connection to refugees and 
the displaced that has not yet been discussed. According to Agamben, refu-
gees are connected to sovereign states because they mutually define and 
constitute each other. If this is right, then our connection to the displaced is 
deeper than even the connections mentioned above. Below, I turn to Agam-
ben’s analysis of the “inclusive exclusion” and show why it is fundamental 
that we understand our connection to refugees in this way.
§ Inclusive Exclusion
For Agamben, far from being an anomaly or political aberration, refugees 
constitute a fundamental part of modern political life. The reason why refu-
gees are a constitutive feature of modern political life has to do with the 
state’s relationship to bare life. As discussed in Chapter Three, bare life is 
life that is stripped of all those particular qualities that make us individu-
als (they lack what Agamben would call a “form of life”). What remains 
of their life is only their bodily, biological existence, devoid from a social 
or political one. As Agier puts it, “refugees are certainly alive, but they no 
longer ‘exist’, that is, they no longer have a social or political existence 
apart from their biological one” (Agier 2008, 49). Refugees are not the only 
example of bare life in modernity, but they are emblematic of it.
Politics has always had an ambivalent relationship to bare life. On the one 
hand, politics was originally founded on the exclusion of bare life from the 
polis. Agamben sees this as originating in the work of Aristotle, who made 
a distinction between zoë (bare or biological life; the kind of life we have 
in common with animals) and bios (the form of life particular to human 
beings). Aristotle argued that zoë ought to be excluded from the polis since 
politics was concerned with what was distinctly human—using language to 
decide what is just and what is unjust. Politics, based on the exclusion of 
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zoë, defined itself as being opposed to bare life. Hence for Agamben, the 
original foundation of politics is the exclusion of bare life.
On the other hand, in modernity, bare life was reintroduced into the polis 
but immediately transformed into something else. In Agamben’s view, the 
modern human rights movement, beginning with the French Declaration of 
1789, made natural or bare life the source of sovereignty. We see in the first 
three articles of the Declaration that natural life is equated with the pos-
session of rights (“men are born free . . . and equal in rights”), but that this 
natural life is immediately subsumed into the life of the citizen (“the aim of 
every political association is the preservation of the . . . rights of man”). In 
the third article we learn that the protection of the natural life of citizens is 
the basis of sovereignty. What this shows for Agamben is that in modernity 
bare life moves to the center of politics—the justification of sovereignty is 
the state’s ability to protect the bare life of its citizens—but this bare life is 
immediately understood as the life of citizens. In other words, though bare 
life becomes important to politics, bare life without this political façade 
becomes invisible. The life of the refugee as a form of bare life not medi-
ated through citizenship must remain excluded. There is no autonomous 
space in the nation-state for the purely human or bare life. It thus remains 
a structural feature of modern political life that bare life must be excluded 
from politics. This is why Agamben claims that we cannot confront refugees 
through political means but only humanitarian ones. In modernity, bare 
life is always seen as embodied in political life, and anyone who breaks this 
fiction—such as the refugee—cannot be treated as a political subject, but 
can only be treated, at best, as an object of aid and protection.
This point by Agamben is intuitive enough—since politics defines itself 
by the exclusion of bare life, it makes sense that the permanent exclusion of 
this category of people is a part of our political landscape. However, Agam-
ben complicates this story by claiming that we should not understand this 
original exclusion of bare life as putting bare life off limits in a way that no 
longer affects politics. Rather, in his view, biological life remains included 
within the polis by virtue of being excluded.11 This is a fundamental point in 
much of Agamben’s work: what is excluded remains in a relationship with 
the included. “Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion 
(which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” (Agamben 1998, 7). 
Politics for Agamben is fundamentally the act of separating and opposing 
ourselves to our bare life and at the same time maintaining a relationship to 
this bare life in the form of an inclusive exclusion (Agamben 1998, 8).
That political life continues to include bare life even as it tries to dis-
tinguish and separate itself from it occurs at an ontological, not a practi-
cal level. As Andrew Norris has pointed out, the idea that something can 
remain included by virtue of its exclusion is similar to Hegel’s analysis 
of the law of identity (Norris 2000, 42). For Hegel the law of identity is 
self-contradictory in the sense that it necessarily contains difference within 
itself. Hegel writes that those who assert the principle “A=A . . . do not see 
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that in this very assertion they are themselves saying that identity is dif-
ferent; for they are saying that identity is different from difference; since 
this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of identity, their 
assertion implies that identity, not externally, but in its own self, in its very 
nature, is this, to be different” (Hegel 1976, 413). In other words, identity 
includes difference within itself even as it tries to separate or distinguish 
itself from it. Similarly, political life continues to include bare life even as it 
tries to separate itself from it. Politics is a constant attempt to shed bare life, 
to move past it; but because this is something that it cannot fully succeed in 
doing, politics remains defined by this struggle. This is how bare life remains 
included within politics by virtue of its exclusion. Politics for Agamben, as 
identity was for Hegel, contains its opposite even as it tries to distinguish 
itself from it.
“Bare life,” writes Agamben, “remains included in politics in the form 
of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an 
exclusion” (Agamben 1998, 11). For him, the implications of a reduction to 
bare life can be seen most dramatically in the figure of homo sacer. Homo 
sacer is a figure from ancient Rome who, having committed a grave crime, 
is exiled from the city. From the moment of his exile, however, he can be 
killed by anyone without penalty (that is, it is not considered a homicide) 
but cannot be a ritualistic sacrifice. This is the original meaning of the term 
sacred, and it is this sacredness that is the original form of the inclusion of 
bare life in the political community.12 Homo sacer is like an animal which 
can be killed without anyone seeing it as wrong, but which is too impure to 
be killed as a sacrifice. Though his biological life remains intact, he has lost 
all those qualities that make a distinctly human life, so much so that taking 
this life is not considered murder. The only law that applies to him is the 
law that exiled him from his community. His life is at the mercy of others.13 
Homo sacer is both excluded from political life and remains included within 
it, insofar as his whole being is determined by his being an exception to the 
law. As Catherine Mills reminds us, the excluded are not just set outside the 
law and made indifferent or irrelevant to it, but rather abandoned by it, i.e., 
“subjected to the unremitting force of the law while the law simultaneously 
withdraws from its subject” (Mills 2008, 62).
What is excluded from the state and its law remains in a relationship to it 
as an exception in the sense that it is placed outside of or excluded from the 
law. More specifically, “what is excluded in the exception maintains itself 
in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension. The rule applies 
to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it” (Agamben 
1998, 17–18). What the state excludes as an exception remains included 
within the state in the form of abandonment—this is the “relation of excep-
tion” by which something is included only through its exclusion (Agamben 
1998, 18). This is the potentiality of the law “to maintain itself in its own 
privation, to apply in no longer applying. The relation of exception is a rela-
tion of ban” (Agamben 1998, 28). To be banned means to be in a relation 
Responsibility for the Forcibly Displaced 131
of inclusive exclusion, where the force of the law is felt in the withdrawing 
of the law. Further, what is banned is not just put aside or made illicit, but is 
abandoned by the law, which is to say that it is left in a condition of exposure 
and threat of violence. Law, then, maintains a relation to life through aban-
donment; life is at the mercy of law. Put another way, the ban means that 
the law is in force but without significance (Agamben 1998, 51). Thus, “law 
is all the more pervasive for its total lack of content” (Agamben 1998, 52).
What would it mean to say that refugees are abandoned by the law? What 
it means is that refugees remain caught up in our system of sovereignty 
through their exclusion from it in a number of ways. First, refugees and 
the forcibly displaced receive their identity through their exclusion from, 
and attempt to enter into, the system of sovereign nation-states. They are 
defined by their relationship to the law—as people who are not citizens of 
any country, who fall into or fail to fall into certain legal categories (i.e., 
refugee, asylum seeker, economic migrant, etc.). This legal status determines 
the way in which their bare life will be sustained—that is, whether they have 
the right to work, to food rations, to housing, etc. When sovereign countries 
refuse entry to asylum seekers or when refugees are warehoused for years in 
camps, it is as if the world is saying, “our law does not apply to you,” yet 
their whole being is defined by their being outside of the law, being unable 
to participate in any political system (including the state in which they are 
residing).
In this sense, our law defines them as being outside of the common world. 
As Michel Agier puts it, they are characterized by no-longer-being-in-
the-world.14 They are not part of the common world in the following sense: 
they are physically outside of the common world (refugee camps, for exam-
ple, are often not even on maps through they may have existed for a decade 
or longer15); they are socially and politically outside the common world 
(since they are denied social integration and political rights or agency); 
and they are economically outside the common world (since they are not 
permitted to engage in the global economy except through being passive 
recipients of the world’s “generosity”). Consequently, having been reduced 
to bare life, they are defined by their exclusion and lack of belonging, and 
are entirely dependent on the global community for their minimal biologi-
cal existence.
The reason why this is generally not noticed or considered a problem is 
because refugees are usually considered to be in a temporary, emergency 
situation. People in such a situation, it is believed, can best be handled by 
treating individuals as lacking all identity except for their biological exis-
tence and their victimhood. The temporary and emergency nature of their 
situation seems to justify focusing on the protection of their biological life at 
the expense of ignoring their social and political existence. The problem of 
course is that the situation of the forcibly displaced often solidifies into some-
thing permanent, yet the de facto permanence of their situation is ignored. 
Thus there is no way to challenge the definition that is given to them by the 
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global community. This is another way in which refugees remain caught up 
in our system of sovereignty through their exclusion from it.
Second, Agamben argued that to be abandoned to the law means that 
the rule of law applies in no longer applying to you. This is apparent in the 
lives of all but a small portion of the world’s refugees (that is, the small per-
centage who are able to find permanent homes). There is a rule: if you are 
forced to flee your home, you have the right to claim asylum in our country. 
But because it is the state which decides who is subject to this rule, the state 
is justified in excluding those it does not want—those who are too poor, 
from the wrong country, are too numerous, too injured or diseased, etc. In 
other words, the state decides to whom the rule should apply and to whom 
it does not. Those in the latter group—who may genuinely lack a political 
community—thus remain at the mercy of the state or the global community. 
These people become the exception to the rule—’we will take in all refugee 
except you’—but people to whom the rule still applies in a failed way. The 
state refuses to apply the rule to them, yet they remain defined by precisely 
this failure to have the rule applied to them.
Finally, there is an important way that we remain in a relationship with 
those we have excluded. As Agier explains, we see refugees as being both 
victims and undesirables. They are not the “good victims” that evoke our 
desire to help and the feeling that our charity can make things better. They 
are victims that threaten us—threaten to take our resources, to enter our 
countries and weaken them. Yet we do acknowledge them as victims and 
not just criminals and as such, they require some reaction from us. We 
acknowledge that they are distinct from economic migrants, and like Wal-
zer, generally believe that we have some moral obligation to them. There is 
a tension here that is generated from realizing that this group needs our help 
and is morally deserving of it, but finding them undesirable and threatening. 
Because they are threatening, they are excluded from our political commu-
nities as a matter of fact, yet remain part of them because we know that, in 
some way, we are responsible. We need to perpetually justify our exclusion 
of them while we at the same time acknowledge our moral obligation to 
them. They remain included in our system by their very exclusion.
To summarize, the situation of the forcibly displaced and their relation-
ship to us is much more complex than is usually acknowledged. Agamben’s 
work is helpful in illuminating the nature of this relationship. In particular, 
his work complicates the way in which the forcibly displaced are excluded 
from our political communities—they are de facto excluded but remain in 
an inclusive relationship by virtue of being abandoned by the law. Far from 
being a phenomenon that can be ignored or a situation that is easily justifi-
able, Agamben forces us to rethink the way we conceptualize those who are 
permanently excluded from our political communities and fundamentally 
lack political belonging. Agamben’s analysis helps to see our deepest con-
nection to refugees and thus grounds our remedial responsibility to them. 
Rather than being distant objects of charity, Agamben’s analysis encourages 
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us to see them as individuals that we remain in a relationship with. They are 
tied and connected to us in a fundamental way.
§ Conclusion
This chapter has been an attempt to reimagine responsibility for complex, 
structural injustices such as global displacement and the refugee regime. 
I have suggested that we rethink not only the model of responsibility we 
use and the way we frame the injustice, but also that we rethink the way 
we are connected to the displaced through the inclusive exclusion. These 
theoretical resources, I suggest, help to move us away from a focus on causal 
responsibility, which has limited the ability of states and the international 
community to take seriously our responsibility not only to aid the displaced, 
but to create a just refugee regime with a fair system of burden sharing. 
What I have suggested in this chapter is that this is the direction that our 
thinking about responsibility ought to move; it is not to say that such a 
change will be easy to achieve.
This conception of responsibility is vulnerable to Samuel Scheffler’s cri-
tique of all expansive notions of responsibility. He argues that non-restrictive 
conceptions of responsibility could never become internalized by individuals 
and able to give action-guiding principles. This is because they contradict 
our experience of ourselves as agents. He argues that we experience our-
selves as agents with causal power, where acts have primacy over omissions, 
near effects have primacy over remote effects, and individual effects have 
primacy over group effects. What this means is that remedial responsibil-
ity for structural injustice, where individuals must take seriously the effects 
of actions that they did not intend and that we are responsible for effects 
we did not directly cause, fundamentally contradicts this sense of agency. 
Further, though there is wide spread agreement that the lives of individu-
als around the globe are interconnected, we do not yet have a clear picture 
of what this means for how we should live our lives. We have difficulty 
in conceptualizing our place in the global chain, and consequently, situat-
ing our responsibility, and this is an obstacle that Scheffler thinks will be 
very difficult to overcome. He doubts that a conception of responsibility for 
structural injustice could be taken seriously by individuals and used to ori-
ent their conduct in a globalized world.
Is there a way to overcome Scheffler’s worry? In many ways he is right. 
The account of responsibility proposed in this chapter is demanding and 
calls for a reorientation of our thinking that goes against the way most peo-
ple think about and understand responsibility. Yet as Scheffler also points 
out, our everyday sense of moral responsibility is a specific cultural product, 
with its deepest roots in those affluent societies “that have the most to gain 
from the widespread internalization of a doctrine that limits their responsi-
bility to assist the members of less fortunate societies” (Scheffler 2003, 41). 
If he’s right about this, then it is at least possible to imagine that as global 
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problems develop and intensify, interests may shift; it may become more in 
the interest of affluent societies to create a just system of burden sharing 
once migrants start reaching Western shores in larger numbers. Yet even if 
he is right about the difficulty of changing our thinking, it doesn’t change 
the fact that traditional conceptions of responsibility no longer serve us 
when thinking about global issues. This chapter is a step towards develop-
ing a more meaningful theory of responsibility for forcibly displaced people.
Notes
 1 For example, see Darling 2009, Hagmann and Korf 2012, Jenkins 2004, and 
Owens 2009.
 2 Though it is possible, under some circumstances. As Carens pointed out, many 
Americans believed that the United States had a special responsibility to refu-
gees from Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, whose situation was a result of the 
unpopular war there at the time. Many agreed that because we were responsible 
for the war, we were responsible for the refugees that resulted from it, especially 
those who were acting on our behalf.
 3 To be sure, within “these structural processes some people often do illegal or 
immoral things,” but these are “not the only perpetrators of the injustice” 
(Young 2011, 95). In other words, we must still take seriously blatantly immoral 
or illegal acts. Her point is that we cannot stop our moral analysis with these 
more obvious forms of harm.
 4 See Kusisto (2015).
 5 This approach can be distinguished from that of someone like Nozick, for whom 
transactions are just as long as the background of those transactions are fair, 
namely that there is no deceit or coercion. Young distinguishes her view from 
precisely this approach. Unless we focus on the outcome of political decisions, it 
is impossible to understand and eradicate the most complex forms of injustice.
 6 Young makes this distinction in response to the objection that her view of respon-
sibility puts too many demands on individuals. Her response is to say that this 
is not the case because political responsibility does not specify particular duties, 
only the requirement that individuals do something to collectively address the 
harm in question.
 7 Young is clear that to say that victims of structural injustice are responsible 
to change conditions is not at all “victim blaming.” For her, this is a way of 
exercising agency and bringing the unique epistemic privilege of victims to help-
ing find solutions. For example, without the input of sweatshop workers in the 
anti-sweatshop movement, the solutions proposed (for example, boycotting fac-
tories that use sweatshop labor) may end up hurting the people the policies are 
intended to aid (such as by forcing them into worse forms of labor if their facto-
ries close). To be sure, other non-victims may have self-interests that align with 
those of the workers. For example, one could imagine a competing factory that 
does not have poor working conditions. Such a factory may not want to give up 
a competitive advantage to sweatshops and as such, would also have an interest 
in undermining structural injustice.
 8 This is not to say that Miller’s theory of responsibility has not been criticized. For 
some examples, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2009), Brooks (2011, 2014), Amighetti 
and Nuti (2015).
 9 Brooks points out that Miller’s argument would be much stronger if there were 
a two tier procedure in place, first asking who has the capacity and then looking 
at other connections (Brooks 2011).
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 10 Miller is highly critical of Pogge’s interpretation of responsibility for global pov-
erty because, in his view, it contains an inaccurate understanding of outcome 
responsibility. In Miller’s reading, Pogge focuses on outcome responsibility by 
wealthy Western states; for Pogge, rich states have a remedial responsibility 
for their plight because they are responsible for creating it. This creates two 
forward-looking responsibilities: to redesign the international order so it is not 
harmful to the poor and to compensate the poor for what we have done until 
now. Miller argues that for Pogge, Western capacity links us to remedial respon-
sibility: because we and only we could reform the global system, we bear pri-
mary remedial responsibility for global poverty. But for Miller, Pogge errs in 
failing to take seriously the role that a country’s history and culture play in 
poverty. Even if it is not the sole factor, it at least shares responsibility with the 
rules of the global economic order.
 11 Agamben interprets Aristotle’s claim that we are “born with regard to life, but 
existing essentially with regard to the good life” as an example of the way that 
life is included in politics by virtue of its exclusion. It implies, in his view, that 
politics is “the place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in 
which what had to be politicized was always already bare life. In Western poli-
tics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the 
city of men” (Agamben 1998, 7).
 12 This is one reason why for Agamben just emphasizing the sacredness of bare life, 
such as through the discourse on human rights, is not sufficient to ensure inclu-
sion in political life.
 13 As De La Durantaye has pointed out, the reason why Agamben saw homo sacer 
as a paradigmatic figure of our time, despite its small historical significance, is 
that this exceptional figure is becoming increasingly the rule. States of excep-
tion, in which homo sacer lives after his exile, are no longer exceptional but an 
increasing part of our political landscape (De La Durantaye 2009, 238).
 14 Agier (2008, 15). Rather than by “being-in-the-world,” which Heidegger took 
to be a constitutive feature of human beings.
 15 Bauman (2007, 38).
Home 
By Warsan Shire
no one leaves home unless
home is the mouth of a shark
you only run for the border
when you see the whole city running as well
you have to understand,
that no one puts their children in a boat
unless the water is safer than the land
no one burns their palms
under trains
beneath carriages
no one spends days and nights in the stomach of a truck
feeding on newspaper unless the miles travelled
means something more than journey.
no one crawls under fences







sucking our country dry
niggers with their hands out
they smell strange
savage
messed up their country and now they want
to mess ours up
how do the words
the dirty looks
roll off your backs
maybe because the blow is softer
than a limb torn off
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or the words are more tender
than fourteen men between
your legs




than your child body
in pieces.1
As I write this book, scarcely a day goes by without the global refugee cri-
sis making the front page. The numbers around the Syrian refugee crisis 
are well known—as of May 2016, more than 50% of the population of 
Syria has been displaced, 5 million people have left Syria, and an astounding 
11.5% of its population have been killed or seriously wounded. These num-
bers of course do not capture the sorrow and agony of people who have seen 
their young children killed or starved, men brutally tortured, and women 
experiencing the violence of war that is known all too well. As Shire makes 
clear in the poem above, “no one puts their children in a boat unless the 
water is safer than the land.” Nor do the numbers capture the experiences 
of the millions of others around the world who have been displaced from 
their homes and eagerly await some kind of durable solution. Yet for most 
of the forcibly displaced in Syria and elsewhere around the world, solutions 
do not come quickly, and very often, they do not come at all.
This is the experience that is at the forefront of this book. The focus of 
this book has been the moral dimension of how the displaced are treated 
between the time of their exile and when they are finally able to find a per-
manent durable solution. I have been arguing for a number of moral obliga-
tions that we have to all forcibly displaced people, people who cannot find a 
state to recognize them as a member. The primary moral obligation that we 
have is to reject long-term encampment as a “solution” for displacement, 
or to reform it so that it is in line with moral principles and protects the 
rights and dignity of the displaced. What follows from this is that we have 
an obligation to work towards a just refugee regime, one that takes seriously 
the full human rights of the displaced and not merely the desire of states 
to protect their sovereignty. Discussions about moral obligations to admit 
asylum seekers or resettle refugees must be supplemented with an ethics of 
the temporary, a morally acceptable way to house refugees and allow them 
to live with dignity while they are waiting to be resettled or return to their 
home countries. Whatever else we owe to refugees, we must take seriously 
the problem of large-scale, protracted refugee situations and the use of refu-
gee camps to deny the displaced basic rights and political participation for 
prolonged periods of time.
This is not to say that we should ignore the importance of long-term solu-
tions such as resettlement, far from it. But even if one believes that resettle-
ment is an important moral obligation, we still ought to see encampment as 
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a distinct moral issue. The goal of this book was neither to provide solutions 
to the global refugee crisis nor to put forth policy prescriptions for how an 
individual state ought to handle refugee issues, but instead to show the impor-
tance of focusing on how the forcibly displaced are treated while they are 
between homes and to demonstrate the moral imperative to reform the cur-
rent refugee regime.
Further, I sought to challenge how refugee camps are understood. Though 
generally believed to be not very nice places, the extent to which they vio-
late human rights and undermine human dignity is less well known. As Ben 
Rawlence has recently put it, the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya “was, 
according to Oxfam, ‘a public health emergency’, and had been for several 
years. It was a groaning, filthy, disease-ridden slum heaving with trauma-
tized people without enough to eat. Crime was sky high and rape was rou-
tine” (Rawlence 2016, 36). Many scholars question whether human rights 
can be protected even in principle in refugee camps since one of the most 
foundational human rights, the right to freedom of movement, is denied in 
these spaces.
Yet the treatment of the displaced is either downplayed or ignored in 
part because refugee camps are seen as exceptional and temporary. Yet as 
I have made clear in this book, this is far from the case. Far from being 
exceptional, encampment in some form is now the standard way of dealing 
with large-scale refugee movements; far from being temporary, the average 
length of time for displacement is close to 20 years. Yet it is hard for many 
to acknowledge that this is the status quo. “The status quo,” writes Raw-
lence, “is dependent upon not recognizing the refugees as humans. Because 
to do so would be to acknowledge that they have rights. And to recognize 
those rights would be to occasion a reckoning with history that would be 
too traumatic, and it would make the conditions under which they live a 
crime” (Rawlence 2016, 184–185). It is much easier to believe that refugees 
are a problem than to acknowledge the extent of the harm that is done to 
them. Yet as Shire makes clear in the poem, even this demonization and 
dehumanization is better than what many refugees are fleeing from; “the 
words are more tender than fourteen men between your legs . . . than rub-
ble, than bone, than your child body in pieces.”
An important facet of my argument is that we must take seriously not 
only the current state of forced displacement, but also the current politi-
cal consensus regarding our moral and legal obligations to refugees. In the 
view of many in the West, states have no legal obligation to resettle refugees 
or other forcibly displaced people, they recognize no moral obligation to 
resettle refugees, and are unlikely to resettle large numbers of refugees. The 
exclusion of refugees is a justifiable act of state sovereignty, whether or not 
it is motivated by the kind of xenophobia described in the poem with which 
this chapter began. Though I think this view is morally objectionable in a 
number of ways, we must nonetheless take it seriously as a starting point in 
order to ask what moral obligations flow from these circumstances. Given 
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what Western states and their populations regard as their interests and as 
the limits of their duties, large-scale mandated resettlement is not likely to 
be a realistic solution to the current and growing phenomenon of forced dis-
placement. This is in part why it becomes so crucial to take this in between 
period seriously. To conclude, let me briefly summarize how I argued for 
this conclusion and then look at some alternative arrangements for ethically 
treating refugees while they are displaced.
I began with a detailed examination of the refugee protection regime and 
the different normative obligations that states have to refugees. By looking 
at how solutions to the problem of refugees have evolved, from resettlement 
to repatriation to containment, it became evident that there was a moral 
ideal that underlies our reliance on the practice of containment: contain-
ment is tacitly justified as an unfortunate but necessary step to achieve what 
is ultimately best for refugees, repatriation. Though this interpretation of 
containment sees it as motivated by a moral ideal, it is nonetheless a politi-
cal choice that is highly questionable. Refugee camps have come to function 
as the de facto “fourth” durable solution even though they often systemi-
cally violate basic human rights and undermine human dignity. Yet despite 
this, containment is a practice that Western states continue to support.
Next, I provided an overview of the ways that our moral obligations 
to refugees have been understood philosophically, through examining the 
work of six contemporary philosophers (Walzer, Miller, Wellman, Ben-
habib, Carens, and Gibney). These theorists, though concerned with the 
broad question of what justice requires with respect to the treatment of 
refugees, focus predominantly on the obligations raised by refugees for 
Western states in terms of resettlement. Though they all agree that the 
fact that people are forcibly displaced from their states is an injustice that 
creates moral obligations for other states, they differ as to what moral 
obligations we, as relatively wealthy Western states, have to the displaced. 
There was no consensus on this issue. Walzer, Miller, and Wellman all set 
strong limits on our obligations to resettle refugees. Though I disagreed 
with their views for a number of reasons, my primary criticism was that 
they have little or nothing to say about what happens to those whom states 
refuse to resettle and who are unable to be repatriated within a reasonable 
amount of time. Though Benhabib, Carens, and Gibney argue for much 
more extensive obligations to refugees, I suggested that they too do not say 
enough about how refugees should be treated in the period between their 
initial displacement and their repatriation or resettlement. As I argued, the 
duty to resettle needs to be supplemented with an ethics of the temporary, 
a morally acceptable way to house refugees and allow them to live with 
dignity while they are waiting to be resettled or to return to their home 
countries.
In Chapter Three, I showed the importance of analyzing the problem of 
forced displacement from the perspective of continental theorists like Arendt, 
Agamben, and Agier, and the importance of attending to the ontological as 
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well as political harms of forced displacement. Using the work of Hannah 
Arendt, I established that forced displacement entails two distinct harms 
that must be analyzed separately. The first harm is the legal or political 
harm, namely the loss of a political community and a legal identity in the 
form of citizenship. This was an important loss in Arendt’s view because it 
is only within a political community that human rights can be protected. 
Her view remains true, I argued, because despite over 50 years of changes 
in international law and human rights conventions around stateless people 
and refugees, the rights of refugees remain fundamentally precarious outside 
the nation-state.
Yet for Arendt, herself a refugee, this was not the most important loss for 
refugees. For her, forced displacement entails an ontological deprivation, a 
loss which is deepened by the practices around prolonged encampment. It is 
a reduction to bare life, an expulsion from the common realm of humanity, 
and a denial of meaningful agency. The ontological deprivation, I suggest, 
constitutes a distinct moral harm to refugees. I show that taking seriously 
the ontological deprivation of statelessness has important consequences for 
how we think about our moral obligations. My explication of the ontological 
deprivation serves to support my argument that we have a moral obligation 
to reject encampment as a solution to the problem of forced displacement. 
Further, once we take seriously the ontological deprivation as a distinct 
harm, other ways we ought to help the displaced become more evident. We 
ought to think about ways that refugees may be able to keep a meaningful 
political identity and resist a reduction to bare life, even though they may 
be formally bereft of citizenship or political membership. Though we have 
had limited success in addressing the political harm of forced displacement, 
namely a lack of citizenship (i.e., through resettling or repatriation), there 
are nonetheless other ways to address the ontological deprivation (some of 
which I discuss in the next section). Refugee policy, supported by Western 
states, ought to be concerned with addressing the ontological deprivation of 
statelessness, through affirming the agency of refugees, and not merely the 
political harm of a loss of citizenship.
In Chapter Four I dealt with perhaps the most challenging problem of 
global justice, responsibility. Who is or ought to be responsible for imple-
menting the moral obligations I have argued for throughout this book? 
I looked at three models of global responsibility (developed by Young, 
Miller, and Pogge) that are alternatives to traditional models of responsibil-
ity. Drawing from these alternatives, I suggested that we think about many 
of the harms associated with the treatment of the forcibly displaced as struc-
tural injustices that give rise to political responsibility. The way that Iris 
Young describes it, structural injustices are not the result of deliberate harm 
or explicitly unjust policies, but the unintentional outcome of the actions of 
different agents, each working for her own morally acceptable ends. It refers 
to situations in which something is morally wrong, but there is no clear 
causal explanation or clear intention on someone’s behalf to cause the harm.
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That the displaced are often forced to live in squalid camps for decades is 
clearly a moral injustice; yet this injustice is neither the result of the deliber-
ate policies of a given state intended to harm the displaced nor the result 
of ill intentions on the part of international agencies or others. It arises as 
a consequence of various sovereign states acting according to their inter-
ests and encouraging international organizations like the UNHCR to do 
what seems best for the displaced, namely keeping them in camps close to 
their countries of origin, for their own safety and for the sake of facilitating 
repatriation. No state is doing anything illegal, or, for the most part, even 
immoral, since they are acting to protect their citizens and the interests of 
their states; in principle at least, they are even acting in the interest of the 
displaced themselves. Nonetheless these processes create structural barriers 
that prevent the displaced from seeking asylum and accessing resources, 
such as security, education, and health care and ultimately a permanent 
solution. Seeing the injustices around the refugee regime, especially encamp-
ment, as structural allows us to avoid the question of moral culpability and 
focus instead on remedying the injustice.
To be clear, there are also many straightforward harms associated with 
the refugee regime: repatriating legitimate asylum seekers, preventing refu-
gees from accessing territory to claim asylum, sexual violence perpetrated by 
NGO workers, police in host states, and UN officials, for example. Further, 
the failure to resettle large numbers of refugees who cannot be repatriated 
in a reasonable amount of time represents a moral failure of an international 
system that was designed to find solutions for displaced people. Yet I think 
it is still helpful to think of encampment as a structural injustice, since it 
helps us to get at a more robust account of responsibility. Unless we move 
beyond examining the morality of individual decisions (such as whether or 
not it is morally permissible for a particular state to exclude refugees), we 
cannot address the structural features of global injustice.
Further, I argued that we ought to understand our responsibility for 
global displacement as a remedial responsibility. We are responsible for fix-
ing the problem in front of us because of the various ways we are connected 
to the situation, even though we did not cause it. In order to determine 
remedial responsibility we ought to expand the way we think about our 
connection to global displacement and the refugee regime. The ground for 
our remedial responsibility is our co-participation in a global system from 
which Western states derive significant benefits. All three models require us 
to interrogate much more deeply the ways in which we (as representatives 
of Western states, citizens of these states, members of the international com-
munity, funders of the UNHCR, etc.) are connected to both the causes of 
global displacement and the outcome, namely, prolonged encampment and 
violations of rights.
While this book is not about solutions, I hope it will help us to find better 
ways to deal with the growing phenomenon of forced displacement and give 
a stronger ground for our ethical obligations to the forcibly displaced. While 
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the goal of this book is not to provide an alternative to the status quo—there 
are many other scholars2 and NGOs working on this problem—it is intended 
to provide the moral basis for why it is urgent to consider and support alter-
natives. Once we see the current refugee regime as a moral injustice, what 
policies and practices should we support? Below, I examine a few of the 
policies that are promising.
Two policies that ought to go hand in hand are supporting resettlement 
as a duty of states and policies of local integration while refugees await 
resettlement or repatriation. As Carens has argued, we have duties to refu-
gees both in the long and short term (Carens 2013). There has been much 
philosophical analysis about what we owe refugees in the long term in terms 
of resettlement and asylum. Since I discussed this debate at length in Chapter 
Two, suffice it to say here that I am sympathetic to the view that we ought to 
consider resettlement not merely an act of charity, but a duty. Once we take 
long-term displacement as a norm in our globalized world, it is imperative 
that states resettle refugees in a much more robust and fair way than they 
currently do. As Carens argued, states ought to take in an appropriate num-
ber based on their causal responsibility, absorptive capacity, ability to assim-
ilate, and what refugees themselves want. This would be an essential feature 
of any ideal refugee regime, one that we certainly ought to work towards.
What about the short term? What policies should we support for refugees 
while they are waiting to be resettled or repatriated, given that this may 
be years or even decades and that many of them will never be resettled or 
able to return to their homes? It is here where there is the greatest need 
for creative solutions. One possibility that I see as particularly promising is 
temporary local integration, where refugees live as part of the communities 
that they find themselves in until a more permanent solution (resettlement 
or repatriation) becomes possible. Smith, for example, argues that tempo-
rary local integration can be used as an interim measure where refugees 
can enjoy the rights set forth in the Refugee Convention while states work 
towards a permanent solution (Smith 2004, 52).
Rather than funding camps as separate from the host state, the UNHCR 
and Western states would fund development projects within host states 
that would benefit the state, its population, as well as refugees who live 
there. Aid would go to improving all public facilities (schools, hospitals, 
job training programs, etc.) and developing the skills and talents of refu-
gees that could be put to use in a host country. The goal is that refugees 
would become increasingly self-reliant and not dependent on international 
aid. In Uganda, for example, refugees are allowed a significant amount of 
economic integration, including the right to work and support in the pursuit 
of other economic opportunities, pending repatriation. In one study of this, 
researchers found that not only do refugees themselves benefit, but they 
positively contribute to local and national economies as well (Betts et al. 
2014). This would go a long way in remediating the ontological deprivation 
of forced displacement.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent also 
views local integration as an important measure, one that is to a certain 
degree inevitable:
More incremental approaches to local integration may help to over-
come states’ resistance to mass naturalization. In all protracted dis-
placement crises, local integration becomes a reality over time, even 
where such contact is officially proscribed. Marriages, education and 
employment can all help to build informal links between displaced and 
host communities, but a lack of official status means these gains are 
precarious. . . . States should accept the inevitability of a degree of local 
integration and consider what forms of formal status might be granted 
to some displaced groups. Permanent residency, for instance, might be 
granted to refugees who own businesses, hold a high school diploma or 
can fill recognized labour shortages. (ICRC 2012)
One problem with this that many philosophers are aware of is that refu-
gees may end up remaining a permanent sub-class of citizens, living in a 
country but never achieving full rights or citizenship. Michael Walzer articu-
lated the moral concern around permanent alienage as follows. For him, 
every immigrant and long-term resident must have at least the potential to 
become a citizen. This is rooted in the idea that polities ought to be com-
posed of equals, and without the possibility of naturalization you would 
have a “little tyranny”; the state would be like a family with live-in servants 
(Walzer 1983). The principle of political justice holds that the process of 
self-determination through which a state defines its political life must be 
open to all residents who work in the economy and are subject to its laws. 
Naturalization can have constraints such as time or qualifications, but it can 
never in principle be completely out of the question.
David Miller (2007) makes a similar point. For him, the worry about per-
manent alienage is particularly problematic for liberal states committed to 
the ideal of equal citizenship. On this view, all members of a political com-
munity must have equal rights and responsibilities, and as such, “second 
class citizens” are morally problematic. What follows from this for Miller 
is that states have the obligation to make immigrants into full citizens and 
grant them the same rights as other permanent members.
I would like to suggest that while we take these concerns seriously, we 
also acknowledge that our current system has implicitly permitted the per-
manent alienage of millions of refugees who live for decades either in refu-
gee camps or urban areas without political status. It is already a moral harm 
that is part of the current status quo. Though the dangers associated with 
permanent alienage are real and important, they are no worse than the cur-
rent dangers refugees are more or less assured of. As such, this worry doesn’t 
reduce the importance of temporary local integration as one method of ethi-
cally treating the displaced while they are awaiting a permanent solution. 
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But perhaps being aware of it will encourage states to find permanent solu-
tions so that, as Walzer hoped, every long-term resident has at least the 
potential to become a citizen.
While reformulating the policies that states rely on to treat the displaced 
during their displacement is crucial, we ought to also support a reformula-
tion of the UNHCR to make it both more effective and more accountable. 
The current funding structure of the UNHCR makes it dependent on donor 
states, and this limits its potential to help the displaced and advocate for 
political solutions. As noted in Chapter One, the UNHCR’s entire budget 
comes from a handful of countries, with the US, Japan, and the EU account-
ing for 94% of all state contributions (Loescher 2012, 6). The problems 
with this funding structure are clear. Because it is dependent on so few states, 
the ability of the UNHCR to operate independently is compromised. This 
is especially true when it might go against the perceived interests of these 
states. The UNHCR, writes Loescher, “is in no position to challenge the 
policies of its funders and host governments” (Loescher 2012, 6). Greater 
financial independence is justifiable on the grounds that the global refugee 
regime ought to work in the interests of the displaced, and it cannot do that 
if it is beholden to donors. While Western states might not want to lose 
control of this organization for fear that the UNHCR will challenge their 
policies on refugees, understandable though it is, this is not a strong moral 
argument for keeping the status quo in place. In order to make it more effec-
tive, we ought to support the mandatory funding of the UNHCR.
Though improving the independence and effectiveness of the UNHCR is 
crucial, it is equally important to make it and other institutions that serve 
the displaced more accountable to the displaced themselves. It is widely 
noted that one of the main disadvantages to the way the UNHCR is cur-
rently structured is that it is largely unaccountable to anyone for violations 
of its mandate. There is no independent monitoring mechanism for the 
1951 Convention as there is for other UN human rights conventions, no 
procedures for overseeing the work of the UNHCR, and no way to make 
independent reports to the UN about its successes and failures. Nor is there 
even minimally an ombudsperson who could hear complaints from refu-
gees and report them to the UN or attempt to resolve them. In order to 
make the UNHCR more accountable, a number of scholars (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005, Loescher 2012) have suggested that there be an 
independent monitoring mechanism or ombudsman to provide oversight 
of states’ activities around refugee protection. This is to help remedy not 
only the problems refugees face, but also their powerlessness to challenge 
decisions or find remedies. This seems like a minimal way that the refugee 
regime could be repaired that would be beneficial to the displaced without 
directly threatening the sovereignty of member states.
I would like to stress that whatever policies we support, they must treat 
refugees as agents and respect their voices. One of the problems identified 
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in Chapter Three is the loss of voice and agency that is part and parcel of 
becoming a refugee. Even though the UNHCR and other agencies are aware 
of this problem and have introduced new methodologies to address it, the 
lack of voice and agency remain problems. As I’ve stressed throughout 
this book, Western states think that the problem for refugees is primarily a 
loss of citizenship, whereas for refugees, at least on a day-to-day basis, the 
problem is the degradation and lack of rights associated with encampment. 
Aleinikoff, for example, suggests that all refugee issues must be considered 
from the bottom up, with refugees participating in both the definition of 
the problem and in finding acceptable solutions. In this sense, international 
assistance should be thought of as facilitative (focused on aiding refugees in 
effectuating their choices) rather than control-based (helping asylum coun-
tries contain refugee flows) (Aleinikoff 1992, 69).
One perspective that follows from this is that we should reject what Ale-
inikoff has called the “membership bias” shared by states, theorists and 
lawyers (Aleinikoff 1992). This bias holds that what refugees want most is 
membership in a new state. Is this unexamined preference for membership 
really justified? Aleinikoff does not think so. “It is at least plausible that 
refugees might prefer an ambiguity and flexibility that does not compel an 
immediate consideration of identity questions and that keeps options open 
for future return or resettlement” (Aleinikoff 1992, 134). This requires us 
to consider other forms of belonging that are not tied to citizenship yet are 
able to protect human rights, both civil and political, as well as social, eco-
nomic, and cultural. Further, solutions must include participation by refu-
gees in the definition both of the problem and the solution. How we should 
prioritize solutions should be left open and determined in consultation with 
the displaced themselves. In the view of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, the “international community therefore needs 
to consider developing creative alternatives to the traditional solutions and 
new ways of viewing citizenship” (ICRC 2012).
Finally, it’s important to keep in mind that the primary problem around 
encampment and forced displacement is not that there is a lack of solu-
tions; the problem is a lack of moral determination to change the status quo. 
As the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent put it, 
“there is no shortage of innovative approaches that could help to alleviate 
the trauma of extended exile. However, the difficulty lies not in the new 
ideas, but in escaping the old ones. Solving protracted displacement is not 
impossible, but it requires political will. The misery of prolonged displace-
ment has become ‘normal’, because many states have effectively decided 
that the misery of excluded forced migrants is an unfortunate price worth 
paying to avoid having to confront the difficult political questions raised 
by the injustices and inequalities of a bordered world” (ICRC 2012, 228). 
It is my hope that this book has contributed to making clear that the cur-
rent status quo for refugees ought to be intolerable for those of us in the 
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West concerned with justice and human rights and that our indifference to 
this problem is not acceptable. This would be a first step towards challeng-
ing protracted encampment and the harms associated with it, and working 
towards a more just refugee regime.
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